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Résumé 
 
Ce mémoire porte sur la responsabilité pénale des entreprises canadiennes pour des crimes 
internationaux commis en partie ou entièrement à l’étranger. 
  
Dans la première partie, nous montrons que les premiers développements sur la 
reconnaissance de la responsabilité criminelle d’entités collectives devant les tribunaux 
militaires établis après la deuxième guerre mondiale n’ont pas été retenus par les tribunaux 
ad hoc des Nations Unies et par la Cour pénale internationale.  En effet, la compétence 
personnelle de ces tribunaux permet uniquement de contraindre des personnes physiques 
pour des crimes internationaux. 
  
Dans la deuxième partie, nous offrons des exemples concrets illustrant que des entreprises 
canadiennes ont joué dans le passé et peuvent jouer un rôle criminel de soutien lors de 
guerres civiles et  de conflits armés au cours desquels se commettent des crimes 
internationaux.  Nous montrons que le droit pénal canadien permet d’attribuer une 
responsabilité criminelle à une organisation (compagnie ou groupe non incorporé) pour des 
crimes de droit commun commis au Canada, comme auteur réel ou comme complice. Nous 
soutenons qu’il est également possible de poursuivre des entreprises canadiennes devant les 
tribunaux canadiens pour des crimes internationaux commis à l’extérieur du Canada, en 
vertu de la Loi canadienne sur les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre, du 
principe de la compétence universelle et des règles de droit commun.      
  
Bref, le Canada est doté d’instruments juridiques et judiciaires pour poursuivre des 
entreprises soupçonnées de crimes internationaux commis à l’étranger et peut ainsi mettre 
un terme à leur état indésirable d’impunité.  
 
Mots-clés : entreprises, droit pénal international, crimes internationaux, Canada, 
compétence universelle, responsabilité collective 
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Abstract 
 
This master’s thesis examines the criminal liability of Canadian corporations for their 
involvement in international crimes committed in part or entirely overseas.  
  
First, we observe that initial developments by the military tribunals established after the 
Second World War in recognizing criminal liability of collective entities were not pursued 
by the United Nations ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court.  In fact, the 
personal jurisdiction of the latter tribunals does not extend to organizations and is limited to 
the prosecution of natural persons accused of committing international crimes.  
  
In the second part of this thesis, we offer concrete examples to illustrate that Canadian 
corporations have assumed and continue to assume criminal roles in supporting civil wars 
and armed conflicts where international crimes are committed.  We will demonstrate that 
Canadian criminal law attributes criminal liability to an organization (corporations or 
unincorporated groups) for common law offences committed in Canada, under direct or 
accomplice liability.  We further maintain that Canadian corporations may be prosecuted 
before Canadian courts for their involvement in international crimes committed overseas, in 
accordance with the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, the principle of 
universal jurisdiction and common law rules.    
  
In conclusion, Canada has the necessary legal and judicial instruments to prosecute 
corporations suspected of committing international crimes overseas and is therefore capable 
of ending their undesirable status of impunity.  
 
Keywords : corporations, international criminal law, Canada, universal jurisdiction, 
collective liability 
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It is a sad truism that there is nothing that people will not do to other people. 
This may be at the individual level, as with the psychopathic serial murderer, 
but it is particularly the case with regard to collective behaviour. This can 
occur in groups, institutions and organizations driven by ideology, 
patriotism, extreme belief in a leader, kinship or clanship, by racial hatred or 
by religious fanaticism. People become absorbed in the group and, within its 
solidarity, restraints are removed and they commit acts they would almost 
certainly never contemplate doing as individuals. To a degree then, the 
organization or collective is complicit ( - Maurice Punch).1   
Introduction 
 
On 23 March 2005, representatives of an indigenous community organization from 
the municipality of Mindanao of the Philippines travelled to Canada.  The purpose of their 
travel was to testify against the operations of a Canadian mining company, TVI, on their 
territory before the Subcommittee on the Human Rights Concerns of the Indigenous and 
Community of Men and Women of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (hereinafter, “SCFAIT”).2 The Subanon people alleged that on 17 
March 2004, TVI’s heavy equipment vehicles advanced on protesters and that TVI 
paramilitary guards shot into the ground and wounded four picketers.3   
 
Following this hearing and a recommendation of the Subcommittee, SCFAIT 
prepared a report in 2005 which called on the Canadian government to “establish clear legal 
norms in Canada to ensure that Canadian companies and residents are held accountable 
when there is evidence of environmental and/or human rights violations associated with the 
activities of Canadian mining companies”.4   
                                                 
1  Maurice Punch, “Why corporations kill and get away with it: the failure of law to cope with crime in 
organizations” in André Nollkaemper & Harmen Van Der Wilt, eds., System Criminality in International 
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 42 at 42.  
2  Mining Watch Canada, Newsletter, 19, “House of Commons tells Government – ‘Regulate Canadian 
Mining Companies Abroad – Investigate TVI Pacific in the Philippines’” (2005), at 5, online: Mining 
Watch Canada <http://www.miningwatch.ca/sites/miningwatch.ca/files/MWC_newsletter_19.pdf> 
(accessed 27 January 2010).   
3  Ibid. 
4  Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade [SCFAIT], Fourteenth Report: 
Mining in Developing Countries-Corporate Social Responsibility, 38th Parliament, 1st sess., (Ottawa: 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2005) at 3.  See also National Roundtables on 
Corporate Social Responsibility Advisory Group, National Roundtables on Corporate Social 
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As a response to these recommendations, the Government of Canada’s Department 
of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (hereinafter, “DFAIT”) hosted a series of 
national roundtables through the office of its National Contact Point (hereinafter, “NCP”)5 
from June to November 2006 in the cities of Vancouver, Toronto, Calgary and Montreal.  
The objective of the roundtables was to examine the position of Canadian extractive sector 
companies operating in developing countries and their capacity to meet or exceed leading 
international corporate social responsibility (hereinafter, “CSR”) standards and best 
practices.6   
 
A report was subsequently released on 29 March 2007 by the Advisory Group of 
the National Roundtables with recommendations that are not binding but are recognized by 
the Government of Canada as “a valuable input to a government response”.7 The Advisory 
Group outlined the challenges faced by Canadian extractive companies operating in 
developing countries’ conflict zones or in areas where they perceive the need to protect 
their operations through the employment of armed security forces.8   Concomitantly, the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Responsibility and the Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing Countries (29 March 2007), online: 
The Mining Association of Canada 
 <http://www.mining.ca/www/media_lib/MAC_Documents/Publications/CSRENG.pdf> (accessed 14 
April 2010), at vi, xiv [hereinafter, Advisory Group Report]. 
5  OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarifications, OECD Doc. 
DAFFE/IME/WPG (2000) 15/FINAL, revised 31 October 2001 [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. (The 
National Contact Point (NCP) acts as a forum to deal with any questions having to do with the 
operations of multinational corporations); DFAIT, Canada's National Contact Point (NCP) for the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), online: DFAIT <http://www.ncp-
pcn.gc.ca/national_contact-en.asp> (accessed 27 January 2010) (Canada’s NCP is located at the 
Investment Trade Policy Division (TBI), 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G2.  E-mail: 
ncp.pcn@international.ca; tel.: (613) 996-3324; fax (613) 944-0679.  In April 2008, a process was 
initiated to transfer the role of NCP chair and coordinator from the Investment Trade Policy Division to 
the Trade Commissioner Service Overseas Operations Division). 
6  DFAIT, The National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility, online: DFAIT 
<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/current_discussions/csr-roundtables-en.aspx> (accessed 8 
December 2006 and 14 April 2010)  
7  Ibid., See also Advisory Group Report, supra note 4, at vi, xiv (So far, two of the Report’s 
recommendations have been implemented.  First, Canada announced its support for the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, pursuant to recommendation 4.1.2.4, including a contribution of 
$1,150,000 to the EITI Trust Fund over the next four years.  Second, Canada enhanced the public 
reporting of the Canada Investment Fund for Africa, pursuant to recommendation 2.3.2.2).   
8  Advisory Group Report, ibid. at 6. 
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Report sustained that some of the countries in which these companies operate are unable or 
unwilling to enact and enforce laws that ensure compliance with fundamental human rights 
and basic environmental protection.9   
 
The question of accountability of Canadian corporate operations on overseas 
territories has thus become a concern deliberated on a national level.  This thesis will 
attempt to respond in part to the question by demonstrating that legal mechanisms do exist 
in Canada for the prosecution of Canadian corporations before Canadian courts for 
international crimes committed on overseas territories. 
 
Historical Background 
 
The first part of this thesis will provide a historical background and describe the 
development of international criminal justice related to punishment of collective action to 
establish the absence of jurisdiction of international courts for the prosecution of 
corporations.  On an introductory level, it is important to mention that since the adoption of 
the Peace Treaty of Versailles10 that concluded the First World War, there were a number 
of proposals and failed attempts by the UN General Assembly to create a permanent and 
effective international justice forum for the prosecution of alleged offenders for 
international crimes.11  
 
It therefore became necessary to set up two international military tribunals 
following the Second World War for the purpose of judging the atrocities committed by the 
                                                 
9  Ibid. at 41. 
10  The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, (1919) L.N.T.S 34 
(entered into force 28 June 1919) [hereinafter, the Peace Treaty of Versailles] 
11  Hervé Ascensio, Emmanuel Decaux & Alain Pellet, Droit international pénal (Paris : Éditions A. 
Pedone, 2000); See also Chérif Bassiouni, Introduction au droit pénal (Brussels : Émile Bruylant, 2002) 
and Antonio Cassese & Mireille Delmas-Marty, eds., Juridictions nationales et crimes internationaux 
(Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2002) (For a history of the discussions and proposals to create 
an international criminal court). 
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Nazi and Japanese regimes from 1939 to 1945.  These tribunals were named the 
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals in Nuremberg 
(hereinafter, the “Nuremberg Tribunal” or the “IMT”) and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter, the “Tokyo Tribunal” or the “IMTFE”).  Their 
charters allowed for a declaration of criminality of a group or organization of which an 
accused individual was a member12 and convictions of individuals for conspiracy to wage 
aggressive war.13  A series of trials were thereafter conducted in the Allied Countries of the 
Second World War which held individual senior company officials, criminal organizations 
and conspirators criminally responsible for actively assisting the Nazi regime and 
contributing to the war. 
 
Despite these advancements, the absence of a permanent and neutral adjudicating 
body with worldwide jurisdiction to punish the criminals of international crimes prevented 
the United Nations from carrying out effective sanctions to curtail the spread of violence 
and killing which continued to plague various regions of the world.   
 
In the interval of international negotiations for the creation of an international 
criminal court, and in response to devastating conflicts and increased threats to worldwide 
peace and security, the international community reacted in 1993, with the United Nations 
Security Council’s creation of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the 
                                                 
12  Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Annex to the Agreement for the prosecution and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, art. 9(1), 
online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=3ae6b39614> 
(accessed 17 April 2010)  [hereinafter, London Charter] and Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Special Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers at 
Tokyo, 19 January 1946, amended 26 April 1946, TIAS No. 1589, reprinted in 4 Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States of America 27 (1946), art. 5 [hereinafter, Charter of the 
IMTFE]. 
13  London Charter, ibid., art. 6 (a) and Charter of the IMTFE, ibid. art. 5 (a). 
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Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereinafter, the “ICTY”).14 The following 
year, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda 
(hereinafter, the “ICTR”) to judge the genocide and other serious crimes committed in the 
country from 1 January to 31 December 1994.15 
 
The personal jurisdiction of each tribunal extends only to natural persons16 for three 
distinct violations of international humanitarian law: crimes against humanity, crimes 
against the laws and customs of war (or “grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 
1949”) and genocide.17  Previous developments on corporate accountability were not 
pursued to include corporations as punishable persons under the Statutes of the ad hoc 
tribunals. Nevertheless, the concept of individual responsibility for participation in 
collective crimes was re-defined and expanded, particularly under notions of complicity, 
common purpose liability and other modes of participation in international crimes.18 
 
Discussions continued on the topic of including jurisdiction for legal persons in the 
framework of proposals to create a permanent international criminal court. The project lay 
                                                 
14  Ana Bijelic, Hélène Dumont & Anne-Marie Boisvert,  “Le système de justice des pays de l’ex-
Yougoslavie et les défis de l’administration de la justice pénale internationale” in Hélène Dumont & 
Anne-Marie Boisvert, eds., La voie vers la Cour pénale internationale : tous les chemins mènent à Rome 
(Montréal : Les Éditions Thémis, Inc., 2004), 225 at 260.  The ICTY was established under the Statute 
of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES 808 (1993), S/RES/827 (1993), S/RES/1166 (1998), annex, S/RES/1329 (2000), 
S/RES/1411 (2002), S/RES/1431 (2002) annexes I & II, S/RES/1481 (2003), annex, S/RES/1597 
(2005), annex, S/RES/1660 (2006), annex, S/RES/1837 (2008), annex, S/RES/1877 (2009), annex, 
online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf> [hereinafter, 
ICTY Statute] 
15  The ICTR was established under the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, 
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 3453rd mtg., U.N. doc. S/RES/955 (1994), S/RES/1165 (1998), S/RES/1329 
(2000), S/RES/(2002), S/RES/1431 (2002), S/RES/1503 (2003), S/RES/1512 (2003), S/RES/1534 
(2004), S/RES/1684 (2006), S/RES/1717 (2006), online: ICTR 
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf>  (accessed 14 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
ICTR Statute]. 
16  ICTR Statute, ibid, art. 5; ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 6. 
17  ICTR Statute, ibid., art. 2 (genocide), 3 (crimes against humanity), 4 (violations of article 3 common to 
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II); ICTY Statute, ibid., art. 2 (grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949), 3 (law and customs of war), 4 (genocide), 5 (crimes against humanity). 
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dormant until 1992, when an original draft statute for the establishment of an international 
criminal court was submitted by the preparatory committee to the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference in Rome on Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court in 1998 (hereinafter, the “Rome Conference”)19.   
 
The Court was finally established by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (hereinafter, the “Rome Statute”) on 17 July 199820  and entered into force on 1 July 
2002 with sixty (60) State Parties. Today, one hundred and eleven (111) States have 
become Parties to the Statute21.  With regards to previous discussions on corporate 
accountability, the Rome Conference decided that “the Court shall have jurisdiction over 
natural persons”22 only pursuant to article 25 of the Rome Statute.  At the same time, this 
article details at length various modes of participation to reinforce individual responsibility 
for collective and mass scale international crimes.   
 
Notions: Group Entities, Corporations and Universal Jurisdiction 
 
The need to delineate rules of liability for group action in international law stems 
from the very nature of the core crimes defined by the international courts.  These offences 
are listed in article 5 (1) of the Rome Statute, which provides the Court jurisdiction over 
                                                                                                                                                    
18  ICTR Statute, ibid., art. 6; ICTY Statute, ibid., art. 7.   
19  United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Official Records, A/CONF.183/13, Rome, 15 June - 17 July 1998, Volumes I, II, & III, 
available at online: United Nations <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/icc-1998/icc-
1998.html> (accessed 14 April 2010) [hereinafter, Rome Conference]. 
20  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9 (adopted on 17 July 1998 and corrected by procès-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 
July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002.  Entered into force 
on 1 July 2002), online: United Nations 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf> (accessed 14 April 2010) 
[hereinafter, Rome Statute]. 
21 International Criminal Court, ICC at a Glance, online: ICC <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/icc%20at%20a%20glance?lan=en-
GB> (accessed   14 April 2010).  
22  Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 25(1). 
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“the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”23 and are 
identified as: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.24  
Importantly, each of these crimes requires a systemic form of participation in their 
commission, either through the perpetration of criminal acts committed as part of a policy 
or on a large-scale for war crimes25; or when committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack for crimes against humanity. “Widespread” refers to a large number of 
victims and “systematic” implies a high degree of organization, pursuant to a plan or policy 
instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group.26  Finally, 
                                                 
23  Ibid., art. 5(1).  
24  Ibid., art. 5(1)(a)(b)(c)(d). See also art. 5(2) with regards to the crime of aggression, which states: “The 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance 
with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” An amendment was recently adopted by the Assembly 
of States Parties to define and provide jurisdiction for the crime of aggression at the Review Conference 
of the International Criminal Court which took place from 31 May to 11 June 2010.  According to this 
amendment, the Conference included the following definition of aggression: “the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the 
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”. See Review Conference of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, The Crime of Aggression, RC/Res.6, 13th plenary mtg., 
Annex I (2010), at art. 2 (1), online: ICC <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-
Res.6-ENG.pdf> (accessed 29 June  2010) [hereinafter, RC/Res.6]].  This definition is based on the 
resolution, United Nations, Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX),  29th Sess., 2319th mtg. 
(1974) 142 (see Assembly of States Parties, Review Conference of the Rome Statute Concludes in 
Kampala, Press Release ICC-ASP-20100612-PR546 (12 June 2010), online: ICC <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/review%20conference%20of%20the%20ro
me%20statute%20concludes%20in%20kampala> (accessed 29 June 2010).  The amendment will only 
be implemented after 17 July 2017 (See RC/Res.6, ibid. at art. 3(3)).  It remains to be seen how Canada 
and other national jurisdictions will integrate the new amendment in their domestic legislations and 
whether the distinction between natural and legal persons will be made therewith. For the moment, 
Canada only provides jurisdiction for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide in its Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24 [hereinafter, CAHWCA] which will be one of 
the main focuses of this thesis. 
25  Ibid., art. 8.    
26  Ibid., art. 7.  See also The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy & 
Rights and Democracy, International Criminal Court.  Manual for the Ratification and Implementation 
of the Rome Statute, 3d ed., (Vancouver: University of British Columbia ICCLR, March 2008), at 75. 
Online: Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
<http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICC_Manual_-_March_2008_-_ICLR.pdf> (accessed 14 April 
2010) [hereinafter, Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute]. 
8 
 
 
genocide, the “crime of crimes”27 is considered unique and the most reprehensible crime 
because of “its element of dolus specialis (special intent) to destroy in whole or in part a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group”28, thus requiring an amount of premeditation and 
thought invested in committing the crime shared by a group of persons.29  
 
Collective entities likely to partake in core international crimes of the international 
tribunals, whilst having a legitimate purpose of existence, include armies, militias, ethnic 
groups, religious associations, government institutions, police forces and others.30   The 
Criminal Code of Canada31 (hereinafter, the “Criminal Code”) also defines “entity” under 
the provisions related to terrorism charges as “a person, group, trust, partnership or fund or 
an unincorporated association or organization”.32 
 
                                                 
27  Prosecutor v. Kambanda, ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, Case (4 September 1998) at para. 
39(x) [hereinafter, Kambanda] in Wibke K. Timmerman, “The Relationship between Hate Propaganda 
and Incitement to Genocide: A New Trend in International Law Towards Criminalization of Hate 
Propaganda?” (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 257, at 272. (Genocide was named the 
“crime of crimes” by Judge Laïty Kama of the ICTR in Kambanda because of its special intent 
requirement that is not included in the other international crimes). 
28  Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Sentence (2 October 1998) (International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, Trial Chamber), online: ICTR 
<http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/ak81002e.html> (accessed 16 April 2010) 
[hereinafter, Akayesu].  Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, [1951] ICJ Rep.  1951, 15 at 23 cited in International Committee of the 
Red Cross, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948.  
Introduction, online: ICRC, International Humanitarian Law – Treaties and Documents 
<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/357?OpenDocument> (accessed 16 April 2010). 
29   André Nollkaemper, “Introduction” in Nollkaemper & Van Der Wilt, supra note 1, 1 at 12-13 (for the 
study of the systemic and collective nature of international crimes). 
30  See generally, Nollkaemper &  Van Der Wilt, supra note 1 at 1-353.  See also Joseph Rikhof, 
“Complicity in International Criminal Law and Canadian Refugee Law. A Comparison” (2006) 4 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 702 at 712-713 (defining non-brutal organizations as “entities 
that have a legitimate purpose, but have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity outside its 
main function and incidental to its mandate”). 
31  R.S. C. 1985, c. C-46. 
32  Ibid., s. 83.01 (1). 
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Namely, States’ responsibility has been engaged for acts of its organs, including 
certain types of corporations, in violation of international law before the International Court 
of Justice (hereinafter, the “ICJ”).33   
 
The corporation is, in fact, by its very essence and definition, the perfect model of a 
collective entity.  Generally, it is referred to as “a body formed and authorized by law to 
act as a single person although constituted by one or more persons and legally endowed 
with various rights and duties including the capacity of succession”.34  The etymology of 
the term “derives from the Latin word corpus meaning body, and comes from the Latin 
verb corporare to form into one body, hence a corporation represents a body of people, 
that is a group of people authorized to act as an individual”.35 
 
The capital of a corporation is composed of shares, owned by shareholders, who 
possess a separate legal personality from the corporate entity itself.  This distinction 
between the company and its shareholders is important because, although the shareholders 
invest in the entity, they have very limited rights to the corporate assets.36  It is, in effect, 
                                                 
33  See e.g. Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Judgment, [2007] ICJ Rep. 140, online ICJ: <http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyjudgment/ibhy_ijudgment_20070226_frame.htm> (accessed 4 
November 2007),  General List no. 91, online: ICJ <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf> 
(accessed 16 April 2010) [hereinafter, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro] and Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, Merits, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, 
online ICJ: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf > (accessed 16 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
Nicaragua Case]. 
34  The Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 2009, s.v. “corporation”, online: Merriam Webster Online 
Dictionary <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corporation> (accessed 27 January 2010).  
35  Thomas Clarke, International Corporate Governance, A Comparative Approach (New York: Routledge, 
2007) at 1. 
36  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), [1970] ICJ Rep. 3 at 40-42, 
online ICJ: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/50/5387.pdf> [hereinafter, Barcelona Traction Case]. In 
fact, shareholders are only entitled to the portion of the corporation’s profits allocated to them through 
their shares in the form of dividends and only if the directors use their discretionary right to declare such 
dividends.  They may also be entitled to a portion of residual corporate assets after payment of 
outstanding debts to other creditors upon dissolution and liquidation of the corporation [see Maurice 
Martel & Paul Martel, La compagnie au Québec. Les aspects juridiques (Montreal : Éditions Wilson & 
Lafleur, 2010) at 19-24 – 19-26 and Raymonde Crête & Stéphane Rousseau, Droit des sociétés par 
actions, 2d ed. (Montreal : Les Éditions Thémis, 2008) at 242-252]. 
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the ability of the corporation to act on its own, as a separate personality from its 
shareholders, which caused several authors and national jurisdictions to recognize the 
accountability of the entity itself before the law.   
 
Common law courts were the first to apply criminal sanctions to corporations in the 
late 19th century as large firms, particularly railroads, played an increasingly important role 
in the economy.37 Following the Second World War, corporate entities known as 
“multinational corporations” (hereinafter, “MNC”)’s emerged on a large scale as a product 
of “the combination of large scale overseas investments under an integrated management 
organization”.38 More specifically, the Draft U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 
(hereinafter, the “Draft Norms on Responsibilities of TNC’s and Other”),39 define the MNC 
as “an economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities 
operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home 
country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively”.40  Hansen 
                                                 
37  See e.g. R v Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co. (1842) 3 QB 223 (the first case rendered by an 
English court in 1842 against the railway company Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Co. for its 
failure to obey an order to remove a bridge over a public road).  See also State v. Morris & Essex 
Railroad Company, 23 N.J.L. at. 360 (1852) and Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 
68 Mass. (2 Gray) at  339 (1854), all cited in Peter A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), at 175. 
38  Detlev F. Vagts, “The Multinational Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law” (1969-1970) 
83 Harvard Law Review 739 at 746; Beth Stephens, “The Amorality of Profit: Transnational 
Corporations and Human Rights” (2002) 20 Berkeley Journal of International Law, 45 at 56. 
39  Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), online: UNHCHR 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En> (accessed 
27 April 2010) (a non-binding instrument developed by the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights (“Sub-Commission”), a subsidiary of the former Commission on Human 
Rights) [hereinafter, Draft Norms on Responsibilities of TNC’s and Other]. 
40  Ibid., art. 20 and Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 
(2003) online: University of Minnesota Human Rights Library 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/commentary-Aug2003.html> (accessed 27 April 2010).  See 
David Weissbrodt, “Business and Human Rights” (2005-2006) 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 65 at 66 
(HeinOnline).  See also, Vagts, supra note 38 at 740 (defines the MNE as “a cluster of corporations of 
diverse nationality joined together by ties of common ownership and responsive to a common 
management strategy”).   
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explains that MNCs “typically invest in a foreign country by establishing a directly 
controlled subsidiary endowed with some of its resources”.41 
 
This type of corporation is also commonly referred to with the terms “multinational, 
transnational, corporation, business and enterprise”.42  The terminology “transnational 
corporations” (hereinafter, “TNC”)’s was used during the New International Economic 
Order movement of the 1970s, and is still mostly used by the United Nations and its related 
organs, while the term “multinational” appears more frequently in institutions more closely 
associated with the business community itself, for instance the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (hereinafter, “OECD”) and the International Chamber of 
Commerce43.   The acronym MNC rather than MNE for a “multinational enterprise” will be 
used in this thesis since “corporation” reflects the terminology employed in the commercial 
world for profit-seeking operators,44 as opposed to “enterprise” for unincorporated or 
incorporated not-for-profit entities, such as nongovernmental organizations (hereinafter, 
“NGO”)’s, churches, hospitals, schools, UN organizations and others. This is important 
since “[p]rofit-maximization, if not the only goal of all business activity, is certainly central 
to the endeavor”45 of a corporation.46  The term “corporation” will also be used 
interchangeably with “company” and encompasses MNCs, as well as smaller, single-entity 
corporations in its significance.  Distinctions will nevertheless be made between the terms 
“corporation” and “MNC” in this thesis for legal purposes relating mostly to relevant 
jurisdictions for prosecution.    
 
                                                 
41  Robin F. Hansen, “Multinational Enterprise Pursuit of Minimized Liability: Law, International Business 
Theory and the Prestige Oil Spill” (2008) 2 Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 26, 410 at 413. 
42 L. Wildhaber, “Some Aspects of the Transnational Corporation in International Law” (1980) 27 Neth. 
Int’l L. Rev. 79 at 80 cited in Menno T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi, “Introduction” in Menno T. 
Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi, eds., Liability of Multinational Corporations Under International Law 
(The Hague: Kluwer, 2000) 1 at 2. 
43  Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi, ibid. at 2-3.  
44  Ibid. at 3, n. 4. 
45  Stephens, supra note 38 at 46 
46  Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi, supra note 42 at 3.  
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The important aspect to retain in this regard is “the ability of MNCs to operate 
across national borders and outside the effective supervision of domestic and international 
law”.47  This creates a number of jurisdictional challenges, for example, when determining 
which country has jurisdiction for the acts of a subsidiary operating on a different territory 
than its parent corporation.  
 
These legal barriers are further exacerbated when considering that it is currently 
impossible to prosecute corporations before any of the international criminal tribunals, 
including the ICC.48  At first impression, this would seem to create immunity for 
corporations with regards to violations of international criminal law, representing an 
increasing paradox in the present context of international commerce and globalization.49  
 
 The situation is explained by the International Commission of Jurists as follows: 
 
“The international community has been shocked at reports from all continents 
that companies have knowingly assisted governments, armed rebel groups or 
others to commit gross human rights abuses. Oil and mining companies that seek 
concessions and security have been accused of giving money, weapons, vehicles 
and air support that government military forces or rebel groups use to attack, kill 
and “disappear” civilians. Private air service operators have reportedly been an 
essential part of government programmes of extraordinary and illegal renditions 
of terrorist suspects across frontiers. Private security companies have been 
accused of colluding with government security agencies to inflict torture in 
detention centres they jointly operate. Companies have reportedly given 
information that has enabled a government to detain and torture trade unionists or 
other perceived political opponents. Companies have allegedly sold both tailor-
made computer equipment that enables a government to track and discriminate 
against minorities, and earth-moving equipment used to demolish houses in 
violation of international law. Others are accused of propping up rebel groups 
that commit gross human rights abuses, by buying conflict diamonds”. 50 
                                                 
47  Ibid.  
48  Ibid. at 3-4.  
49  Robert Dufresne, “The Opacity of Oil : Oil Corporations, Internal Violence, and International Law” 
(2004) 36 International Law and Politics 331 at 389.  
50  Ibid. at 345-346 See also International Commission of Jurists, Report of the ICJ Expert Legal Panel on 
Corporate Complicity in International Crimes: Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability. Volume 
1: Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal Path, Vol. 1 (Geneva, 2008), online: UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a78418c2.html> (accessed 17 April 2010) [hereinafter, ICJ 
Expert Panel Report, Vol. I] 
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In many cases, corporate actors deny their involvement in conflicts that affect peace 
in a country by alleging their political neutrality or the positive impact that they have in 
contributing to developing countries’ economy and human rights.51  The need to regulate 
activities and effective neutrality of corporations operating on territories prone to violence 
and conflict is nevertheless increasingly recognized by the international community.52 
 
A question that arises with regards to corporate liability is the practicality and 
usefulness of invoking corporate rather than individual liability.  This thesis does not deny 
the importance of prosecuting both the corporation and its directors, representatives and/or 
officers responsible for international crimes.  It nevertheless sustains that corporate 
accountability is essential with or without individual accountability in certain situations.  
For instance and perhaps the most beneficial reason for prosecuting the corporation is the 
access that a conviction would provide to corporate assets for reparations to victims. In 
addition, corporate accountability has the advantage of avoiding the harsh impact of 
criminal law on individuals, particularly considering the risk of high-level officers 
denouncing lower-ranked officers as scapegoats to avoid personal liability.  Such an 
undesirable phenomenon resembles the difficulties encountered by the military tribunals 
following the Second World War with the concept of criminal liability based on 
membership in criminal organizations that will be described in the first part of this thesis.  
Namely, convictions based on membership in a criminal organization against individuals 
risked undermining important legal safeguards for the accused, including the presumption 
of innocence.53 
 
 Fisse and Braithwaite list the challenges encountered in identifying individual 
criminal liability incurred through corporate activities and collective action, which include: 
“enforcement overload; opacity of internal lines of corporate accountability; expendability 
                                                 
51  Dufresne, ibid. at 363. 
52  Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) at 28-29.  
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of individuals within organizations; corporate separation of those responsible for the 
commission of past offences from those responsible for the prevention of future offences; 
and corporate safe-harbouring of individual suspects”.54   
 
In light of these difficulties and the recognized need for corporate liability, this 
thesis attempts to demonstrate that corporations engaged in the commission of international 
crimes may no longer benefit from impunity at all times, since other jurisdictions and 
venues exist for their prosecution other than the existing international tribunals.  
 
More specifically, criminal jurisdiction originally belonged to the State of 
nationality of the accused, under the doctrine of personal jurisdiction.55  Following the 
French Revolution of 1789, the principles of sovereignty and independence of a State 
gained international recognition and the new basis of jurisdiction in all States became 
territorial.  The advantages of prosecution of a crime before the judicial authorities of the 
territory where the crime was committed include proximity and availability of evidence at 
the location of the crime; and a better prevention of crimes on a State’s own territory.56  In 
contrast, territoriality fails to address situations such as escape of the offender abroad or a 
passive approach adopted by local authorities in punishing a particular crime.57 
 
Since the Second World War, a new conception of international law based on the 
obligation to respect fundamental rights at all costs emerged and began to coexist with the 
principle of sovereignty of States.58   In this regard, a new head of jurisdiction has been 
adopted in various national legislations and identified by legal doctrine as the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                    
53  Ibid. at 28-29, 33, 93-94.  
54  Ibid. at 133.  
55 Valentine Buck, “Première Partie: Droits nationaux. Chapitre 4 - Droit espagnol” in Cassese & Delmas-
Marty, supra note 11, 121 at 126-127.  
56 Damien Vandermeersch, “Troisième Partie : Synthèse générale. Chapitre 3 - La compétence universelle” 
in Cassese & Delmas-Marty, ibid., 589 at 589 and Buck, ibid. at 127.   
57  Ibid. at 128.  
58  Ibid. at 125-126.  
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universality for prosecution of international crimes.59  Its origins date back to the jus-
naturalist periods of the 16h and 17th centuries and the preoccupation of effectively 
punishing high seas piracy.60  It was confirmed as a basis of jurisdiction in 1928 by the 
Permanent International Court of Justice, predecessor of the ICJ in the S.S. Lotus Case.61  
The opinion of the court was that some crimes are so reprehensible and appalling to the 
social conscience that all the tribunals of the world have an interest in prosecuting them.62   
 
The ICJ further maintains that “universal jurisdiction is nearing the status of 
customary law in light of the international consensus that perpetrators of international 
crimes should not have impunity”.63  Each state however has remained sovereign to 
determine the limits of its punitive jurisdiction. This includes extraterritorial jurisdiction for 
crimes committed in a foreign territory and/or by a non-national.64    
                                                 
59   Antonio Cassese, “Troisième Partie: Synthèse générale.  L’incidence du droit international sur le droit 
interne » in Cassese & Delmas-Marty, supra note 11, 555 at 571-576. See also George P. Fletcher, 
«Deuxième Partie : Synthèses régionales. Les pays d’Amérique du Nord. I - Trois modèles de 
compétence universelle » in Cassese & Delmas-Marty, supra note 11, 451 at 467.  
60  Fletcher, ibid. at 451; Buck, supra note 55 at 136.  
61  Case of the S.S. "Lotus" (France v. Turkey), (1927), Judgment, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, 4 at 19 
[hereinafter, the Lotus Case] cited in Roger O’Keefe, “Universal Jurisdiction, Clarifying the Basic 
Concept”, (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice, 735 at 738, n. 12 (The Court judged that 
Turkey had jurisdiction to punish the captain of a French ship, which had collided with a Turkish 
steamboat, drowning eight nationals on board).   
62  Fletcher, supra note 59 at 467. See also, Richard J. Wilson, “Prosecuting Pinochet: International Crimes 
in Spanish Domestic Law” (1999) 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 946; Damien Vandermeersch, “Compétence 
universelle et immunités en droit international humanitaire – la situation belge” in Marc Henzelin & 
Robert Roth, eds., Le droit à l’épreuve de l’internationalisation (Paris : L.G.D.J., 2002) at 71 and 
Ministère public c. Ntezimana, Cour d’Assises, Bruxelles, (June 2001), all cited in Hélène Dumont & 
Martin Gallié, “L’édification sur une fondation fragile d’un droit universel et d’un forum commun 
supranational en matière de crimes de guerre et contre l’humanité” in Institut canadien d’administration 
de la Justice, ed., in Justice et participation dans un monde global : la nouvelle règle de droit 
(Montreal : Les Éditions Thémis, 2004) 87 at 108.  
63  Kevin R. Gray, “Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium)” 13:3 European Journal of International Law 723 at 723, online: European Journal 
of International Law <http://207.57.19.226/journal/Vol13/No3/sr1.pdf> (accessed 21 October 2009); 
See also Cherif Bassiouni, Internutional Criminul Lalis, vol. III, 2d ed. (Enjorcenzent, 1999) at 228 and 
Theodor Meron, "International Criminalization of Interna1 Atrocities" (1995) 89 AJIL at 576, both cited 
in Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium), Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Koojimans and Buergenthal, [2002] ICJ Rep. 64 at 76 
[hereinafter, the Arrest Warrant]. 
64  Buck, supra note 55 at 125-126. 
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Positions across the world concerning the principle of universality vary, ranging 
from attempts at full application65 to a very limited approach.66  The legitimacy of an 
unlimited scope of application remains an unresolved question in international law.67   
  
                                                 
65  See e.g. the Belgium courts in the Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 63, referenced as “Arrest Warrant of 
11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), International Court of Justice, General 
List, No. 121, 14 February 2002 (Yerodia case)” in the former edition of The International Centre for 
Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy & Rights and Democracy, International Criminal 
Court.  Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute, 2d ed., (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia ICCLR, March 2003) at 116, online:   ICCLR’s International Criminal 
Court Programme 
  <http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/ICC%20Reports/Manual_2nd_ed_mar21_03.pdf> 
(first accessed 8 Dec. 2006; last accessed 17 April 2010). 
66  See The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy & Rights and 
Democracy, supra note 26 at 71 stating: “A modest model, invoked by States such as Argentina and 
Belgium, asserts jurisdiction over conduct, wherever and by whomever it may have been committed, on 
the basis of binding international agreements providing for such jurisdiction (for example, the provisions 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols relating to ‘grave breaches’). 
Another interpretation of the concept, espoused by such States as Canada, France, Samoa and Senegal, 
would permit the exercise of jurisdiction by a State over any perpetrator of a serious international crime, 
regardless of whether a treaty explicitly provides for such jurisdiction, if the perpetrator is found in that 
State's territory. Still another approach, invoked for example by New Zealand, Costa Rica, Cyprus and 
Spain, eschews the latter requirement of territorial presence. In this interpretation, jurisdiction is asserted 
by a State over serious international crimes committed anywhere by anyone, regardless of the 
perpetrator's presence in the territory of that State”. 
67  Vandermeersch, supra note 56 at 589 and Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction Steering 
Committee, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton: Program in Law and Public 
Affairs and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and international Affairs, Princeton University, 2001), at 
40, online: Princeton University Program in Law and International Affairs 
<http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/unive_jur.pdf>  (accessed 17 April 2010); See also, O’Keefe, 
supra note 61 at 744-745; Arrest Warrant, Judgment, supra note 63 at 3. The controversy surrounding 
the wide scope of jurisdiction of the Belgian law in Arrest Warrant caused it to modify its law in 
February 2002, with final approval by the Senate in August 2003.  The new law adds the condition for 
the victim(s) or suspect(s) to be a Belgian citizen or long-term resident at the time of the alleged crime. 
It also guarantees diplomatic immunity for world leaders and other government officials visiting 
Belgium.  See, in this regard, “Belgium Senate Approved Revised War Crimes Law”, Associated Press 
in CTV.ca (Saturday, 2 August 2003), online: CTV 
<http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1059750411634_16/>  (accessed 17 April 
2010); Diane F. Orentlicher, “Universal Jurisdiction After Pinochet: Prospects and Perils” (Paper 
presented at UC Irvine as part of the Symposium Series Prosecuting Perpetrators: International 
Accountability for War Crimes and Human Rights Abuses, 21 February 2003)  at 10 and “Belgium 
Amends War Crimes Law”, BBC News (Friday, 1 August 2003), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3116975.stm> (accessed 17 April 2010).  
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According to the 2001 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (hereinafter, 
the “Princeton Principles”), drafted by a group of eminent scholars and jurists across the 
world, universal jurisdiction is defined as: 
 
“criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard 
to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted 
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state 
exercising such jurisdiction”.68 
 
While the Princeton Principles set the condition that the accused must be present 
before the adjudicating body, this does not prevent “a state from initiating the criminal 
process, conducting an investigation, issuing an indictment, or requesting extradition, when 
the accused is not present”.69  On the other hand, universal jurisdiction does not eliminate 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs and Heads of States when they are abroad and for the duration of their offices.70    
 
Setting aside any discussions on the admissibility of broad scopes of jurisdiction 
and on a practical level, the principle of universality aims to prevent all risks of impunity.71 
Its advantages are particularly relevant for the repression of organized criminality or crimes 
committed by large multinational corporations.72 These crimes may be initiated on one 
                                                 
68  Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction Steering Committee, ibid. at 25-26, 41. 
69  Ibid. at 44.  
70  Arrest Warrant, supra note 63 at 53-54.  See also at 61: the ICJ did however add that immunities 
enjoyed by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal 
prosecution in certain circumstances, which include the absence of criminal immunity in their own 
countries, situations in which the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive their 
immunity, situation in which he or she ceases to hold office and therefore no longer enjoy all the 
immunities accorded by international law, and in particular for acts committed prior or subsequent to his 
or her period of office and acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity; and before 
international criminal courts which have jurisdiction (examples include the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established 
pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the future 
International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention).  
71  Buck, supra note 55 at 136-137.  
72  Ibid. Fisse and Braithwaite also argue that an advantage of corporate accountability is that it allows for 
the corporation to be used as a medium for the international administration of the criminal law, 
particularly in cases where a local officer’s conduct may be immune because no act has been committed 
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territory at the planning stage, while their development and effects may occur on another or 
several territories through a process of concerted decision-making and actions. 
 
Today, most States have recognized that offences whose “harmful and murderous 
effects were so embracing and widespread as to shake the international community to its 
very foundations”73 include at least: (1) piracy; (2) slavery; (3) war crimes; (4) crimes 
against peace; (5) crimes against humanity; (6) genocide; and (7) torture.74   
 
In some situations, extraterritorial jurisdiction may also become mandatory by 
agreements formed in multilateral treaties dealing with specific crimes.75  For countries that 
                                                                                                                                                    
against local law, or it may not be covered by extradition arrangements or the costs involved in pursuing 
extradition proceedings may be too costly (see Fisse and Brathwaite, supra note 52, at 42). 
73  Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 ILR 1962 (Supreme Court of Israel) at 
300 in Dumont & Gallié, supra note 62 at 110.  Other jurisdictions having recognized the principle of 
universal jurisdiction include: the United States (Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776, F.2d 571 (US Court of 
Appeal, 6th cir. 1985), Australia (Polyukhovich v. The Commonwealth of Australia and another, (1991) 
172 C.L.R. 501 (FCA 91/26) at 659), Canada (R. v. Finta, [1994] R.C.S. 701) and Great Britain (R. v. 
Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, 
24 March 1999, 38 ILM 581 (1999)) all cited in Dumont & Gallié, supra note 62 at 110. 
74  Arrest Warrant, Separate Opinion of Judge (Pres.) Guillaume, supra note 63, 35 at 38, 42, 44 (piracy); 
Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma, supra note 63, 59 at 61 (at least piracy, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, including slave trade and genocide); Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans 
and Buergenthal, supra note 63, at 81-83 (at least piracy, war crimes, crimes against humanity), and 
Dissident Opinion. Van der Wyngaert, supra note 63, 137 at 173 (at least war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, including genocide).  See also O’Keefe, supra note 61 at 740, n. 17 and Princeton Project on 
Universal Jurisdiction Steering Committee, supra note 67 at 29. 
75  See e.g. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. at 277 (entry into force 12 January 1951 in accordance with article XIII); 1949 Geneva 
Conventions:Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, (1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, (1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Geneva Convention relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, (1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,  (1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 
287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978); Conventions on terrorism  
(http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp), including the European Convention on the Suppression of 
Terrorism, (1977) (ETS No. 090) (entered into force 4 August 1978), and the 1984 Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 
1465 U.N.T.S. (entry into force 26 June 1987) [hereinafter, UN Convention against Torture].  See 
Vandermeersch, supra note 56 at 590-591 (referring to and citing the above instruments). 
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do not recognize the self-executing character of international provisions, i.e. dualist 
countries, a domestic law of execution of new heads of jurisdiction is considered a sine qua 
non condition for their application.76  
 
In this regard, pursuant to the complementarity principle enshrined in the Rome 
Statute,77 a number of national jurisdictions are required to incorporate international 
criminal law in their domestic legislation following their States’ adherence to the ICC.  As 
a repercussion, “regardless of, and to some extent despite, the omission of legal persons 
from the ICC’s jurisdiction, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
France, Norway, India, Japan and the United States have also introduced some or all of the 
international crimes contained within the Rome Statute into their domestic laws as 
applicable to legal persons and with varying degrees of extraterritorial reach”.78   
 
This thesis will similarly describe, in its second part, corporate accountability for 
international crimes under national jurisdictions derived from the integration of both 
corporate criminal liability and international criminal law in domestic legislations and 
jurisprudence.  
 
Canada will serve as an excellent case study of this scenario, since it was the first 
country to introduce comprehensive domestic implementation legislation of the Rome 
Statute by adopting the Act Respecting Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War 
                                                 
76  Vandermeersch, ibid. at 593.  
77  Rome Statute, supra note 20 at preamble & art. 1,17.   
78  Joanna Kyriakakis, “Corporations and the International Criminal Court: The Complementarity Objection 
Stripped Bare”, (2008) 1 Criminal Law Forum 115, at 147, referring to International Peace Academy 
and FAFO AIS, Business and International Crimes: Assessing the Liability of Business Entities for 
Grave Violations of International Law, FAFO Report 467 (Oslo: Allkopi Sarpsborg, 2004), online: 
FAFO <http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/index.htm>  (accessed 20 April 2007), 
<http://www.amnestyusa.org/events/western/pdf/AmnestyConference_RamasastryAnita.doc.pdf>  
accessed 17 April 2010) [hereinafter, 2004 FAFO Report].  See also Anita Ramasastry and Robert C. 
Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict. Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave 
Breaches of International Law. A Survey of Sixteen Countries, Executive Summary, FAFO Report 536 
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Crimes and to Implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, alias 
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act79 (hereinafter, “CAHWCA”) on 24 June 
2000.80  This Act, entered into force on 23 October 2000, was followed by consequential 
amendments to other existing Canadian laws such as the Criminal Code,81 the Extradition 
Act,82 the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act83 and the Crimes against Humanity 
Fund.84  
 
First, as mentioned above, this thesis will begin with a description of the evolution 
of international criminal justice and collective liability for international crimes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Oslo: Allkopi AS, 2006), online: FAFO http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/536/536.pdf> (accessed 17 April 
2010) [hereinafter, 2006 FAFO Report]. 
79  Supra note 24. 
80  Morris Rosenberg, “Canadian Legislation against Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes. Changing 
Face of International Criminal Law: Selected Papers”, (Paper presented at the 10th Annual Conference of 
the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 8-9 June 2001) 
(Vancouver: ICCLR&CJP, 2002) 229 at 232, online: ICCLR&CJP 
<http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/ChangingFace.pdf> (accessed 17 April 2010); Bruce 
Broomhall, “Towards the Development of an Effective System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes 
Under International Law”, (2000-2001) 35 New England Law Review 399 at 409 (HeinOnline). Canada 
signed the Rome Statute on December 18th, 1998, and deposited its instrument of ratification on July 7th, 
2000 (see online: ICC <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/Western+European+and+Other+States/Canada.htm> (accessed 17 
April 2010).  
81  Criminal Code, supra note 31.  
82  S.C. 1999, c.18. 
83  R.S., 1985, c. 30 (4th Supp.) 
84 CAHWCA, supra note 24, ss. 30, 31.  See also Rosenberg, supra note 80 at 235 (This fund is designed 
to channel funds obtained through the enforcement of the Act as well as orders of the International 
Criminal Court enforced in Canada, to the International Criminal Court Trust Fund, victims of offences 
under CAHWCA or the Rome Statute, and their families).  
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Part I: The Absence of Jurisdiction of Existing 
International Tribunals for the Prosecution of Accused 
Corporations  
 
 The first major tribunals set up to judge international crimes were created in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.  These judicial institutions laid the foundations of 
international criminal law which continues to expand its application today through the ICC 
and other existing ad hoc and international tribunals.  
 
 Despite the advances in this field of justice over the past decades, it is nonetheless 
notable that initial developments in judging collective responsibility for the commission of 
international crimes have never been endorsed as a precedent by the international 
community. This led to the complete eradication of any form of corporate liability for 
international crimes before the existing international criminal tribunals.  Thus, today it is 
impossible to assign a Canadian or any other corporation before an international court. 
 
Chapter 1: Initial Developments of Collective Criminal Liability at the 
Origins of International Criminal Law and Jurisprudence  
 
 International criminal law is a branch of justice that developed after centuries of war 
and horrendous crimes, from the very first accounts of world history.  As populations grew 
and humans began to form groups, the need to regulate collective action became an 
inevitable legal consideration. The first judicial forums to formally address this question 
were the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals.   
 
 
 
22 
 
 
Section 1. The Military War Crimes Tribunals and Trials Involving Collective 
Entities after the Second World War 
 
 The historical events that led to the Second World War are intrinsically linked with 
the industrial progress preceding and carried out throughout the war.  Namely, the severe 
economic depression in the early 1930’s, combined with the development of aviation and 
major discoveries in the gasoline, rubber and medical fields caused many governments to 
become more actively involved in the commercial sectors of their countries.  Likewise, the 
attractiveness of war as a profitable machine to build military equipment, develop processes 
and resort to forced labor to increase production drew a number of businesses into the 
political and violent atrocities that occurred from 1939 to 1945.85    
 
 The participation of corporate actors in fuelling the global conflict that shocked the 
conscience of the world brought many directors, owners, managers and other high-level 
business officers before the military tribunals created to judge the criminals of the Second 
World War.  
 
                                                 
85  See, for example, the participation of the Krupp industry in the rearmament period of Germany 
following the First World War in the 1930’s in United States v. Goering et al., 6 F.R.D. 69, also cited as 
1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Judgment from 14 
November 1945 to 1 October 1946, Nuremberg (1947), 171 at 182-183 (online:  Federal Research 
Division (F.R.D.) Library of Congress. Military Legal Resources  
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_major-war-criminals.html>, 42-volume series entitled the 
Blue Series, the official record of the trial of the major civilian and military leaders of Nazi Germany 
who were accused of war crimes [hereinafter, T.M.W.C.], 1st volume downloaded at 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_Vol-I.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2010).  A more modern 
example of corporations profiting from war is described by Gerald Schumacher who refers to examples 
of private military contractors providing services to the United States in the Iraq war as follows: 
“Construction contractors provide infrastructure services like basic subsistence, housing, utilities, and 
industrial rehabilitation.  Trucking contractors keep supplies moving to the soldiers and the construction 
sites.  Training contractors provide small-unit combat training, law enforcement training, and battle-
staff training for mid-level military officers.  Technical assistance contractors keep communications 
networks, radar sites, tanks and aircraft functioning.  Security contractors provide the first level of 
security to all the rest of the contractors …” See Gerald Schumacher, A Bloody Business: America’s war 
zone contractors and the occupation of Iraq (Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2006), at 15.  See also Peter 
Warren Singer, “Outsourcing War” (2005) 84 Foreign Affairs 119. 
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Sub-section 1.  The Signing of the London Charter by the Allied Countries 
 
On 8 August 1945, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, surnamed the “Allied Countries” 
entered into the London Agreement Establishing the International Military Tribunal for the 
Trial of German Major War Criminals. 86   The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal were defined in the Charter annexed to the Agreement, whose 
binding provisions were recognized as the expression of international law existing at the 
time of its creation.87 
 
Paragraph 1.  The Criminal Organizations  
 
With regards to criminal responsibility, article 6 (a) of the London Charter provided 
in that “leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes” would 
be held criminally responsible.88 The same text provided for the trial and punishment of the 
major war criminals who, “acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether 
as individuals or as members of organizations” committed crimes against peace, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity.89   
 
                                                 
86  Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, 8 
August 1945, 82 U.N.T.C. 279, online: UNHCR <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=47fdfb34d> (accessed 17 April 2010) [hereinafter, London 
Agreement].  In accordance with art. 5 of the London Charter, supra note 12, the Governments of 
Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, 
Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay, and 
Paraguay, expressed their adherence to the agreement, as Governments of the United Nations.  See also    
87  T.M.W.C., supra note 85 at 171 and 281.  See also, London Agreement, ibid., art. 2. 
88  London Charter, supra note 12, art. 6 (a). 
89  Ibid. art. 6.    
24 
 
 
By providing for jurisdiction over “members of organizations”, the Nuremberg 
Tribunal became the first international forum to formally recognize that criminal 
responsibility was attributable to collective action, pursuant to article 9 (1) of the London 
Charter, which states: 
 
“At the trial of any individual member of any group or organization, 
the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act of which the 
individual may be convicted) that the group or organization of which 
the individual was a member was a criminal organization”.90 
 
The idea of penalizing membership can be traced back to a French proposal during 
the drafting of the London Charter in response to difficulties in identifying the individual 
roles played in the atrocities of mass crime.  These challenges were discovered during 
investigations of the destruction of the village of Lidice by units of a German military 
division during the war.  The French delegation proposed to include the concept of 
“association de malfaiteurs”, pursuant to its own national criminal legislation which 
allowed the prosecution of individuals for membership in a criminal organization.91  
 
The practical interest of such a charge was to address the situation of hundreds of 
thousands of prisoners of all categories, ranging from prisoners of war to civilians or 
demobilized soldiers, being held by the Allied countries at the time.92  In fact, the 
government of the United States alone held 74,000 prisoners in Germany and 31,000 
prisoners of war in the United States.93  
 
Under such considerations, Colonel Murray C. Bernays, the United States Attorney 
General of the United States War Department, further developed the French proposal by 
                                                 
90  London Charter, supra note 12, art. 9(1). 
91  Elies van Sliedregt, The Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 
(The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003) at 21.  
92  Jonathan A. Bush, “The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What 
Nuremberg Really Said” (2009) 5 Columbia Law Review, Vol. 109, 1094 at 1144, online: Columbia 
Law Review <www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/5/Bush.pdf> (accessed 1 August 2009). 
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suggesting the inclusion of “criminal organizations” and “conspiracy” in a binding text 
establishing the military tribunal. Bernays’ proposals were adopted by the Commission of 
Allied countries on 16 May 1945 in the London Charter.94 
 
First, with regards to criminal organizations, the London Charter provided that the 
declaration of criminality of an organization would not lead to a conviction of the 
organization but rather, the determination of guilt of its individual members in subsequent 
trials before the national judicial authorities of any Signatory Party, in accordance with 
article 10.  The latter states:   
 
“In cases where a group or organization is declared criminal by the Tribunal, 
the competent national authority of any Signatory Party shall have the right to 
bring individuals to trial for membership therein before national military or 
occupation courts.  In any such case the criminal nature of the group or 
organization is considered proved and shall not be questioned”.95 
 
Under these provisions, an indictment was lodged in Berlin before the Nuremberg 
Tribunal on 18 October 1945 charging the members of seven organizations with crimes 
against peace by the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression; as 
well as with war crimes and crimes against humanity96.  
 
The IMT held that three organizations, i.e. the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, 
the Gestapo (Die Geheime Staatspolizei) and Die Sicherheitsdienst des Reichfuehrer SS 
(SD), and the SS (Die Schutztaffeln Der Nationalsocialistischen Deutchen Arbeiterpartei) 
                                                                                                                                                    
93  Ibid. 
94  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 21-22.  
95  London Charter, supra note 12, art. 10. 
96  T.M.W.C., Judgment, supra note 85 at 257;   T.M.W.C., Indictment, supra note 85, 27 at 28 (para. 28). 
(The seven organizations indicted were: Die Reichregierung, alias the Reich Cabinet, Das Korps der 
Politischen Leiter Der Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei, alias the Leadership Corps of 
the Nazi Party, Dieschutz-Staffeln der Nationalsozialistischen Eutschen Arbeiterpartei, commonly 
known as the "SS" and including Der Sicherheitsdienst, commonly known as the "SD", Die Geheime 
Staatspolizei, alias the Secret State Police, commonly known as the “Gestapo”,  Diesturmabteilungen 
Der NSDAP, commonly known as the "SA”, and the General Staff and High Command of the German 
Armed Forces).   
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were used for purposes which were criminal under the London Charter.  The violations 
included Germanization of incorporated territory, the persecution and/or extermination of 
Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration camps, excesses in the administration of 
occupied territories, administration of the slave labor programme and mistreatment of 
prisoners of war. 97   
 
Three other organizations, the SA (Die Sturmabteilungen der Nationalsozialistischen 
Deutchen Arbeiterpartei), the Reich Cabinet (Die Reichsregierung)98 and the General Staff 
and High Command of the German Armed Forces, were declared non-criminal by the 
Tribunal.99  
 
The judges first conducted a preliminary analysis of whether there existed a group or 
organization among the indicted entities.100  Once this fact was recognized, the Tribunal had 
discretion to determine whether the group or organization’s activities were criminal under 
the London Charter101 “in accordance with well-settled legal principles, one of the most 
important of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishments should be 
avoided.”102 At the same time, the Tribunal expressed that it “should not hesitate to declare 
                                                 
97  T.M.W.C., Judgment, ibid.at 261 (Leadership Corps), at 267 (The Gestapo and the SD), at 273 (the SS). 
98  Ibid..at 275 (the Reich Cabinet consisted of members of the ordinary cabinet after 30th January 1933, 
members of the Council of Ministers for defence of the Reich and members of the Secret Cabinet 
Council).  
99  Ibid.at 273-279. 
100  Ibid. at 256 stating: “There must be a group bound together and organised for a common purpose”.  See 
also (1947) 41 AJIL 172 cited in Andrew Clapham, “The Question of Jurisdiction under International 
Criminal Law over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal 
Court” in Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi, supra note 42, 139 at 160. 
101 See e.g. T.M.W.C., supra note 85 at 275-276, where the IMT was of the opinion that after 1933, the 
Reich Cabinet did not act as a group or organization.  Moreover, the group of persons charged was so 
small that members could be conveniently tried in proper individual cases without resort to a declaration 
that the Cabinet was criminal. See also ibid. at 276-279, where the IMT decided that the General Staff 
and High Command of the German Armed Forces were much the same as the armies, navies and air 
forces of all other countries, and therefore, could not logically be defined as a group or organization 
within the meaning of article 9 of the Charter. See also, ibid. at 256 where the IMT explained that the 
terms : «The Tribunal may declare…» of article 9 of the London Charter were the basis for discretion 
afforded to the Tribunal.  
102  41 AJIL 46, cited in Clapham, supra note 100, at 162.   
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it (the organization) to be criminal because the theory of ‘group criminality’ is new, or 
because it might be unjustly applied by some subsequent tribunals”.103 
 
In making this statement, the IMT did not consider the Prosecutor’s reference to 
certain countries that already included concepts of collective liability in their national 
legislations, such as the United States, France, Germany and India.104 The fact is that “the 
judges at the IMT betrayed considerable discomfort with the case against the criminal 
organizations”.105  The Tribunal raised such legal questions as: 
 
“(1) whether the ongoing decisions about the organizations would give rise to 
presumptions or findings against individual members simultaneously on trial; 
(2) what sort of evidence gathering procedures and due process rights would 
be created for the organizations; (3) what sort of immunity, if any, would be 
given to members held all over Europe whose testimony was not sought by 
lawyers for their former organizations; (4) how would a decision from the 
IMT about organizational guilt affect members who were already being 
detained as POWs or for other reasons; (5) what procedures would embed its 
procedural recommendations in its findings about organizational guilt so that 
later tribunals would be bound; (6) would some of those membership trials be 
heard by a second sitting of the IMT itself under the London Charter (this 
being winter 1946, it was still conceivable that there would be a second 
international trial); (7) what inferences might be drawn in any later trial from 
an organization’s conviction in the IMT; and (8) were there any limits to 
membership guilt (the problem of brief or early-stage members)?”106 
 
                                                 
103  Ibid. 
104  See e.g. in the United States, “it was unlawful for any person to organise or help organise any society, 
group, or assembly of persons to teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any 
Government in the United States by force or violence, or to become a member of any such society or 
group knowing its purposes” according to the Smith Act of 28 June 1940, cited in Sliedregt, supra note 
91 at 23.  Justice Jackson also referred to the British India Act no. 30 of 1936, penalising the 
participation in a ‘gang of thugs’, French laws providing for the concept of “association de malfaiteurs” 
and Soviet and German criminal laws containing provisions on “banditry” and “secret organizations” 
(UNWCC (1948) at 303-304, cited in Sliedregt, supra note 90 at 23).   
105  Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, “Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law” (2005) 75 California Law Review 
77 at 113-114, online: Vanderbilt University Law School <http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/affiliated-
faculty/allison-marston-danner/download.aspx?id=645> (accessed 8 September 2009).  
106  Bush, supra note 92 at 1145.  
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As a result of the Tribunal’s “discomfiture”107 with the theoretical basis of 
organizational charges, the prosecutor’s burden of proof was significantly raised to prove 
each individual’s voluntary and knowing participation in a group with criminal aims.108   
 
While there were no individual convictions before the Nuremberg Tribunal on the 
basis of membership of these aforementioned ‘criminal organizations’, national legislation 
in countries such as Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Norway, 
Poland and the United States subsequently created the offence of being a member of a 
criminal organization.109  Moreover, a number of later trials referred to the Nuremberg 
Tribunal’s declarations of organizational guilt to charge individuals of membership therein.  
 
Paragraph 2.  The Conspiracy Issue 
 
In addition to organizational liability, “conspiracy” became another subject of 
contention during the drafting of the London Charter.110 This other form of collective 
responsibility was defined as “the agreement of two or more persons to effect any unlawful 
purpose, whether as their ultimate aim or only as a means to it”.111    
 
The notion of “conspiracy”, of common law origin, was considered too broad, vague 
and unfamiliar amongst the civil law allies. The main continental law objections, namely in 
Germany and France, were the unreasonable evidentiary and procedural advantages for 
prosecutors and the creation of penalty enhancements such that in some instances 
                                                 
107  Term used in ibid. at 1144. 
108  T.M.W.C., supra note 85 at 256. Under this rule, some of the lowest members from the Reichleitung, 
Gauleitung and Kreisleitung of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party were excluded from the 
declaration of criminality (T.M.W.C., supra note 85 at 261-262). Contra, in the original proposal for the 
prosecution of criminal organizations and conspiracy recommended by Murray C. Bernays, a lawyer in 
the U.S. War Department, “the burden would be on defendants to prove that they did not join the 
organizations voluntarily, and a defendant’s lack of knowledge of the organization’s criminal purpose 
would not constitute a defense” (Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 113).   
109  Clapham, supra note 100 at 166.   
110  Supra note 12. 
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conspiracy is punished more seriously than the successfully completed act.112  In contrast, 
countries of common law tradition, such as Great Britain and the United States, as well as 
the Soviet Union endorsed the inclusion of conspiracy.113   
 
The signatory parties finally settled on the inclusion of “conspiracy” with the 
additional wording of “common plan” in article 6 (a) of the London Charter as a 
“compromise to the continental unfamiliarity with conspiracy”.114  In this manner, 
conspiracy was likened to a form of criminal participation rather than a substantive offence 
as in common law systems.115 
 
The conspiracy provisions led to charges against twenty-two defendants before the 
Nuremberg Tribunal under Count One of the Indictment for a common plan or conspiracy 
to wage aggressive war. Fourteen of the defendants were convicted and it was generally 
agreed that the “key concept in the collective criminality theory before the IMT was the 
concept of conspiracy”.116  Nevertheless, the judges of the Nuremberg Tribunal noted that 
“conspiracy” had been “hurriedly drafted” in the London Charter which listed it twice, 
“both within Article 6 (a) as a part of crimes against peace and also as a separate free-
standing addition to Article 6”.117  They limited the application of this mode of liability to 
crimes against peace.118   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
111 C.S. Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, Cambridge (1966), p. 335 cited in Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 17.   
112  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 17, 20 and Bush, supra note 92 at 1137.  
113  Sliedregt, supra note 92 at 19.   
114  Ibid. at 18. 
115 Ibid.  
116  Bush, supra note 92 at 1163 and ibid. at 17.  
117  Bush, ibid. at 1139. 
118  Ibid. at 1139.  
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The scope of conspiracy was also narrowed under the following terms: 
 
“the conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal purpose.  It must not 
be too far removed from the time of decision and of action.  The planning, to 
be criminal, must not rest merely on the declarations of a party program, such 
as are found in the 25 points of the Nazi party, announced in 1920, or the 
political affirmations expressed in Mein Kampf in later years.  The Tribunal 
must examine whether a concrete plan to wage war existed, and determine the 
participants in that concrete plan”.119   
 
The Judgment of the IMT clearly emphasized however that when the parties to a 
conspiracy cooperated in a plan with knowledge of its criminal aims, it became irrelevant 
“that they were assigned to their tasks by a dictator”.120  In this regard, the judges of the 
tribunal agreed that: “Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself.  He had to have 
cooperation of statesmen, military leaders, diplomats and, notably, business men”.121  
  
Sub-section 2.  The Tokyo Tribunal, Groups and Conspiracy Charges  
 
 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereinafter, the 
“IMTFE Charter”)122 was established in January 1946 by an executive order of the 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, General McArthur.123   
 
 The Trial opened on 3 May 1946 and lasted two years and ninety-eight days.124 
Seven defendants were condemned to death and hanged.  The rest were imprisoned.  By 
1958 however, Danner describes that the politics of Cold War overtook the politics that had 
                                                 
119  T.M.W.C., supra note 85 at 225.  See also L. Friedman, The Law of War, A Documentary History, Vol. 
II, (New York, 1972), p. 941, cited in Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 19. 
120  Sliedregt, ibid. at 20.  
121  Ibid. 
122  Charter of the IMTFE, supra note 12.  
123  Andrea Gattini, “A Historical Perspective: from Collective to Individual Responsibility and Back” in 
Nollkaemper &  Van Der Wilt, supra note 1, 101 at 117.  
124 Allison M. Danner, “Beyond the Geneva Conventions: Lessons from the Tokyo Tribunal in Prosecuting 
War and Terrorism” in (2005-2006) 46 Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, 83 at 90.   
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led to the Tokyo defendants’ prosecution125 and all defendants still alive had been set 
free.126 
 
As opposed to the IMT, the IMTFE did not encounter the same civil law scepticism 
with regards to the concept of conspiracy.  In fact, twenty-five defendants were convicted 
of this crime.127  Indeed, although article 5 of the IMTFE Charter provided that the Tribunal 
shall have the power to try and punish war criminals “as individuals or as members of 
organizations”, the “prosecutors in the Far East did not indicate any of the groups or 
organizations to which the Japanese defendants belonged”.128 The defendants included 
former Prime Ministers, War and Navy Ministers, and Ambassadors.129 Furthermore, the 
IMFTE Charter did not foresee the possibility of declaring organizations criminal.130 The 
Tribunal therefore limited itself to condemning leading officials but without consideration 
of their role within a particular organization.131    
 
The centerpiece of the Tokyo indictment was Count One, which charged all the 
accused with conspiring “as leaders, organisers, instigators or accomplices between 1st 
January 1928 and 2nd September 1945 to have Japan, either alone or with other countries, 
wage wars of aggression against any country or countries which might oppose her purpose 
                                                 
125  Ibid. 
126  Ibid. at 92.   
127  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 20. See also Gattini, supra note 123.  
128  Sliedregt, ibid. at 21. 
129 Danner, supra note 124. 
130  Gattini, supra note 123. 
131  See e.g. ibid. (Gattini refers for example to “patriotic societies” and the Zaibatsu, the “industrial 
complexes closely connected with the military and which had first made the war possible”. See also 
Yishay Yafeh, “An International Perspective of Japan’s Corporate Groups and their Prospects”, National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper Series, Working Paper 9836 issued in December 
2002 at para. 1.1, online: NBER: <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9386.pdf?new_window=1> (accessed 
14 March 2010) published in NBER Chapters, ed., Structural Impediments to Growth in Japan 
(Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2003) explaining that the Zaibatsu were 
“family owned conglomerates, controlled through holding companies which in turn held a large number 
of shares in a first tier of subsidiaries).   
32 
 
 
of securing the military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the 
Pacific and Indian oceans and their adjoining countries and neighbouring islands”.132  
 
 Following the lead of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the IMTFE judges dismissed all 
charges that involved conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity and war crimes,133 but 
held the charges related to conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, in the following 
terms: 
 
“A conspiracy to wage aggressive or unlawful war arises when two or 
more persons enter to commit that crime.  Thereafter, in furtherance of 
the conspiracy, follow planning and preparing for such war.  Those 
who participate at this stage may be either original conspirators or later 
adherents.  If the latter adopt the purpose of the conspiracy and plan 
and prepare for its fulfillment they become conspirators.”134 
 
 Furthermore, since the Tribunal accepted the overarching conspiracy count, “it did 
not consider the more limited conspiracies alleged in the other counts of the indictment”.135 
 
Danner observes that “the Tokyo Tribunal’s grand vision of a pre-war Japanese 
conspiracy has been persistently criticized and represents one of the central weaknesses of 
the Tokyo judgment”.136 
 
                                                 
132  R. John Pritchard, “The Indictment” in R. John Pritchard, ed., The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The 
Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East: With an Authoritative Commentary and 
Comprehensive Guide (Michigan: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), Vol. 2, 2 at 2-3, cited in Danner, supra 
note 124, at 90 [hereinafter, The Tokyo Indictment].  See also Tokyo Indictment at 1 in Danner, supra 
note 124 at 114-115, explaining that the total indictment included fifty-five counts. Counts Two through 
Five broke out the massive conspiracy into smaller conspiracies.  Later counts accused the defendants of 
the waging of aggressive war and more conventional war crimes, including the Rape of Nanking and 
Bataan Death March. 
133  Danner, supra note 124 at 116.  
134 R. John Pritchard, “The Judgment” in R. John Pritchard, ed., The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The 
Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East: With an Authoritative Commentary and 
Comprehensive Guide (Michigan: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), Vol. 102, 49 at 375-395, cited in Danner, 
supra note 124, at 116 [hereinafter, Tokyo Judgment].    
135  Tokyo Judgment, ibid. at 770 cited in Danner, ibid. at 117.  
136  Danner,ibid. at 118.  
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 Among its very first critics, two judges of the IMTFE, Rabhabinod Pal, from India, 
who dissented from all of the Tribunal’s findings, and Bernard Roehling, from the 
Netherlands, were strong opponents of the use of conspiracy as a charge, described by the 
latter as “one of the ugly aspects of the Anglo-Saxon criminal justice”.137  The judgment 
has also gained considerable disrepute among many contemporary historians138 and in 
Japan.  In fact, several of its defendants have since been enshrined as martyrs in Japan139 
and “[s]ome Japanese disparagingly refer to the ‘Tokyo Trial View of History’ as capturing 
the principal weakness of the institution”.140   
 
 Charging the defendants for “conspiracy to wage aggressive war” rather than 
“waging an aggressive war” was particularly useful to obtain convictions for all defendants 
despite the deep divisions that existed between the defendants during their tenure in the 
Japanese government and military.  In this regard, the Chief Prosecutor, Joseph Keenan, 
subsequently wrote that “the efficacy of the Anglo-American doctrine of conspiracy, as a 
technical device for the prevention and suppression of potential crime, stems largely from 
                                                 
137  Danner, ibid at 118.  See R. John Pritchard, “The Dissenting Opinion of Rabhabinod Pal” in R. John 
Pritchard, ed., The Tokyo Major War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East: With an Authoritative Commentary and Comprehensive Guide (Michigan: Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1998), Vol. 109, 980 at 982 and B.V.A. Röling, with an introduction by Antonio Cassese, 
The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993 
138  Hosoya, Chihiro, “Question-And-Answer Period” in  C. Hoyosa et al., eds., The Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial: An International Symposium (New York, 1986), 105 at 109; Martin Bagish & Hilary Conroy, 
Japanese Aggression Against China: The Question of Responsibility in China and Japan: Search for 
Balance Since World War I (1978), 325 at 331; Kokima Noburu, “Contributions to Peace” in  C. Hoyosa 
et al., eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: An International Symposium (1986), 69 at 76; Richard H. 
Minear, Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial 1929 (1971); R. John Pritchard, “The 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East and the Allied National War Crimes Trials in Asia”, 2d. 
ed. by M. Chérif Bassiouni, III International Criminal Law (1999), 109 at 123; Stephen Large, “Far East 
War Crimes Trials” in I.C.B. Dear, ed., The Oxford Companion to The Second World War (Oxford, 
1995), 347 at 349; John W. DOWER, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of The Second World War 
(1999), 470, all cited in Danner, ibid. 
139  See e.g. “Where War Criminals are Venerated”, CNN News (14 January 2003), online CNN.com  
<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/13/japan.shrine> (noting that several Japanese 
premiers have visited the shrine over the past twenty-five years) and Stephanie Strom, “Japan’s Premier 
Visits War Shrine, Pleasing Few”, N.Y. Times, (14 August 2001) A1, cited in Danner, ibid. at 122.  
140  Danner, ibid. at 119. 
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its elasticity”.141  In other terms, instead of focussing on the conduct of individual 
defendants, the prosecution had to prove only that “a general and continuing conspiracy as 
alleged in Count One had existed, that each of the defendants had been a member of the 
conspiracy at some time during the course of its existence, and that the defendant had not 
expressly withdrawn from it”.142 Pritchard reveals that, in reality, the charges in the 
indictment had been framed even before the prosecution determined which individuals 
would be tried.143  This arbitrary selection seems to have been largely due to the 
“prosecution’s unfamiliarity with the intricacies of Japanese decision-making”.144 
 
 The evidence relied upon by the Tribunal was in fact very general and would 
probably not have been conclusive to obtain convictions without a charge of conspiracy.  
As noted by Danner, “[w]hen discussing whether the grand conspiracy charge in Count One 
had been proved, the Tribunal prefaced its findings with a lengthy discussion of Japanese 
history that begun with the foundation of the Empire of Japan in 660 B.C”145 and on 
“propaganda written by individuals who did not serve in the Japanese government”.146 
 
 The prosecution and tribunal clearly had humanitarian grounds to form their 
opinions.   Danner describes, in this regard, that the United States led prosecution “placed 
particular emphasis during the trial on the murders of service members that occurred 
                                                 
141  Joseph B. Keenan & Brendan Francis Brown, Crimes Against International Law (Washington, D.C.: 
Public Affairs, 1950), cited in Danner, ibid. at 115. 
142  Danner, ibid. at 115.  
143  Danner, ibid. at 115.  See R. John Pritchard, “The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its 
Contemporary Resonances: A General Preface to the Collection” in R. John Pritchard, ed., The Tokyo 
Major War Crimes Trial: The Records of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East: With an 
Authoritative Commentary and Comprehensive Guide (Michigan: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), Vol. 1 at 
xxxv.  
144  Stephen Large, “Far East War Crimes Trials” in I.C.B. Dear, ed., The Oxford Companion to The Second 
World War (Oxford, 1995), 347 at 349 in Danner, ibid. at 90.   
145  Danner ibid. at 116-117.  See Tokyo Judgment, supra note 134 at 763 stating ““the probable result of 
such a conspiracy and the inevitable result of its execution is that death and suffering will be inflicted on 
countless human beings”. 
146  See e.g. Danner, ibid. at 116-117 (The author refers to the writings of the pan-Asian philosopher, 
professor and writer, Ōkawa Shūmei). 
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because of the aggressive war against the United States initiated at Pearl Harbor”.147   The 
United States domination of the trial proceedings is even more apparent when considering 
that the Charter of the IMTFE, promulgated by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers in the Pacific, was largely written by U.S. officials.148  
Furthermore, “[u]nlike the IMT, which featured one chief prosecutor each from the United 
States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, the IMTFE had only one chief 
prosecutor each from the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, the 
IMTFE had only one chief prosecutor, Joseph Keenan of the United States”.149  It also 
seems that “[t]hrough the trial, the presence of the major colonial powers in Asia – 
including Britain, France, and the Netherlands – sitting in judgment over Japan’s own 
colonial ambitions, struck a discordant note”.150   
 
 Although the IMTFE was less restrictive in pronouncing guilty verdicts of 
conspiracy, the Tokyo Tribunal judges nevertheless limited their convictions against those 
who were formulators of government policy.151  For instance, one of the defendants, Matsui 
Iawme, a former senior officer in the Japanese Army, was acquitted of Count One on this 
basis.152 
 
Sub-section 3.  Trials of the Major Industrialists of the Second World War 
 
While the rulings of the international military tribunals were still underway, the 
Allied Countries promulgated the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 in Nuremberg on               
                                                 
147 Danner, ibid. at 97.  Danner adds that General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the 
Allied Powers in the Pacific unilaterally established the IMTFE on January 19, 1946.  At the same time, 
he promulgated its Charter, which had been written largely by U.S. officials and which set out the law 
that would be applied during its proceedings (Danner, ibid. at 88-89) 
148  Ibid. at 88-89. . 
149 Ibid. at 89 
150  Ibid. at 89 
151  Ibid. at 123 
152  Danner, ibid. at 123. See Tokyo Judgment, supra note 134 at 814, cited in  
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20 December 1945.153 This binding text provided for future prosecution of war criminals 
and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with by the Nuremberg Trial, under a 
uniform legal basis in each of the Control Council Areas occupied by the Allied 
Countries.154 The Control Council was composed of four representatives of the victorious 
powers: the United States, Great Britain, France and the U.S.S.R.155   
 
Paragraph 1.  Discussions of the Allied Countries on Corporate Criminal Liability   
 
A major difference between the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Allied Control Council 
Law No. 10 trials was that the former’s declarations of criminality were directed at political 
rather than industrial organizations, while the latter were committed to bringing some of the 
leading executives of German corporations to justice.    
 
In fact, during the IMT proceedings, the Allied Countries attempted to prosecute one 
leading industrialist: arms maker, Gustav Krupp. The prosecutors however failed to conduct 
a medical examination prior to the indictment, which led to the unexpected result of charges 
                                                 
153  Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace 
and Against Humanity, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette Control Council for Germany, no. 3, 
(Berlin, published on 31 January 1946), available online: Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law 
Library.  The Avalon Project <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp> (accessed 18 April 2010) 
[hereinafter, Allied Control Council Law No. 10]. This law was promulgated in order to give effect to the 
aforementioned Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 “Concerning Responsibility of Hitlerites for 
Committed Atrocities” and the London Agreement of 1945, pursuant to its Preamble. 
154  United States v. Alfred Krupp et al., 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No. 10 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949-53. 15 vols.) 
(Case No. 10, 1948) at 1330 (online Federal Research Division (F.R.D.) Library of Congress. Military 
Legal Resources  <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/NT_major-war-criminals.html>, 15-volume 
series entitled the Green Series of the subsequent trials to the I.M.T. trial that took place under the Allied 
Control Council Law No. 10 [hereinafter, Trials of War Criminals]. 9th volume downloaded at 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-IX.pdf> (accessed 18 April 
2010) [hereinafter, Krupp Case]. 
155  Anita Ramasastry, “Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon.  An Examination of Forced 
Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability on Multinational Corporations” (2002) 20 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 91 at 105.  
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deferred because of Krupp’s medical condition.156  On 15 and 17 November 1945, the court 
rejected the prosecution’s suggestion to delay the trial to permit the replacement of Gustav 
Krupp as a defendant by his son, Alfried Krupp, who took control of the firm in 1943.157    
 
The failure to include private businesses in the case before the Nuremberg Tribunal 
became a “dramatic high point”, where the Allied prosecutors “made commitments of 
varying intensity to bring later proceedings against at least the worst of the German 
industrialists”.158  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
156  It was proven that since 1939, Krupp suffered from progressive arteriosclerosis and senility, and 
experienced an attack of cerebral thrombosis which resulted in a temporary facial paralysis, followed by 
a loss of bladder and sphincter control (Matthew Lippman, “War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: 
The ‘Other Schindlers’” (1995) 9 Temp. Int’l and Comp. Law Journal,173 at 177).  
157  Bush, supra note 92 at 1102, 1112.  
158  The most adamant amongst the parties was the French Government who undertook to secure 
commitments from the other Allies.  The British government was the first to commit to such a promise, 
whereas the United States was reluctant, given the negative outcome of charging Krupp as a defendant at 
the IMT trial with Krupp.  Finally, Russia is presumed to have been favourable to the trial of 
industrialists. (Ibid. at 1113). 
38 
 
 
A. Collective Modes of Liability under the Allied Control Council Law 
No. 10 
 
The Allied Control Council Law No. 10 included the same international crimes as 
the London Charter for which an individual may be prosecuted.159  At the same time, it 
provided a wider scope of collective modes of liability than the London Charter.  This non 
exhaustive list would hold a person liable who was: 
 
“(a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any such 
crime [as defined elsewhere in Article II] or ordered or abetted the 
same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with 
plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of 
any organization or group connected with the commission of any civil 
or military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of 
its Allies, co-belligerants or satellites or held high position in the 
financial, industrial, or economic life of any such country.”160 
 
 
Based on these provisions, a number of proposals were studied for the prosecution 
of German industrialists in relation to the events before and during the Second World War.  
 
B. Theories of the Prosecution  
 
Several theories of prosecution were set forth in preparation of the Allied Control 
Council Law No. 10 trials, based on existing modes of collective liability that would 
adequately address the involvement and contribution of industry during the Second World 
War. These proposals had the challenge of addressing a particularly new form of collective 
liability, namely business crimes.   
 
At the time of the discussions, corporate criminal liability was only applied in 
certain common law jurisdictions in the world, such as the United States and Great 
                                                 
159  Allied Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 153, art. II (2). 
160  Ibid., cited in Bush, supra note 92 at 1165. 
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Britain.161  However, this possibility had not yet been explored in most civil law 
jurisdictions. For example, in France, “corporations were only made amenable to ordinary 
criminal jurisdiction in 1992”.162  Furthermore, in Germany, initial developments of 
collective responsibility in the eighteenth century lost credit “in the wake of Immanuel 
Kant’s individualistic understanding of responsibility”.163 Regardless of some strong 
arguments in favour of a “real corporate personality”,164 the Penal Code for the new 
German empire, written in 1870, adhered to another school of thought limiting criminal 
liability to natural persons.165  
 
Despite only primitive developments in the field of corporate responsibility, it 
seems, according to the collection of data by Jonathan Bush, that there was a proposal made 
for the prosecution of corporate entities by the United States’ senior deputy for the 
economic cases at Nuremberg in a memorandum dated 27 August 1945 to Telford 
Taylor.166 There exist no records however on the government’s response to this proposal.  
Bush suggests that the piece missing to the prospect of conducting such prosecutions was 
“not whether international law recognized territorial and other national claims to criminal 
                                                 
161  Bush, ibid. at 1152-1153 (providing the history of corporate liability under common law jurisdictions).  
See also Thomas Weigend, “Societas Delinquere non Potest?  A German Perspective”, (2008) 6 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 927 at 928. 
162  Bush, supra note 92 at 1221. 
163  Weigend, supra note 161 at 930. 
164  Through the advocacy of Otto von Gierke, the Germanic Reality Theory surfaced on the basis that the 
law cannot create its subjects and that therefore, groups such as the corporation were declared to be a 
juridical fact (French, supra note 37 at 36-37).   
165  According to the “fiction theory” developed by C. Von Savigny, the individual will of each of the 
company’s representatives was regarded as the will of the legal person (Weigend, supra note 161 at 
930). Legislative discussions in the following decades allowed for the adoption of the Code on 
Administrative Infractions (Gesetz u ber Ordnungswidrigkeiten) in 1968, which permits the imposition 
of an administrative fine against a legal person if an organ, a representative or a person with control 
functions of the legal person committed a criminal offence or an administrative infraction by which an 
obligation of the legal person was violated or the legal person was enriched (Weigend, supra note 161 at 
931). The Penal Code also provides for the possibility of confiscating the proceeds of a crime from a 
legal person when a natural person has committed a criminal offence on its behalf. (73 sec. 3 
Strafgesetzbuch, cited in Weigend, supra note 161 at 931). 
166  Abraham L. Pomerantz, “Feasibility and Propriety of Indicting I.G. Farben and Krupp as Corporate 
entities” (1946) Columbia Law Review, Gantt papers, at box EE, cited in Bush, supra note 92 at 1150.  
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jurisdiction over corporations – that much was straightforward, as examples from a few 
dozen nations had been prominently published in 1935 – but whether the law defined or 
recognized international crimes for which corporations as entities might be liable”.167  In 
fact, at the time of the Nuremberg trials, it was only “acknowledged that a private party can 
make war, but … that if it does so, the act is either ratified by that party’s nation, in which 
case the act is deemed a legitimate act of war, or it is not ratified, in which case the party 
may be like the pirate, an international criminal”.168   
 
Several other theories of collective liability were also proposed for potential 
business cases against the most illustrious industrialists of German economy.  Abraham L. 
Pomerantz, senior deputy for the economic cases at Nuremberg, was an active protagonist 
of corporate prosecutions in this regard.  The American lawyer recommended a creative use 
of the conspiracy doctrine connecting industrialists to each other and the Nazi Party.  His 
reasoning was that “if it could be shown that they [industrialists] met in pre-existing groups 
that shared the militaristic, nationalistic, illiberal, and anti-Semitic views of the Nazi Party, 
and that those groups actively supported the Party, the groups might serve as the legal 
expression of the industrialists’ shared involvement with the Nazi regime”.169   
 
Another American, Leo Drachsler, working as a prosecutor, proposed, as an 
alternative liability theory, the “institutional approach”, in order to “address the fact that 
German industrialists had constituted a ‘third pillar’ of the regime along with the Nazi 
Party-controlled government and the military, and that, in important ways, this third pillar 
                                                 
167  Harvard Research in International Law, “Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime”, 29 
American Law Journal, 439, 535-539 (Supp. 1935), cited in Bush, ibid. at 1154. Countries and 
legislations included in the study referred to were: the British Empire and United States, based on 
common law, India, Penal Code (1860), sec. 11; Liberia, Criminal Code (1914), sec. 28; Palestine, 
Companies Ordinance (1921), art. 84; Sudan, Penal Code (1899), art. 9; Mexico, Federal Penal Code 
(1931), art. 11; Cuba, Project of Penal Code (Ortiz, 1926), art. 15; and France, project of Penal Code 
(1932), art. 115, para. 2; New South Wales, Act 40 of 1900, sec. 4; New Zealand, Cons. Stat (1908) 1, 
No. 32, “Crimes”, sec 2 and South Africa.   
168  Bush, ibid. at 1154-1155. 
169  Bush, ibid. at 1155.  
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was ‘a single organization,’ ‘a single entity’”.170  The German term of this institution, the 
“Reichsvereinigungen” is described by Bush as “a network of cartels, semi-public and 
public economic institutions, and instrumentalities… associations through which nazified 
industries like iron and coal – their owners and senior managers in personal attendance – 
advised the military, the Party, and each other about shared goals”.171   
 
The decisive factor in choosing between each theory was the rendering of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal judgment on 30 September and 1 October 1946.  The curtailment of 
conspiracy and organizational theory doctrines clearly showed the challenges of invoking 
collective liability theories before the military courts of this period. Moreover, the IMT 
sharply dismissed the notion of imposing liability on “abstract entities” rather than 
individual perpetrators.172  It must be noted however that the court did not rule out the 
possibility of trying corporations, but rather aimed to ensure “that natural persons could not 
hide behind the artificial entities like the state”.173 
 
It was also questionable whether future trials were bound by precedents of the IMT, 
particularly since the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 did not contain the same legal 
wording and accountability provisions as the London Charter.   
 
C. The Caseload 
 
The Allied Control Council Law No. 10 liability provisions were used in a number 
of Allied countries’ jurisdictions to prosecute German industrialists of the Second World 
War.  Japanese industrialists were also targeted by prosecutions in the Allied countries.  
Finally, new collective liability doctrines were formulated in subsequent military court 
proceedings. 
                                                 
170  Ibid. at 1158.  
171  Ibid.  
172  Ibid. at 1158, 1162. 
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(i) The Cases of Bruno Tesch (Zyklon B) and the Roechling Company 
 
The British were the first Allies to undertake proceedings against industrialists 
under the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 three months after its adoption.  The charges 
were laid against the owner and two employees of the firm, Tesch and Stabenow, for selling 
the highly toxic poison Zyklon B to German concentration camps.174  The chemical was 
used to exterminate four and a half million prisoners in Auschwitz/Birkenau.175  Two 
defendants, Dr. Bruno Tesch and one of his employees, Karl Weinbacher, were declared 
guilty for their role as accessories to violations of the laws and customs of war and they 
were sentenced to death.176 
 
A second prosecution was brought in France against the directors of the well-known 
Roechling Company for crimes against peace and war crimes. The lead defendant was 
Hermann Roechling, the head of Voelklingen Iron Works in the Saar and the “animated 
figure behind the Roechling Company”, named President of the Reich Associated Iron 
(RVE) and Reich Plenipotentiary (Reichbeauftragter) by Hitler.177  
 
Both Hermann Roechling and his nephew, Ernst Roechling, were convicted of the 
plunder and spoliation of factories and machineries in Alsace Lorraine, as principals and 
accessories to the crime.178 Hermann Roechling was further convicted for encouraging, 
                                                                                                                                                    
173  Ibid. at 1162. 
174  Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), Brit. Mil. Ct. Hamburg 1946 in United 
Nations War Crimes Commission, 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 93 (1947) [hereinafter, The 
Zyklon B Case]. 
175  Although Zyklon B was manufactured and shipped by another company, Tesch's firm was the exclusive 
agent for the supply of the gas east of the Elbe River and thus arranged for the shipments, which 
included "vast quantities to the largest concentration camps in Germany east of the Elbe (Ibid. at 94, 
cited in Kyle Rex Jacobson, “Doing business with the devil: the challenges of prosecuting corporate 
officials whose business transactions facilitate war crimes and crimes against humanity” (2005) Air 
Force Law Review 167 at 194 (HeinOnline)). 
176  Lippman, supra note 156 at 182.  
177  Lippman, supra note 156 at 182.   
178  The Roechling Case (Superior Military Government Court of the French Occupation Zone in Germany, 
14 Trials of War Criminals (1949) at 1114-1116 (online:  Federal Research Division (F.R.D.) Library of 
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planning and participating in the deportation, allocation and abuse of over two hundred 
thousand involuntary workers from the occupied territories and assigning them to work in 
German iron and steel firms to produce munitions under abominable conditions.179  
Roechling executives were also held liable for encouraging and tolerating the cruel conduct 
of the plant police as well as the use of a Gestapo disciplinary court and punishment 
camp.180   
 
The first two industrialist cases in the British and French Zones served as precedents 
for the trials that followed under Ordinance Council No. 7 in the American zone.  Similarly 
to the Allied Control Council Law No. 10, this legislation dropped modes of liability 
language of the London Charter for the IMT trials.181   
 
(ii) The First United States’ Military Court Collective Liability 
Proceedings: the Justice, Medical and Pohl Cases 
 
Despite the flexibility offered by the new legal texts, the United States’ military 
courts experienced the same unease as the IMT judges with regards to collective liability.   
 
The first three indictments were brought against sixteen judges and legal officials 
(Justice Case),182 twenty-three Nazi doctors and medical officials (the Medical Case)183 and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Congress. Military Legal Resources, 15th volume downloaded at 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XIV.pdf> (accessed 18 April 
2010) [hereinafter, Roechling Case], cited in Lippman, supra note 156 at 183.  Hermann and Ernst 
Roechling were pardoned in 1951 (online: Weltkulturerbe Völklinger Hütte <http://www.voelklinger-
huette.org/en/fascination-world-cultural-heritage/the-roechlings-a-family-of-entrepreneurs/>). 
179 Lippman, ibid. at 183.  See Roechling Case, ibid. at 1127, 1134, 1137-1139. 
180  Lippman, ibid. at 184.   See Roechling Case, ibid. at 1135-1136.  
181  Bush, supra note 92 at 1166-1167.  
182  Bush, supra note 92 at 1167.  See United States v. Alstoetter (Justice Case), Indictment, 3 Trials of War 
Criminals, at 15, 17 (1947) (online:  Federal Research Division (F.R.D.) Library of Congress. Military 
Legal Resources, 3rd volume downloaded at: <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-
criminals_Vol-III.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2010) [hereinafter, Justice Case]. 
183  Bush, ibid. at 1167. See United States v. Brandt (Medical Case), Indictment, 1 Trials of War Criminals 
at 8, 10 (1946) (online:  Federal Research Division (F.R.D.) Library of Congress. Military Legal 
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eighteen chieftains of the SS (Pohl Case),184 each containing a charge of conspiracy or 
common design to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity.185  On 11, 14 and 18 
July 1947 respectively,186 the three panels of judges rejected the conspiracy claims, 
accepting the defendants’ arguments which included the binding effect of the IMT’s rulings 
rejecting conspiracy for war crimes and crimes against humanity.187  Telford Taylor, the 
United States’ principal prosecutor, had nevertheless argued that the civil liberties concerns 
at the IMT were exaggerated and the ruling was mistaken, since “[n]obody at the IMT ... 
had been charged with conspiracy as mere thought crime (...) [n]one of the defendants were 
charged with having agreed early but then withdrawing or renouncing before persecutions 
had occurred”.188   In fact, in each of the three cases, the “acts that the defendants had 
contemplated, intended, and agreed upon had actually been undertaken and completed”.189   
 
As a consequence of these rulings, it became more difficult to convict major 
participants’ roles in mass scale crimes, particularly those running the most important 
economies of the time.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Resources, 1st volume downloaded at: <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-
criminals_Vol-I.pdf> (accessed 18 April 2010) [hereinafter, Medical Case]. 
184  Bush, ibid. at 1167.  See United States v. Pohl, Indictment, 5 Trials of War Criminals at 200, 201 (1947) 
(online:  Federal Research Division (F.R.D.) Library of Congress. Military Legal Resources, 5th volume 
downloaded at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-V.pdf> (accessed 
18 April 2010) [hereinafter, Pohl Case].  
185 Bush, ibid. at 1167. 
186  Bush, supra note 92 at 1208.  See Dismissal Before Judgment of All or Parts of Counts of the 
Indictments as to All Defendants, 15 Trials of War Criminals  at 234, 235–237  (online:  Federal 
Research Division (F.R.D.) Library of Congress. Military Legal Resources, 15th volume downloaded at: 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XV.pdf> (accessed 18 April 
2010). 
187  Bush, ibid. at 1205. 
188  Ibid. at 1207. 
189  Ibid. 
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(iii) The First United States’ Military Courts’ Industrialist Trial: the Flick 
Case 
 
Simultaneous to the first three military court cases dealing with collective liability, 
the United States also conducted its first major industrialist war crimes trial, the United 
States of America v. Friedrich Flick and al. (the “Flick Case”).190 The Flick concern, 
Friedrich Flick Kommanditgesellschaft, was a top holding company in the German steel 
and coal industries.191  The indictment was filed against Friedrich Flick, the leading director 
and five of his associates.  Among the five counts of which they were charged,192 two were 
convicted of the charges related to slave labor,193 one of economic plunder194 and two of 
participating in the atrocities of the SS195 with sentences ranging from two and a half to 
seven years of imprisonment.196  
 
Count Four of the indictment alleged “that defendants ‘were accessories to, abetted, 
took a consenting part in, were connected with plans and enterprises involving, and were 
members of organizations or groups connected with’ atrocities through their early, 
continuing, and crucial financial and political support for the SS”.197  This charge, 
according to Bush, incorporated some of the ideas proposed by Pomerantz “to look for 
                                                 
190  United States v. Friedrich Flick et al., 6 Trials of War Criminals (Case No. 5, 1947), (online:  Federal 
Research Division (F.R.D.) Library of Congress. Military Legal Resources, 6th volume downloaded at: 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-VI.pdf> (accessed 18 April 
2010) [hereinafter, Flick Case]. 
191  Ibid. at 1192. 
192  The five counts consisted of the following: (1) forcible deportation of foreign nationals, concentration 
camp inmates and prisoners of war to forced labor in Germany, and specifically in Flick mines and 
factories; (2) the seizure of plants and property in France and the USSR; (3) crimes against humanity by 
the persecution of Jews during the prewar years 1936-39; (4) knowing participation in persecutions and 
other atrocities perpetrated by the SS; (5) membership of one defendant, Steinbrinck, in the SS 
subsequent to 1 September 1939 (Flick Case, Indictment, ibid. at 11-27).   
193  Ibid. at 1202 (convicting Friedrich Flick and Berhard Weiss). 
194 Ibid. at 1212 (convicting Friedrich Flick).  
195  Ibid. at 1222 (convicting Friedrich Flick and Otto Steinbrinck). 
196  Ibid. at 1228 (convicting the defendents of the following sentences: 7 years of prison for Friechrich 
Flick, 5 years of prison for Otto Steinbrinck and 2 ½ years of prison for Berhard Weiss). 
197  Bush, supra note 92 at 1175.  
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groups and associations that connected big business or at least individual businessmen with 
Nazi atrocities”.198  More specifically, the charge alleged that defendants “were members of 
a group variously known as ‘Friends of Himmler’, ‘Freundeskreis’ (Circle of Friends), and 
the ‘Keppler Circle’, which throughout the period of the third Reich, worked closely with 
the SS, met frequently and regularly with its leaders, and furnished aid, advice, and support 
to the SS, financial and otherwise”.199 
 
There were, however, no aggression or conspiracy charges and in this sense, the 
indictment was conservative and cautious not to distance itself excessively from the 
Nuremberg Tribunal rulings.200 
 
Furthermore, the prosecutors chose not to indict the corporate entities, but rather the 
individuals controlling the firm. The decision seems to have been based on practical 
purposes for accumulating evidence against the magnitude of the Flick empire and the 
complexity of its business structure, which consisted of “corporations, subsidiaries, hidden 
interests, shares owned by dummies, and firms and factories”.201   
 
(iv) The United States’ Military Court’s Prosecution of I.G. Farben 
Representatives and Corporate Liability 
 
 Prosecution of major industrialists pursued in another important industrial war 
crimes trial, the United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al202 on 3 May 1947 
                                                 
198  Ibid. at. 1175.  
199  Bush, supra note 92 at 1175.  See Flick Case, Indictment, supra note 190 at 23. 
200  Bush, ibid.  
201 Bush, ibid. at 1176.   
202  United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al , 7-8 Trials of War Criminals (Case No. 6, 1948)  (online:  
Federal Research Division (F.R.D.) Library of Congress. Military Legal Resources, 7th volume 
downloaded at: <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-VII.pdf> 
(accessed 18 April 2010) [hereinafter, IG Farben Case, Vol. 7] & 8th volume downloaded at 
<http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-VIII.pdf> (accessed 18 April 
2010) [hereinafter, I.G. Farben Case, Vol. 8]. 
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(hereinafter, the “I.G. Farben Case”).  The indictment charged twenty-four officials203 of 
the German concern, Interessen-Germeinschaft Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft 
(hereinafter “I.G. Farben”)204 for five counts: (1) crimes against peace through the planning, 
preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other countries; 
(2) plunder and spoliation of public and private property; (3) slavery and mass murder; (4) 
membership in a criminal organization; and (5) a common plan or conspiracy to commit 
crimes against peace.205  The possible verdicts of the Indictment ranged from acquittal to 
death.206 
 
On July 29, 1948, the Tribunal read its judgment and rendered its verdict, acquitting 
the defendants on counts one, four and five.207   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
203  I.G. Farben Case, Vol. 7, Indictment, ibid. at 11-14 (the accused individuals wered: Carl Krauch, 
Chairman of I.G.’s supervisory board, Herman Schmitz, Chairman of the managing board, and Goerg 
von Schnitzler, Fritz Gajewski, Heinrich Hoerlein, August Von Knieriem, Fritz ter Meer, Christian 
Schneider, Otto Ambros, Max Brueggemann, Ernst Buergin, Heinrich Buetefisch, Paul Haefliger, Max 
Ilgner, Friedrich Jaehne, Hans Kuehne, Carl Lautenschlaeger, Wilhelm Mann, Heinrich Oster, Carl 
Wurster, Walter Duerrfel, Heinrich Gattineau, Erich von der Heyde and Hans Kugler, all high-level 
officials of the concern. Among the indicted defendants, Carl Wurster, Carl Lautenschlaeger and Max 
Brueggemann were absent on account of illness).   
204  I.G. Farben, freely translated as meaning “Community of Interests of the Dyestuffs Industries, a Stock 
Corporation”, was one of the largest German companies ever to exist, renowned for such achievements 
as the development and sponsoring of pharmaceutical products including aspirin, atabrin and the 
salvarsans.  In the industrial sphere, this firm was a pioneer in the development of intricate processes and 
large-scale commercialization of dyestuffs, methanol, plastics, artificial fibres, light metals, buna rubber, 
nitrogen, gasoline and lubricants. The production capacity and knowledge of this corporation greatly 
contributed to armament, use of poison gases, military equipment, transportation and other war 
necessities during the First and Second World Wars (I.G. Farben Case, Vol. 8, supra note 202, at 1085-
1088).   
205  Ibid. at 1082.  With regards to count five, the Tribunal ruled that a common plan or conspiracy did not 
exist as to war crimes and crimes against humanity, as they were defined in the Allied Control Council 
Law No. 10 (Ibid. at 1084). 
206  London Charter, supra note 12, art. II(3).  
207   I.G. Farben Case, Vol. 8, Judgment, ibid. at 1113-1127 (count one), 1196-1204 (count four), 1127-1128 
NMT (count five). 
48 
 
 
With relation to counts one and five, the Tribunal indicated: 
 
“None of the defendants, however, were military experts.  They were not 
military men at all.  The field of their life work had been entirely within 
industry, and mostly within the narrower field of the chemical industry with 
its attendant sales branches.  The evidence does not show that any of them 
knew the extent to which general rearmament had been planned, or how far it 
had progressed at any given time”. 208 
 
On the subject of Farben’s continuing support during the war, the Tribunal 
maintained:  
 
“In this case we are faced with the problem of determining the guilt or 
innocence with respect to the waging of aggressive war on the part of men of 
industry who were not makers of policy but who supported their government 
in the waging of war… We cannot say that a private citizen shall be placed in 
the position of being compelled to determine in the heat of war whether his 
government is right or wrong, or, if it starts right, when it turns wrong”. 209 
 
 
Thus, the Tribunal re-established the high standards required to prove a conspiracy, 
more appropriately met by those who led their country to war with a “knowing agreement 
on a concrete plan to wage an aggressive war”, rather than civilians working in the 
industrial sector of society.210   
 
The Military tribunal was less lenient however with regards to counts two and three.  
In fact, nine of the defendants were declared guilty of plunder of public and private 
property based on article II (1) of the Allied Control Council Law No. 10.211  The remaining 
fourteen were acquitted.  The second conviction was pronounced against five members of 
the managing board for slave labor and mass murder at I.G. Farben’s Auschwitz buna plant 
                                                 
208  Ibid. at 1113. 
209  Ibid. at 1125-1126. 
210  Ibid. at 1125.  
211  Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben (New York, The Free Press, a division of 
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1978) at 189-194.  
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and Fuerstengrube, a nearby I.G. coal mine.212  All other members, including those of the 
Vorstand, the supervisory board, were acquitted.213  With respect to Count Four, the 
tribunal followed the narrow test of the IMT on membership in a criminal organization, 
concluding that knowledge of the criminal activities of the organization had not been 
demonstrated and acquitted each accused individual.214 The tribunal stated that factors 
indicating membership in a criminal organization excluded the accused individuals’ failure 
to attend the organizations’ functions, wear its insignia,215 passive membership through 
mere sponsorship216 or membership in non-culpable factions of the criminal organization.217     
 
In conclusion, the Tribunal convicted thirteen defendants with relatively light 
sentences ranging from one and a half to eight years of prison.218  
 
As Joseph Borkin describes, the prosecution staff was obviously “outraged by the 
court’s verdict and the sentences of the guilty” in this high-profile industrial case.219 Almost 
five months after the verdict, Judge Hebert filed a forceful dissent on the charge of slavery 
and mass murder, stating:   
 
“Willing cooperation with the slave labor utilization of the Third Reich was a 
matter of corporate policy that permeated the whole Farben organization... 
criminal responsibility goes beyond the actual immediate participants at 
Auschwitz.  It includes other Farben Vorstand plant-managers and embraces 
all who knowingly participated in the sharing of the corporate policy”.220 
                                                 
212  I.G. Farben Case, Vol. 8, supra note 202 at 1180-1192. See also Borkin, ibid. at 192 (the individuals 
declared guilty were: Duerrfeld, Ambros, Buetefisch, Krauch and Ter Meer).  
213  I.G. Farben Case, ibid. at 1192-1196.  
214  Ibid. at 1196-1204.  
215  Ibid. at 1201 (e.g. the refusal of Buetefisch to wear the organization’s insignia).  
216  Ibid. at 1198 (e.g. Schneider was considered to be merely sponsoring member of the SS, which did not 
amount to membership in a criminal organization). 
217  Ibid. at 1201-1203 (e.g. Von Der Heyde belonged to the non-culpable Riding Unit of the SS).   
218  Borkin, supra note 211 at 194-195 (The sentences were: 8 years of prison for Otto Ambros, 8 years of 
prison for Walter Duerrfeld, 7 years of prison for Fritz ter Meer, 6 years of prison for Carl Krauch, and 5 
years of prison for Heinrich Buetefisch. 
219  Ibid. at 195.  
220  Ibid. at 187-188. Judge Hebert’s concurring opinion was somewhat more ambiguous than his dissent.  
On the one hand, he condoned the lenient judgment of the Tribunal, while he nevertheless felt he had to 
acquit the defendants on counts one and five.  For more information, see Alberto L. Zuppi, “Slave Labor 
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There were a series of factors alleged to have influenced the majority of the Tribunal 
at the time, namely, the global political climate at the time highly affected by the growing 
Cold War tensions.221  Among the critics, Josiah E. DuBois, Prosecutor of the Court, 
alleged that the United States’ War Department did not support charging the industrialists 
because it in no way wanted to discourage the American industrialists from supplying 
American troops with war material for fear of future prosecutions of conspiracy.222  
Furthermore, the rise of communism in the Soviet Union had provoked divisions between 
right-wing “conservative, pro-business, or pro-German interests” in the United States 
opposing left-wing interest groups that seemed more proactive in bringing German 
industrialists to justice.223 
 
Another major concern for the Allied Countries was centered on the deplorable 
conditions of the German people and collapse of economy following the devastating effects 
of the Second World War.   Bush describes that:  
 
“Food rations were reduced in the American zone from an official 
1,550 calories per day... to a new low of 1,180 calories in May and 
June 1946.  With production essentially at a halt, living standards 
were likely to get worse rather than better, and in fact the winter of 
1946-47 brought prolonged cold and terrible hardship.  A staggering 
number of refugees – seven million, according to Clay’s estimate, 
mostly East – flooded into the British and U.S. zones with a combined 
prewar population of 34 million, further draining resources.”224   
 
Such conditions were likely to cause political disorder and possible German military 
revival, as was the effect of the Versailles Treaty reparations imposed to Germany after the 
                                                                                                                                                    
in Nuremberg’s I.G. Farben Case: The Lonely Voice of Paul M. Hebert” (2005-2006) 66 Louisiana Law 
Review 495.  
221  Zuppi, ibid. at 522.  
222  Josiah E. DuBois, The Devil’s Chemists: 24 Conspirators of the International Farben Cartel Who 
Manufacture Wars (The Beacon Press, 1952), at 21-22, cited in Zuppi, ibid. at 520.  
223  See Bush, supra note 92 at 1150-1152, 1197, 1215 on the difficulties encountered by Du Bois and 
Pomerantz during the Nuremberg Trials leading to Pomerantz’s eventual resignation due to accusations 
of his support to the Communist regime of the Soviet Union. 
224  Ibid. at 1121-1123.  
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First World War.  The goal seemed therefore to avoid destabilization and an increased 
slowdown in commercial development and ties, which the Western Powers feared would be 
exploited by the Soviet Union.225 
 
(v) The Anticipated Trial of the Krupp Concern  
 
The third, long-awaited industrial trial was the United States of America v. Alfried 
Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach et al. (hereinafter, the “Krupp Case”).226 This case listed 
Alfried Krupp as the principal defendant, a logical decision following the previous failed 
attempts at bringing his father before the IMT proceedings. The Krupp firm dominated the 
mine, steel and armament industries in Germany during the First and Second World Wars.   
 
The military tribunal decided that six defendants227 were guilty for plunder and 
spoliation of property in France, Holland and other occupied territories.228  It also judged 
that eleven defendants229 were guilty of slave labor230 and illegal deportation of civilians 
from occupied territories by participating extensively in the government labor program.231 
The sentences passed against the guilty individuals of the Krupp Concern were more severe 
than in all the industry cases, ranging between two years, ten months and nineteen days to 
twelve years of imprisonment for the head of the enterprise, Alfried Krupp.232  
 
                                                 
225  Ibid. at 1122.  
226  Krupp Case, supra note 154.  
227  Ibid. at 1373 (the said defendants were Krupp, Loeser, Houdremont, Mueller, Janssen, and Eberhardt). 
228  Ibid. at 1348. (the counts of property and spoliation were dealt with by the Tribunal from pages 1358 to 
1373 of the Judgment).  
229  Ibid. at 1449 (the said defendants were Krupp, Loeser, Houdremont, Mueller, Janssen, Ihn, Eberhardt, 
Korschan, von Buelow, Lehmann, and Kupke). 
230  Ibid. at 1373-1374.    
231  Ibid. at 1432-1433.  
232  Ibid. at 1449-1550. The Tribunal emphasized the close relationship between Gustav Krupp, the father of 
Alfried and Hitler.  Krupp had in fact contributed large sums of money to the Nazi Party and played a 
leading part in bringing other influential industrialists to Hitler’s support (See ibid. at 1445). 
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In all four cases of industrialists of major corporations, respectively, the Roechling, 
Flick, I.G. Farben and Krupp Cases, the defendants argued the defence of necessity, stating 
that they were submitted to oppressive coercion and compulsion due to government 
production quotas and compulsory deportation and utilization of slave labor.233  While the 
I.M.T. acknowledged the pressure exerted by the dictatorial regime of the former German 
Chancellor, Adolf Hitler,234 it did not consider such a defence to be available to individuals 
who chose to exceed the expectations of their government through their own initiatives and 
actions.235  The Tribunal did however consider the defence of necessity for mitigation of 
punishment in the I.G. Farben and Flick trials.   
 
Overall, the sentences applied for the industry war crimes trials were very light, 
considering “thousands of helpless victims whom they daily exposed to danger of death, 
great bodily harm from starvation, and the relentless air raids upon the armament plants; to 
say nothing of involuntary servitude and the other dignities which they suffered”.236  Borkin 
and Clapham shed some light on the lenient sentences by explaining that the imminence of 
the Cold War during the trials, had made Germany a sought-after ally, whereas the 
U.S.S.R., the former ally, was now regarded as the enemy.237  
 
Importantly, the trials of major industrialists did not include the corporations as 
parties to the judgment, but rather, the prosecution of its individual representatives, the 
majority of which were directors, officers or agents of a corporation.   
                                                 
233  See I.G. Farben Case, Vol. 8 supra note 202, at 1174-1179 (describing also the defense of necessity in 
the Roechling Case, supra note  178 and the Flick Case, supra note 190), as well as Krupp Case, ibid. at 
1435-1448. According to the I.G. Farben Case military tribunal, at least 5,000,000 persons were forcibly 
deported from the occupied territories to Germany to support its war efforts (I.G. Farben Case, Vol. 8, 
supra note 202 at 1173). 
234  T.M.W.C., supra note 85 at 176, stating: “ the history of the Nazi regime shows that Hitler and his 
followers were only prepared to negotiate on the terms that their demands were conceded, and that force 
would be used if they were not”.   See also the military tribunal judgments in the I.G. Farben Case, ibid. 
at 1175 and the Flick Case, supra note 190 at 1201. 
235  Flick Case, ibid. at 1202.  
236  Krupp Case, supra note 154 at 1445-1446. 
237  Borkin, supra note 211 at 176.  See also, Clapham, supra note 100 at 165.  
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Whether it would have been possible to convict a corporation for the same crimes 
remains ambiguous. Clapham observes that despite the Tribunal’s assertion that “‘the 
corporate defendant, Farben, is not before the bar of this Tribunal and cannot be subjected 
to criminal penalties in these proceedings’, the Tribunal did in fact treat Farben as a legal 
entity (juristic person) capable of violating the laws of war”.238  Furthermore, Bush 
describes how, during the IMT trial, “Dr. Friedrich Silcher, formerly a Farben in-house 
lawyer now assisting in the defense of August von Knieriem, rose to speak for what ‘from a 
moral point of view is the invisible defendant’, arguing that to the ‘portion of human 
society which was qualified and prepared for it... Farben had become the enterprise per 
se”.239 
 
It is also relevant that just like in the Flick case, “corporate charges would be 
difficult to aim correctly against an entity as structurally complex as Farben”.240  Moreover, 
as previously described, charging corporations for international crimes was a novel idea 
which “might awaken legal concerns with the judges or political concerns with the military 
government or Allied Control Council, a deadlocked group that was formally still the 
highest authority in Germany and might have other plans for German corporate assets”.241  
Finally, since many of the private industrialists of the Reich had been offered and accepted 
public offices in the government ministries and regulatory boards, it was easier for 
prosecutors to target defendants through these “lords of industry” on a personal level, 
                                                 
238  Clapham, ibid. at 167, 169.  Clapham quotes, among others, the following part of the judgment: “Where 
private individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the military occupancy by acquiring 
private property against the will and consent of the former owner, such action not being expressly 
justified by any applicable provision of the Hague regulations, is in violation of international law....” in 
I.G. Farben Case, Vol 8, supra note 202 at 1132-1133.  
239  Bush, supra note 92 at 1224, quoting an official unpublished transcript of the I.G. Farben Case cited as 
Closing Statement for Farben as an Entity, Official Transcript at 15400 (9 June 1948), Krauch, 7 Trials 
of Major War Criminals at III. 
240  Bush, ibid. at 1198.  
241  Ibid. 1199.  
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“regardless of which of their many hats one could prove they were wearing during 
particular decisions”.242 
 
(vi) The Trial of Japanese Industrialist Washio Awochi 
 
 In addition to the German industrialists’ trials, subsequent proceedings followed the 
judgment of the IMTFE against Japanese industrialists for their active role during the 
Second World War.  For instance, in 1946, the Netherlands Temporary Court-Martial at 
Batavia tried Washio Awochi for forcing Dutch women into prostitution during the 
Japanese occupation of Batavia in his restaurant, bar and brothel, the Sakura Club.243 
Despite one of Awochi’s arguments that he was compelled to conduct this business at the 
order of the Japanese government, the court-martial found Awochi guilty of the war crime 
of “enforced prostitution” and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment.244   
 
(vii)  New Doctrines of Collective Liability: Common Design and 
Common Enterprise 
 
 The challenges propounded by the role of industrialist actors in the war, as well as 
widely disputed collective liability theories of conspiracy and organizational membership 
caused other judicial forums to formulate new tenets of mass crime responsibility.  In 
particular, British and American JAG trials taking place simultaneously to the IMT trials 
opted for the use of “common design” and “common enterprise” language similar to the 
accomplice liability wording adopted in the Allied Control Council Law No. 10.  Based on 
these new forms of liability, SS men and women were charged for planning and for 
participatory activity instead of a conspiracy.245 
                                                 
242  Ibid. 1199.  
243  In re Awochi, Neth. Temp. Ct. Martial Batavia 1946, in United Nations War Crimes Commission, 13 
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 122 (1949) at 122-23, cited in Jacobson, supra note 175 at 196. 
244  Jacobson, ibid. at 123. 
245  Bush, supra note 92 at 1165.  
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    The first case was instituted by British Judge Advocate-General prosecutors in the 
fall of 1945 against officials and guards from the Bergen Belsen concentration camp, using 
a theory of “concerted action” or “joint action” or agreement.246  This was followed by a 
series of American cases against personnel from concentration camps owned and run by 
German cartels or production firms in Dachau, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, and other camps 
and sub-camps.247 Other prosecutions were also brought in Poland against Rudolf Hoess, 
commandant of Auschwitz, and later, against Joseph Buhler, the deputy of the IMT’s 
defendant Hans Frank.  The latter was known as the Germany’s economic tzar at the time 
of the war.248   All the charges in these cases used “common design” liability language.249  
 
These cases were innovative in providing a new theory for trying executives and 
directors from German big business in 1948, imputing a kind of corporate status to the 
concentration camps that permitted to hold its members responsible for atrocities committed 
under a systemized “common design”.250  Indeed, as explained by Bush, “[v]iewing camps 
as ongoing enterprises and the officials and guards as members or coparticipants allowed 
courts to try Nazis for participating in atrocities even where the proof needed for an 
ordinary murder conviction was unavailable”.251 
 
With new concepts developed in the concentration camp cases, the creators of the 
future international criminal law tribunals were able to abandon the controversial and 
                                                 
246  Trial of Josef Kramer (The Belsen Trial), Trial of Josef Kramer (The Belsen Trial), 2 U.N. War 
 Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, at 1, 108–09, 118, 120 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 
Luneberg, 1945), cited in Bush, ibid. at 1225.   
247  See Michael S. Bryant, “Punishing the Excess: Sadism, Bureaucratized Atrocity, and the U.S. Army 
Concentration Camp Trials, 1945–1947”, in Nathan Stoltzfus & Henry Friedlander, eds.,  Nazi Crimes 
and the Law, (2008) at 63, 69, cited in Bush, ibid. at 1225. 
248  See Trial of Joseph Buhler, 14 U.N. War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 
(1947) 93  at 23 (Sup. Nat’l Trib. of Poland, 1948) and Trial of Rudolf Hoess, 7 U.N. War Crimes 
Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (1947) 93 at 11, 20 (Sup. Nat’l Trib. of Poland, 
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seemingly ineffective notions of conspiracy and criminal organizations and ultimately 
endorse other doctrines of collective criminal responsibility. 
 
Chapter 2: The Ad Hoc Tribunals Created by the Security Council of the 
United Nations in Response to the Conflicts of Rwanda and the Former 
Yugoslavia 
 
Contrary to the international military tribunals, the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
did not contain any provisions related to organizational criminality nor any advancements 
in corporate criminal liability since the trials of major industrialists of the Second World 
War. Indeed, articles 5/6 ICTR/ICTY Statutes only provide for jurisdiction over natural 
persons.  
 
Reasons for prosecuting corporations did however exist for the conflicts that took 
place in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda during the 1990s. These included arms 
dealings, possible involvement of construction companies in covering up mass graves and 
the role of the radio station, Radio des Milles Collines that had urged the killing of Tutsis 
during the Rwandan genocide.  Reference has also been made to coffee companies in 
Rwanda that assisted in the genocide by storing arms and equipment.252  
 
The practice until now has been to hold States responsible for the acts of organs, 
groups or entities acting under their control.  
 
Section 1.  State Liability Engaged Through Actions of Collective Entities 
 
When the ad hoc tribunals were created, criminal acts committed by organizations 
were only addressed before the sole permanent international judicial forum existing at the 
                                                 
252  Clapham, supra note 100 at 148.  
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time, the ICJ.  Under the jurisdiction of the international court, responsibility may only be 
incurred by the State for acts of its organs or de facto organs acting under its control.253  By 
analogy, States may be held liable for the acts of corporations or entities acting under their 
authority for violations of international law. 
 
Sub-section 1.  The Attribution of State Responsibility for the Acts of its 
Organs  
 
In a recent judgment, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro,254 the ICJ 
attributed responsibility to a State for the acts of its organs.  This case was brought by 
Bosnia-Herzegovina against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (at the time of 
judgment, this State was called Serbia & Montenegro) for participation in genocide during 
the armed conflict that took place from 1991 to 1993.255 The Court rendered its first 
judgment interpreting the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (hereinafter, the “Genocide Convention”)256 and held that the massacre of 
Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica during the month of July 1995 amounted to genocide.  In its 
landmark ruling, the Court also found that Serbia and Montenegro had violated the 
Genocide Convention by failing to prevent and punish those responsible for the massacre of 
Bosnian Muslims.257   
 
 The most novel and controversial statement of the Court was the recognition that a 
State may be held responsible for genocide and for violating the Convention, independent 
                                                 
253 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, art. 93. 
254  Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, supra note 33.  
255  Ibid. 
256 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered 
into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
257  Susana Sa Couto, “Reflections on the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in Bosnia's 
Genocide Case against Serbia and Montenegro”, (2007) 15 Human Rights Brief 2 at 2,3 (See Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, supra note 33 at 386, 434).  
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from any individual prosecution.258  More specifically, Serbia and Montenegro was held 
liable for acts of Bosnian-Serb armed forces acting as de facto organs of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, in accordance with article 8 of the International Legal Commission 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts259 
(hereinafter, “Draft Articles on State Responsibility”), a reflection of international 
customary law.260  The article attributes to a state conduct by persons or groups of persons 
acting ‘on the instructions’, or ‘under the direction’ or ‘under the control’ of the state.261    
 
In this sense, the ICJ relied on the “effective control” test that it developed in a prior 
judgment, the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (hereinafter, the “Nicaragua Case”).262  The ICJ also rejected the “overall 
control” standard developed by the ICTY in its Prosecutor v. Tadić judgment of the 
Appeals Chamber in 1999 [hereinafter, “Tadić”] stating among others that the ICTY did not 
have jurisdiction to address State responsibility.263   
 
The more lenient standard developed by the ICTY Chamber in the Tadić judgment 
was derived from article 10 of the former Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
provisionally adopted by the International Law Commission in 1998, which provided that a 
State may be even be held responsible for the ultra vires acts of its organs or a military 
                                                 
258  Notwithstanding the acknowledgement of State responsibility, the Court concluded that there was not 
enough evidence to find Serbia directly responsible or complicit in that genocide (Sa Couto, ibid. at 3.  
See Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, ibid. at 166-169, 182).  
259  International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10, chp.IV.E.1 (2001), art. 8, online: 
UNHCR: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddb8f804.html> (accessed 22 April 2010) 
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260  Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, supra note 33 at 398.  
261  Antonio Cassese, “The Nicaragua and the Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide in Bosnia” (2007) 4 The European Journal on International Law, Vol. 18, 649 at 650.  
262  Nicaragua Case, supra note 33, at 105–115. 
263  Cassese, supra note 261. See Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, supra note 33 at 406, 
referring to the ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 6.   
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group.264  The standard of control was consequently lowered from a requirement of issuing 
specific instructions or directions to a group to one where “a State wields overall control 
over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also by coordinating or 
helping in the general planning of its military activity”.265  
 
A question which arises from these judgments is whether corporate leaders or 
corporations acting in connection with armed forces or in collusion with state authorities 
would, under one or the other control test, engage State responsibility for international 
crimes.  
 
Sub-section 2.  Corporations Engaging States’ Liability 
 
Andrew Clapham provides two circumstances under which, similarly to acts of 
armed groups, State responsibility may be engendered for acts committed by corporations. 
First, under article 5 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility:  
 
“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under 
article 4 but which is empowered by the law of the state to exercise elements 
of governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under 
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the 
particular instance”.266 
 
 
                                                 
264  Prosecutor v. Tadíc, IT-94-1-A, Judgment on Appeal (15 July 1999) at para. 121 (ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber) online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf> (accessed 27 
October 2009) [hereinafter, Tadíc, ICTY Appeals Chamber] referring to article 10 of the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-second 
session (5 May–25 July 1980), U.N. Doc. A/35/10, p.31.  See also First Report on State Responsibility 
by the Special Rapporteur J. Crawford, U.N. Doc. A/CN./490/Add.5, pp. 29-31.  The ICTY also 
referred to article 10 of  the Draft Articles on State Responsibility as provisionally adopted in 1998 by 
the ILC Drafting Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ L.569 at 3.   See also First Report on State 
Responsibility by the Special Rapporteur J. Crawford, U.N. Doc. A/CN./490/Add.5, pp. 29-31 (U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/ L.569) at 3. 
265  Tadíc, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ibid. at para. 131. 
266  Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non State Actors (New York: Oxford Press University, 
2006) at 142.  See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 259, art. 5. 
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According to the ILC Commentary, the entities in question may include  
 
“public corporations, semi-public entities, public agencies of various kinds 
and even, in special cases, private companies, provided that in each case the 
entity is empowered by the law of the State to exercise functions of a public 
character normally exercised by State organs.”267 
 
 
In fact, during the 1930s process of drafting the articles on State responsibility, the 
German Government had already proposed responsibility of States for situations where the 
government authorized private organizations, such as private railway companies, to fulfill 
certain sovereign functions.268  A few more modern examples would include activities 
carried out by privatized detention centres, prison transfers, airports, housing associations, 
and even water services.269 
 
In order for attribution of State responsibility to apply however, it must be proven 
that the entity was empowered under internal law and second, that the conduct concerned 
“governmental activity and not other private or commercial activity in which the entity may 
engage”.270 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
267  Clapham, ibid. at 242.  See UN General Assembly, Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of Its Fifty-third Session, Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Respnosibility, UN GAOR, 
56th Sess, Supp. 10, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001) at 92, online: United Nations Treaty Collection 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/english/a_56_10.pdf>  (accessed 22 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility]. 
268  Clapham, ibid. See League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of 
Discussion for the Conference drawn up by the Preparatory Committee, Vol. III: Responsibility of States 
for Damage caused in their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners (Doc. C.75.M.69.1929.V.) 
at 90, cited in Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, ibid. at 93. 
269  Clapham, ibid.  
270  Ibid. See Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 267 at 94.  
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Under the aforementioned article 8 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, a 
State may also become liable specifically for the conduct of a corporation when the “state 
actually controls or directs a company to act in a certain way”.271  The ILC Commentary 
notes in this regard that: 
 
“(...)  In discussing this issue it is necessary to recall that international law 
acknowledges the general separateness of corporate entities at the national 
level, except in those cases where the ‘corporate veil’ is a mere device or 
vehicle for fraud or evasion.  
 
(...)  Since corporate entities, although owned by and in that sense subject to 
the control of the State, are considered to be separate, prima facie their 
conduct in carrying out their activities is not attributable to the State unless 
they are exercising elements of governmental authority within the meaning of 
article 5.  This was the position taken, for example, in relation to the de facto 
seizure of property by a State-owned oil company, in a case where there was 
no proof that the State used its ownership interest as a vehicle for directing the 
company to seize the property.  On the other hand, where there was evidence 
that the corporation was exercising public powers, or that the State was using 
its ownership interest in or control of a corporation specifically in order to 
achieve a particular result, the conduct in question has been attributed to the 
State.”272 
 
 
The responsibility of States for conduct of corporations has a much narrower scope 
than that for conduct of soldiers under article 4 of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.273  In the latter situation, it suffices to show that the person engaging the 
state’s responsibility was indeed a soldier. On the other hand, as Hoppe explains, unless 
incorporation of the personnel into the national army can be proven, attribution of 
contractor conduct to a state under the conventional reading of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility requires a much more complex factual inquiry.274 This makes it very difficult 
to attribute state responsibility for private military or security companies (alias 
                                                 
271  Clapham, ibid. at 243. See article 8 of the Draft Articles on States Responsibility, supra note 259. 
272  Clapham, ibid. at 244.  Commentary to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 267 at 107-
108. 
273  Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 267, art. 4. 
274 Carsten Hoppe, “Passing the Buck: State Responsibility for Private Military Companies” (2008) 5 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, 989, at 990-991. 
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PMSCs/contractors) often hired in armed conflict and occupation to fulfil many tasks 
formerly exclusively handled by government armed forces.275 
 
Indeed, the ICJ explains that the independence contractors tend to have in planning 
their operations creates a challenging task to prove that they were acting as de facto organs 
of State.276  This, as mentioned by Hoppe, was the problem with attributing State liability 
for acts of torture or other similar conduct of combat, guarding and protection personnel, as 
well as interrogation services in countries ravaged by armed conflict, such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan.277 
 
Clapham points out that the law of state responsibility developed by international 
tribunals and the International Law Commission does not exhaust the relevance of 
international law for corporate behaviour.278  First, it must be noted that the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction excludes other legal entities other than the State.279  Furthermore, the ad hoc 
tribunals’ jurisdiction is only applicable to natural persons.  Nevertheless, certain collective 
forms of criminality, originally developed during the Nuremberg era, were re-explored by 
the tribunals instated by the Security Council.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
275 Ibid.at 989. 
276  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 Feb. 2007, not yet reported, at para. 392.cited 
in Hoppe, ibid. 990-991.  
277  Hoppe, ibid. at  990-991. 
278  Clapham, supra note 266, at 244. 
279  Statute of the International Court of Justice. 26 June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, art. 34, 
online: ICJ <http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0> [hereinafter ICJ Statute].  
Article 34 of the ICJ Statute states that “[o]nly States may be parties in cases before the Court”.  
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Section 2.  Individuals as Principals of Collective Crime: Creation of New Doctrines to 
Attribute Individual Responsibility under the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals 
 
 As described previously, the ad hoc tribunals’ ratione personae jurisdiction is 
limited to natural persons and it excludes juridical persons, such as political parties, 
paramilitary formations or states.280  
 
 In particular, unlike the situation before the international military courts, there are 
no provisions in the ICTR/ICTY Statutes according to which criminal organizations can be 
declared criminal or under which corporations or other collective entities may be 
prosecuted.281  Nevertheless, both Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals provide for the criminal 
responsibility of an individual based on his interaction with others.282  In this regard, an 
individual becomes accessorial to a crime and incurs criminal liability when he instigates, 
orders, aids or abets the commission of a crime by a principal offender.283  Furthermore, an 
individual with command authority, whether as a civilian or military leader, may be held 
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinate(s) if he took active steps to bring 
about the crime or failed to prevent or punish the crimes of his subordinates.284 
 
It is important from the outset to draw a distinction between various degrees of 
involvement in committing international crimes.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
280  Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005) at 273. 
281  Ibid. 
282 Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 102. 
283  ICTR Statute, supra note 15, art. 6(1) and ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 7(1). 
284  ICTR Statute, ibid. art. 6(3) and ICTY Statute, ibid. art. 7(3). 
64 
 
 
Sub-section 1.  The Imprecise Notion of Complicity and Joint Criminal 
Enterprise Included in the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ Statutes 
 
 John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (hereinafter, 
“SRSG on Business and Human Rights”), states that “few companies may ever directly 
commit acts that amount to international crimes.  But there is greater risk of their facing 
allegations of ‘complicity’ in such crimes.”285  Particularly, when placed in a high legal risk 
zone, a company may become involved with actors of an armed conflict or in committing 
violations of international criminal law by trying to protect its operations or increase 
financially profitable relationships.   
 
 The concept of “complicity” has a historical meaning closely linked to the concept 
of “aiding and abetting” in criminal law. The International Law Commission is nonetheless 
of the view that, in a general way, other forms of participation contained in the ICTY/ICTR 
Statutes constitute forms of complicity.286  
 
This would naturally exclude the actual “commission” of a crime, which, according 
to the ICTY/ICTR Trial Chambers, refers to the physical participation of an accused in the 
                                                 
285  John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, A/HRC/4/035 (2007) at 10, 
online: OHCHR, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises <http://daccess-ods-
un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/HRC/4/35&Lang=E> (accessed 22 April 2010) [hereinafter, 2007 
SRSG on Business and Human Rights Report].  
286  International Law Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, Vol. II (Part 
Two), UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.l (Part 2), (ILC Yearbook 1996) pp. 18-20, cited in 
International Commission of Jurists, Report of the ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in 
International Crimes: Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability. Volume II: Criminal Law and 
International Crimes, Vol. II (Geneva, 2008), online: UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a78423f2.html> (accessed 22 April 2010) [hereinafter, ICJ 
Expert Panel Report, Vol. II] at 2. 
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actual acts consisting in the material elements of a crime.287  A person may also be found 
criminally liable by engendering an omission in violation of a rule of criminal law.288 
 
First, based on articles 6(1)/7(1) of the ICTR/ICTY Statutes, individuals may be 
convicted of planning to commit international crimes.  Planning occurs when one or several 
persons contemplate designing the commission of a crime at both the preparatory and 
execution phases, usually at the level of high-ranking officers or influential individuals289. 
For instance, the IMT held that industrialists who contributed to fuelling the Second World 
War through their participation in the government re-armament program and the 
reorganization of the economic life of Germany for military purposes were responsible for 
planning to wage a war of aggression.290    
 
Another form of participation was described in an ICTR ruling, convicting 
Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, leaders of the Rwandan Radio 
Television Libre Mille Collines and Hassan Ngeze, editor-in-chief, founder and director of 
Kangura newspaper for incitement and instigation to commit genocide [hereinafter, the 
“Media Case”].291 This trial was “the first time since Nuremberg that the role of the media 
                                                 
287  Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3, Judgment at para. 40 (ICTR, 
Trial Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Rutaganda/judgement/index.htm> 
(accessed 22 April 2010) [hereinafter, Rutaganda, Trial Chamber], Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, IT-98-
29-T, Judgment (5 December 2003) at para. 168 (ICTY, Trial Chamber), online: ICTY 
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf> (accessed 22 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
Galić], Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 25(3), cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 
286, at 11.  
288  Mettraux, supra note 280 at 283. 
289  Akayesu, supra note 28 at para. 480, Rutaganda, Trial Chamber supra note 287 at para. 37, Galić, supra 
note 287 at para. 168, cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286, at 11.   
290  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 
1945 – 1 October 1946, Vol. 1 at 35, cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286, at 13. 
291  See Trial and Appeal Chambers decisions Rutaganda, Trial Chamber, supra note 287 and Ferdinand 
Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v. Prosecutor, ICTR-96-30A, Judgment (26 May 
2003) at para. 678 (ICTR, Appeals Chamber), online: ICTR 
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
The Media Case, ICTR Appeals Chamber] The convictions were made for counts of genocide under 
article 6 (1), conspiracy to commit genocide under sub-paragraph 2(3)(b), direct and public incitement to 
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was examined as a component of international criminal law”.292  It focused on the role of 
businessmen related to the media companies.  
 
Instigating under articles 6(1)/7(1) of the ICTR/ICTY Statutes means prompting 
another to commit an offence which is actually committed.293  This form of liability 
requires only that the acts contributed substantially to the commission of the crime, but they 
need not be a sine qua non condition for its commission as in “incitement to genocide” 
under articles 2(3)/2 ICTR/ICTY Statutes.294 
 
Ordering, a third form of liability, occurs when a person in a position of authority 
uses that authority to instruct another, explicitly or implicitly, to commit an offence.295  
This position of authority may be held only temporarily296 and may be conferred on a 
factual basis rather than by title.297 It occurs, for example, when a company hires the 
services of a private security firm to protect its assets in a high legal risk zone and the 
company or one of its officials issues binding orders to the security forces to commit crimes 
against humanity, such as transfers of populations or attacks targeted against rebel forces.298   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
commit genocide under sub-paragraph 2(3)(c), as well as crimes against humanity under article 3 of the 
ICTR Statute.  
292  Michael Scharf, “Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda” (2008) United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law at 3, online: United Nations 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/ictr/ictr_e.pdf> (accessed 21 October 2009). 
293  Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. Prosecutor, ICTR-2001-64-A, Judgment (7 July 2006) at para. 129 (ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org/default.htm> (accessed 22 April 2010) 
[hereinafter, Gacumbitsi].  Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 25(3)(b), which prohibits soliciting or 
inducing the commission of a crime, cited in the ICJ, Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286 at 11.  
294  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 87.  
295  Akayesu, supra note 28, at para. 483; Rutaganda, Trial Chamber, supra note 287, at para. 39; 
Gacumbitsi, ibid. at paras. 181-183.  See also  Rome Statute, ibid. and Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, 
IT-95-14-A, Judgment (29 July 2004) at para. 282 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber), online:  ICTY 
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acjug/en/bla-aj040729e.pdf> (accessed 22 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
Blaškić], cited in Sliedregt, ibid. at 84.    
296  Mettraux, supra note 280 at 282.   
297  Akayesu, supra note 28 at para. 483 and Blaškić, supra note 295 at para. 281 in Sliedregt, ibid. at 84.  
298  ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286 at 43. 
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Finally, the ICTR Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema judgment in 2001 described the 
general concepts related to the actus reus of aiding and abetting, one of the most known 
forms of complicity, as follows: 
 
“For an accomplice to be found responsible for a crime under the Statute, he or 
she must assist the commission of the crime; the assistance must have a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime.  Further, the participation in 
the commission of a crime does not require actual physical presence or physical 
assistance (...) The Chamber agrees that presence, when combined with 
authority, may constitute assistance (the actus reus of the offence) in the form 
of moral support.  Insignificant status may, however, put the ‘silent approval’ 
below as the threshold necessary for the actus reus.”299  
 
The ad hoc tribunals have recognized, with regards to the mens rea for aiding and 
abetting, that mere knowledge of the commission of the crime is necessary, while the 
subjective intention to aid or encourage is essential.300  Moreover, the International 
Commission of Jurists’ Expert Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes 
(hereinafter, the “ICJ Expert Panel”) “considers that there could be situations in which a 
company official exercises such influence, weight and authority over the principal 
perpetrators of a crime that his or her silent presence could be taken by the principals to 
communicate approval and moral encouragement to commit the crime.  Further, if these 
company officials actually have the authority to prevent, stop or mitigate a crime and do not 
do so, they may be considered as aiding and abetting it”.301 
                                                 
299  Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, ICTR-95-1-A-T, Judgment (7 June 2001) at paras. 32-34 (ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber) online: <http://www.ictr.org/default.htm>  (accessed 22 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
Bagilishema], cited in Rikhof, supra note 30 at 706.  
300  Akayesu, supra note 28 at paras. 538-545. See also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1, Judgment,(10 
December 1998) at para. 243 (ICTY, Trial Chamber II), Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-94-1-T (7 May 
1997) at para. 689 (ICTY, Trial Chamber II) [hereinafter, Tadić, ICTY Trial Chamber], all cited in 
Rachel Grondin, « L’élément psychologique des crimes internationaux les plus graves » (2003) 33 
R.G.D. 439 at 452. The ICTY has suggested that the mens rea required for the crime of complicity in 
genocide, provided in articles 4(3)(e)/2(3)(e) of the ICTY/ICTR Statutes could be narrower than aiding 
and abetting, and thus require a specific intent to commit genocide , i.e. the aider and abettors must 
know that the people whom they are helping intend to destroy a particular national, ethnic, religious or 
racial group (Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33-A, Judgment (19 April 2004) at paras. 140-142 (ICTY, 
Appeals Chamber) online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-aj040419e.pdf> 
(accessed 22 April 2010).  
301  ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286 at 20.  
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The ICJ Expert Panel also provides specific examples of aiding and abetting to 
commit crimes, which can include the provision of goods or services,302 information,303 
personnel, such as private security companies or detention employees, guards or translators 
for interrogations,304 logistical assistance305 and banking facilities for the deposit of 
proceeds of a crime.306  
 
Liability for direct commission of a crime does not necessarily entail a higher degree 
of responsibility than accessorial liability under the ad hoc tribunal Statutes.  This is 
consistent with the Anglo-American model of liability where participation as an accomplice 
is considered as a “contribution” to a crime, to a lesser or higher degree, but punishment is 
often “equal to that of the one who pulled the trigger”.307  
 
 
                                                 
302  See Zyklon B Case, supra note 174 at 93-102 and Public Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, LJN AX6406                    
(23 December 2005) The Hague District Court, both cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, ibid at 
20.  
303  Gustav Becker, Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others, Vol. VII,  Law Reports 67 at 70 cited in Tadić, Trial 
Chamber supra note 300 at 687, cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, ibid. at 39. 
304  Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević & Dragan Jokić, IT-02-60-A, Judgment (9 May 2007) at paras 130-135 
(ICTY, Appeals Chamber) at 130-135, cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, ibid. at 19, 39. 
305  Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgment (1 September 2004) at paras. 571-583 (ICTY, 
Trial Chamber, II) [hereinafter, Brđanin, ICTY Trial Chamber] and Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, IT-
99-36-A, Judgment (3 April 2007) paras. 305-306 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) [hereinafter, Brđanin, 
ICTY Appeals Chamber], both cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, ibid. at 19.  In re South African 
Apartheid Litigation, WL 960078 (SDNY 2009) at 16-17, 20 (for example, the provision by the 
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) to the South African Government under the 
apartheid era of computers, software, training and technical support to register individuals, strip them of 
their South African Citizenship, and segregate them in particular areas of South Africa, as well as to 
produce identity documents and effectuate denationalization). 
306  T.M.W.C., supra note 85 at 305-306; Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal 
Memoir (New York: Knopf, 1992) at 381-398. For example, Walter Funk, President of the Reichbank 
since January 1939 was convicted for participation in crimes against peace, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes for setting up a revolving fund of 12,000,000 Reichsmarks to the credit of the SS for the 
construction of factories to use concentration camp laborers during the Second World War. Walther 
Funk also took office in early 1938 as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for War 
Economy; was member of the Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich on August 1939; and a 
member of the Central Planning Board in September 1943 (See ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, ibid. at 
14). 
307  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 63.  
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Sub-section 2.  Common Purpose Liability 
 
An additional form of liability has been developed by the ad hoc tribunals and 
recognized as implicit in articles 6(1)/7(1) of the ICTR/ICTY Statutes under the doctrine of 
“common purpose liability” or “joint criminal enterprise” (hereinafter, “JCE”).308  This 
doctrine was specifically referred to for the first time by the ICTY in the case of Dusko 
Tadić (hereinafter, “Tadić”).309  The Tadić Appeals Chamber reversed the accused’s 
acquittal for murdering five Muslim men in the Bosnian village of Jaskići,310 by 
introducing the concept of a JCE.311  The Appeals Chamber’s conclusions were drawn 
despite the recognized fact that Tadić had not personally shot the men.312  In its judgment, 
the Appeals Chamber reviewed the case law of the Second World War military courts on 
common design and common enterprise.313   
                                                 
308  Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber, supra note 264 at para. 190, Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljević, IT-98-32-
A, Judgment (25 February, 2004) at para. 95 (ICTY Appeals Chamber), Prosecutor v. Milorad 
Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A, Judgment (17 September 2003) at paras. 28-32 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber) 
[hereinafter, Krnojelac, ICTY Appeals Chamber], cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 
286 at 27.  
309  Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ibid. at para. 188, 190. See also Natalie Wagner, “The Development of 
the Grave Breaches Regime and of Individual Criminal Responsibility by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” (2003) 850 IRRC, Vol. 85, 351 at 362.  
310  Tadić, ICTY Trial Chamber, supra note 300.  See also Danner & Martinez, supra note 105.  
311  Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber, supra note 264 at para. 183.  
312  Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 104.  
313  There were two types of cases referred to by the ICTY. The first type involved the unlawful killings of 
small groups of Allied prisoners of war (POWs), either by German soldiers with or without German 
townspeople, such as (1) the Essen Lynching Case, cited as The Essen Lynching Case, Trial of Erich 
Heyer and Six Others,British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, in 1 Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals,(London: UNWCC, 1947) at 88 and (2) the Georg Otto Sandrock et al. case, cited as 
The Almelo Trial, Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others, British M ilitary Court for the Trial of War 
Criminals, in 1 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (London: UNWCC, 1947), at 35,40. The second 
group of cases concerned crimes committed in concentration camps, namely, (1) the Dachau 
Concentration Camp Trial, cited as Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and Thirty-Nine Others, General 
Military Government Court of the United States Zone, in XI Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 
(London: UNWCC, 1949) at 5, 12 and (2) the Trial of Josef Kramer (The Belsen Trial), 2 L.R.T.W.C., 
at 1, 108-09, 118, 120 (Brit. Mil. Ct. Luneberg, 1945). The ICTY has also referred to decisions by Italian 
courts from 1960s to 1990s, decisions from the French Court of Cassation from 1947 and 1984, as well 
as jurisprudence in England, Wales, Canada, the United States, Australia and Zambia.  See Danner & 
Martinez, supra note 105 at 110-112 for summaries and citations on the cases.  See also Jasmina Pjanić, 
“Joint Criminal Enterprise. New form of individual responsibility”, (2007) 4 OKO RRZ, 6 at 6-7, online: 
OKO Reporter <www.okobih.ba/files/docs/oko_Reporter_4_ENG.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2010). 
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As defined by the ICTY, JCE occurs “where several persons having a common 
purpose embark on criminal activity that is then carried out either jointly or by some 
members of this plurality of persons. Whoever contributes to the commission of crimes by 
the group of persons or some members of the group, in execution of a common criminal 
purpose, may be held to be criminally liable”.314   
 
The actus reus of a JCE requires: (1) a plurality of persons; (2) the existence of an 
explicit or implicit common plan, design or purpose, to commit a crime provided for in the 
Statute of the ICTY or of the ICTR; and (3) the participation of the accused in the common 
design, translated by the commission of the crime, assistance in, contribution to or 
execution of the common plan or purpose.315   
 
Three categories of collective criminality were distinguished by the Appeals 
Chamber in Tadić. In the first category (hereinafter, “JCE I”), the perpetrators act pursuant 
to a common design and share the same criminal intention.316  The defendants must 
voluntarily enter into an agreement with other members of the JCE with the intention to 
commit crimes, even if they do not physically perpetrate the crime.317   
 
The second category of JCE (hereinafter, “JCE II”) is applicable to “systems of ill-
treatment”, primarily concentration camps.318  Danner and Martinez explain that “to convict 
an individual under this rubric, the prosecution must prove the existence of an organized 
system of repression; active participation in the enforcement of this system of repression by 
                                                 
314  Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber, supra note 264 at para. 190. 
315  Ibid. at para. 227. See also Kai Ambos, “Individual Criminal Responsibility, Article 25 Rome Statute” in 
2d ed.by Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. – 
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (München: C.H. Beck – Hart – Nomos, 2008), 743 at 750.   
316  Tadic, ibid. at para. 196.  
317  Prosecutor v. Multinovic, IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging 
Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise (21 May 2003) at para 23 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber), online: 
ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/tdec/en/060322.htm> (accessed 23 April 2010), Tadić, 
ICTY Appeals Chamber, ibid. at para. 196. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 105-106 
318  Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ibid. at para 202.  See Danner & Martinez, ibid. at 105-106 
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the accused; knowledge of the nature of the system by the accused; and the accused’s intent 
to further the system of repression”.319   
 
Importantly, in the two first categories, all members of the JCE may be found 
criminally responsible for all crimes committed that fall within the common design.320   
 
Alternatively, the third and most far-reaching category of JCE (hereinafter, “JCE 
III”) “involves criminal acts that fall outside the common design”.321 The Tadić Appeals 
Chamber concluded that a member of a JCE may be found guilty of acts outside that design 
if such acts are a “natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting” of the common 
design or purpose.322  According to the Brdjanin judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber, 
JCE III may even give rise to the criminal responsibility of a JCE participant for genocide 
without having the specific intent to destroy a protected group.323 
 
Sliedregt describes that “the bulk of case law which the Tadić Appeals Chamber 
relied upon in drawing up the common purpose concept was the output of Bernay’s 
collective criminality theory”,324 described in the previous chapter of this thesis.  In this 
respect, Danner and Martinez also observe that it seems rather unusual that neither the 
ICTY nor the ICTR have recognized the close doctrinal link between the criminal 
organization charges at Nuremberg and the concept of JCE.325  In fact, both liability 
                                                 
319  Tadić,  ICTY Appeals Chamber, ibid. at para. 203 in Danner & Martinez, ibid. at 106. 
320  Danner & Martinez, ibid. at 106.  
321  Ibid. at 106.  
322 In this regard, although it was not part of the common purpose of the armed group to which he belonged, 
the Appeals Chamber held that Tadić was guilty for the killing of non-Serbs in Jaskici. It was 
determined that Tadić was aware of a foreseeable risk of killing but nevertheless willingly participated 
in the common plan. Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber, ibid. at paras. 204, 232. See also in Danner & 
Martinez, ibid. at 106-107. 
323  Prosecutor v. Brđanin, IT-99-36-A, Decision on Interlocutory (19 March 2004), online: ICTY 
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/040319-2.htm> (accessed 23 April 2010) cited in Ambos 
supra note 315 at 751.  
324  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 106.  Please refer to pages 24-28 above concerning Bernay’s collective 
liability theory and proposals for the London Charter. 
325  Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 117-118.  
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mechanisms include membership in a group which ultimately committed crimes.326  
Nevertheless, the ICTY Appeals Chamber denies the analogy between the various 
doctrines.327   
 
Efforts to distance ad hoc tribunals’ jurisdiction from the precedents of Nuremberg 
seem to be influenced by the significant criticism surrounding the concepts of both 
organizational criminality and conspiracy following the Second World War,328 as described 
in the previous chapter.  
 
Sliedregt adds that “the mix of conspiracy and complicity – that is typical for the 
common purpose concept – was one of the features of the conspiracy concept at 
Nuremberg”.329  The author points out the danger in shading the lines between both 
concepts which allows complicity’s reach of criminality to extend “to remotely associated 
parties of whose existence co-conspirators may not even know”.330 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
326  Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 118. It must be noted, however, that continental law, as well as 
many U.S. statutes and other jurisdictions do include such a requirement.   
327  Prosecutor v. Multinovic, supra note 317 at para. 26. 
328  Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 119-120.  
329  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 106.  
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 The intertwining of various modes of liability with JCE is in fact a problem 
identified by the ad hoc tribunals.  For instance, the ICTY Trial Chamber made a 
fundamental distinction between aiding and abetting, as a form of accessorial liability, and 
co-perpetratorship as a form of principal liability, whereby: 
 
“a co-perpetrator of a joint criminal enterprise shares the intent to carry out 
the joint criminal enterprise and performs an act or omission in furtherance of 
the enterprise; an aider or abettor of the joint criminal enterprise need only be 
aware that his or her contribution is assisting or facilitating a crime committed 
by the joint criminal enterprise.  An aider or abettor need not necessarily share 
the intent of the co-perpetrators.... Eventually, an aider or abettor, one who 
assists or facilitates the criminal enterprise as an accomplice, may become a 
co-perpetrator, even without physically committing crimes, if their 
participation lasts for an extensive period or becomes more directly involved 
in maintaining the functioning of the enterprise.  By sharing the intent of the 
joint criminal enterprise, the aider or abettor becomes a co-perpetrator.”331 
 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber took a partly different stance than the Trial Chamber 
and considered co-perpetratorship as a form of accomplice liability.332  Nevertheless, the 
Chamber felt that the distinction was superfluous in terms of sentencing333 since, regardless 
of the mode of participation prosecuted, “international judges may impose any sentence 
from one day imprisonment to life imprisonment”.334 The ICTR/ICTY tribunals have in fact 
allowed considerable prosecutorial discretion for the description of JCE’s in expansive 
terms.335  According to Danner and Martinez, this permissiveness is justified as a means to 
                                                                                                                                                    
330  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 106.  
331  Prosecutor v. Kvocka, IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, (2 November 2001) at para. 284 (Kvocka , ICTY Trial 
Chamber), online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf> (accessed 23 
April 2010) [hereinafter, Kvocka, ICTY Trial Chamber], cited in Sliedregt, ibid at 72. 
332  Tadić, ICTY Appeals Chamber, supra note 264 at para. 221 in Sliedregt, ibid. at 73. This view was also 
endorsed by the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, Judgment (15 March 2002) at 
para. 77 (ICTY, Trial Chamber II), online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/krnojelac/tjug/en/krn-
tj020315e.pdf> (accessed 23 April 2010) [hereinafter, Krnojelac] which rejected the findings on this 
point in the Kvocka, ICTY Trial Chamber case, ibid.. In this regard, see, Sliedregt, ibid. at 73. 
333  Krnojelac, ibid.  
334  Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 99, 141 (according to Danner and Martinez, objections to JCE 
and its far-reaching effects may be resolved through formal limitations and safeguards, such as 
sentencing determinations). 
335  Ibid. at 135-136. 
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secure convictions when proof is lacking due to chaotic conditions caused by war, mass 
atrocity and large-scale breakdown in public order.336 
 
This wide latitude of liability may affect corporations conducting operations on high 
legal risk territories, since they may incidentally become involved in armed conflict.  This 
may occur, for instance, for corporations wishing to protect their operations, obtain 
territorial concessions or negotiate the safety of their personnel by succumbing to dubious 
demands of the actors of a conflict. 
 
For example, the ICJ Panel of Experts describes the varying levels of participation 
under which corporations contributed to international crimes related to the perpetuation of 
apartheid in South Africa during the 1980s, as follows:  
 
“Companies that actively helped to design and implement apartheid policies 
were found to have had ‘first-order involvement’. This included, for example, 
the mining industry which worked with the government to shape discriminatory 
policies such as the migrant labor system for their own advantage. Companies 
which knew the state would use their products or services for repression were 
considered as having ‘second-order involvement’. this included more indirect 
assistance, such as banks’ provision of covert credit cards for repressive 
security operations or the armaments industry’s provision of equipment used to 
abuse human rights. This contrasted with more indirect transactions that could 
not have been reasonably expected to contribute directly or subsequently to 
repression, such as building houses for state employees. Finally, the 
Commission identified “third-order involvement:” ordinary business activities 
that benefited indirectly by virtue of operating within the racially structured 
context of an apartheid society.”337 
 
Common purpose liability has nevertheless been applied in other international 
criminal tribunals.338  In particular, the Special Court for Sierra Leone339 (SCSL) has 
                                                 
336  Ibid. at 138.  
337  ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. I, supra note 50 at 14. 
338  Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 75.  
339  The Special Court for Sierra Leone was created in a process that differed from that of ICTY and ICTR. 
The U.N. Security Council requested that the U.N. Secretary-General negotiate with the government of 
Sierra Leone to create a court to prosecute crimes against humanity, war crimes, "other serious 
violations of international law," and violations of "relevant Sierra Leonean law." (See United Nations, 
Security Council Resolution 1315 on the situation of Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th 
75 
 
 
employed this doctrine of liability under the same terms as the ICTR and ICTY.340  While 
the Statute of the SCSL does not contain any express reference to a JCE, the Court has 
recognized it as implicit in the action of “committing” a crime, under its article 6 (1), which 
closely mirrors the individual criminal responsibility provisions of the ICTR/ICTY 
Statutes341.  As a result, at least eleven indictments from the Special Court have accused the 
indicted of participating in a JCE.342 
 
Most of these charges included a JCE III theory.343  It seems however, according to 
some commentators, that the indictments emerging from the SCSL were overly expansive 
and flawed since the common plan or purpose ascribed to the enterprise did not appear to 
be the sort of activity that would attract criminal liability.344  Boas, Bischoff and Reid refer 
to Prosecutor v. Taylor where the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary (AFRC) were accused of “sharing a ‘common plan, purpose or 
design (joint criminal enterprise) which was to take any actions necessary to gain and 
                                                                                                                                                    
Sess., 4186th mtg. at 2 (2000), online: UN Security Council Resolutions – 2000 <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 23 April 2010), 
cited in Jacobson, supra note 175 at 221).  
340  Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 75. See also, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 
January 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138, annex, art. 6, online: SCSL <http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&> (accessed 23 April 2010) [hereinafter, SCSL 
Statute]. 
341  SCSL Statute, ibid. art. 6(1) provides: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 
to 4 of the present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime” 
342  These include the following: Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL-2003-01, Indictment, (7 
March 2003) at paras. 23-25 (SCSL); Prosecutor v. Fodah Saybana Sankoh,. SCSL-2003-02, 
Indictment, (7 March 2003) (SCSL), Prosecutor v. Johnny Paul Koroma, SCSL-2003-03, Indictment, (7 
March 2003) at para. 24 (SCSL); Prosecutor v. Sam Bockarie, SCSL-2003-04  Indictment (7 March 
2003) at 25 (SCSL), Prosecutor v. Issa Hassan Sesay, SCSL-2003-05, Indictment, (7 March 2003) at 23 
(SCSL), Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, SCSL-2003-06, Indictment (7 March 2003) at 23 (SCSL), 
Prosecutor v. Augustine Gbao, SCSL-2003-09, Indictment (16 April 2003) at 25 (SCSL), Prosecutor v. 
Brima Bazzy Kamara, SCSL-2003-10, Indictment, (26 May 2003) at 23 (SCSL), Prosecutor v. Moinina 
Fofana, SCSL-2003-11, Indictment, (24 June 2003) at 14 (SCSL), Prosecutor v. Allieu Kondewa, 
SCSL-2003-12, Indictment, (24 June 2003) at 14 (SCSL); Prosecutor v. Santigie Borbor Kanu, SCSL-
2003-13, Indictment (16 April 2003) at 23 (SCSL), all cited in Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 
155. 
343  Danner & Martinez, ibid. at 77.   
344 Gideon Boas, James L. Bischoff, Natalie L. Reid, Forms of Responsibility in International Criminal 
Law, Vol. I (New York: International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, 2007) at 132.  
76 
 
 
exercise political power and control over the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the 
diamond mining areas’”.345  The same authors point out that this differs from the ad hoc 
model, where the common plan must itself be criminal, and the common mental state of 
JCE participants must be an express or implied agreement that a crime would be 
committed.346 
 
 In addition to this form of liability, the ad hoc tribunals have also recognized 
responsibility of military commanders and other superiors based on hierarchical roles 
played in the commission of international crimes. 
 
 Sub-section 3. Criminal Responsibility of Military Commanders and Other 
Superiors 
 
The concept of “command responsibility” originates from the post-Second World 
War case law.  The most famous case is that of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the 
commanding general of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines, who was sentenced 
to death by a US military commission for atrocities committed by troops under his 
command.  The military commission and the US Supreme Court accepted the basic premise 
that a military commander could be held criminally liable in some circumstances for 
breaching his duty to prevent his troops from committing crimes347 even without any actual 
knowledge of the commission of crimes by his troops.  In this regard, the tribunal was of 
the view that Yamashita’s failure to provide the effective control of his troops as required 
                                                 
345  Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, supra note 342 at para. 23 in ibid. at 129. 
346  Prosecutor v. Milošević, Milutinović, Šainović, Ojdanić and Stojiljković, IT-99-37-PT, Motion for Leave 
to File a Second Amended Indictment, Attachment A (16 October 2001) (ICTY, PT) at para. 17, cited in 
ibid. at 132.  
347  Trial of General Tomuyuki Yamashita, IV Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (London: UNWCC, 
1947) at 35, cited in Jenny S. Martinez,  “Understanding Mens rea in Command Responsibility.  From 
Yamashita to Blaskic and Beyond” (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 638 at 647.  
Martinez also describes the other case law, namely that of:  United States v. Wilhelm List and others, 
VIII Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals (London: UNWCC, 1949) at 34 and The Hostage Trials, 
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by circumstances was sufficient to presume the existence of requisite knowledge of the 
accused, although he had not personally committed or ordered the crimes in question, nor 
had it been alleged that he had any knowledge of their commission.348  
 
The doctrine of superior responsibility was also used to convict industrialists during 
the Second World War.  For instance, in the Flick Case, studied as one of the industrialist 
cases under the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 in the previous chapter of this thesis, the 
accused was convicted for knowing and approving the increase of quotas by Weiss, an 
official of his firm, to produce freight cars with additional forced labor.349   
 
Liability of non-military superiors of international crimes has been incorporated 
under articles 6(3)/7(3) ICTR/ICTY Statutes. In Čelibići, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the Trial Chamber’s position that “command’ normally means powers that attach 
to a military superior, whilst the term ‘control’, which has a wider meaning, may 
                                                                                                                                                    
XI Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 
(1950). 
348  Beatrice Bonafé, “Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility” (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 599 at 605.  Bonafé describes the dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy on the requisite 
knowledge for criminal liability. In this regard, Justice Murphy expressed: “No one denies that inaction 
or negligence may give rise to liability, civil or criminal.  But it is quite another thing to say that the 
inability to control troops under highly competitive and disastrous battle conditions renders one guilty of 
a war crime in the absence of personal culpability.  Had there been some element of knowledge of direct 
connection with the atrocities the problem would be complete different” (See In re Yamashita, judgment 
of 7 December 1945, International Law Review, Vol. 13 and US Supreme Court, judgment of 4 
February 1946, in International Law Review, Vol. 13, at 278, cited in ibid. at 605-605, n. 14).  See also, 
Danner & Martinez, supra note 105 at 123. Other cases before the Tokyo Tribunal included the 
conviction of Japanese Foreign Minister, Koki Hirota, for having disregarded his duty to take adequate 
steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of the laws of war in relation to the rape of Nanking.  
Similarly, the tribunal found Prime Minister Hideki Tojo and Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu 
criminally liable for their omissions to prevent or punish the criminal acts of the Japanese troops.  See 
The Complete Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 
reprinted in R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide, eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Vol. 20 
(New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1981), at 49, 816, 49, 791, 49, 831 cited in Prosecutor v. 
Zejnil Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) at paras. 357-358 (ICTY, Trial Chamber) cited in 
ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286 at 35. 
349  Flick Case, supra note 190 at 1202 in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, ibid. Please refer to pages 45-46 
above for the description of this case. 
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encompass powers wielded by civilian leaders”.350 In Kordic, the ICTY acknowledged that 
a civilian authority did not have the same degree of influence and power as a military 
commander351 and that his effective control over subordinates “must be based on an 
assessment of the reality of the accused's authority.”352  
 
Articles 6(3)/7(3) ICTR/ICTY Statutes specifically provide that a superior may not 
be relieved of responsibility “if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was 
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof”353. 
Necessary measures are limited to those which are feasible in all circumstances and are 
within the power of the superior.354  The ICTY Appeals Chamber has nonetheless adopted a 
more careful approach for the knowledge requisite of this form of responsibility compared 
to the more strict liability approach of the post-World War II cases. Notably, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber specifies that a showing that the military commander/superior “had 
alarming information in his possession” would be needed to prove that he “had reason to 
know” of the wrongful acts.355   
 
Under this doctrine, the ad hoc tribunals have proceeded to convict political and 
business figures with significant influence and effective control over the commission of 
international crimes.  For instance, the ICTR held a civilian tea factory manager, Alfred 
                                                 
350  Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) at para. 196 (ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber). 
351  Prosecutor v. Kordic, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, 26 February 2001 at paras. 415-416 (ICTY, Appeals 
Chamber), online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf> 
(accessed 24 April 2010).  
352  Maria Nybondas, “Civilian superior responsibility in the Kordic case.” 50 Netherlands International Law 
Review 59 at 69. 
353  ICTR Statute, supra note 15, art. 6(3) and ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 7(3). 
354  Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, supra note 332 at para. 95. 
355  Similarly, in Delalić et al., supra note 348 at para. 232, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated that “a superior 
is not permitted to remain wilfully blind to the acts of his subordinates,” however, he would only be held 
criminally responsible “only if some specific information was in fact available to him which would 
provide notice of offences committed by his subordinates” (at. 393), confirmed by the Appeals Chamber 
in Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., supra note 350 at paras. 400-413.   See also Bonafé, supra note 348. 
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Musema, responsible as a superior for the actions of his employees who participated in the 
genocide and crimes against humanity through the provision of factory vehicles, uniforms 
or other property of the factory.356 It was established that Musema exercised de jure 
authority over his employees performing duties outside factory premises because he had 
legal and financial control over these employees, particularly through his power to appoint 
and remove them from their positions at the factory.357 
 
The ICJ Panel of Experts sustains that superior responsibility is not limited to 
crimes physically committed by subordinates in person but encompasses any modes of 
individual criminal responsibility including aiding and abetting.358  For example, “if a local 
manager of private security forces is engaged in assisting in interrogations in a war zone 
which involve torture, by organising the guarding of interrogation rooms, he or she may be 
guilty of aiding and abetting torture and his or her superiors could be held responsible as 
superiors if the other elements of this offence are made out”.359 
 
It is important to mention, when referring to positions of authority and influence, 
that although in most scenarios, and as mentioned by the United States military tribunal in 
Farben, men of industry are not makers of policy but support their government in the 
waging of war,360 “[s]ome businesses now wield considerable political influence and 
possess more economic power than some governments”.361  
 
 
                                                 
356  Alfred Musema v. Prosecutor, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment (16 November 2001) (ICTR, Appeals 
Chamber), online: ICTR <http://www.ictr.org/default.htm> (accessed 24 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
Musema]. See Anne-Marie Boisvert, Hélène Dumont & Martin Petrov, « Quand les crimes des sous-
fifres engagent la responsabilité de leur chef : la doctrine de la responsabilité du supérieur hiérarchique 
en droit pénal international » (2004) 9 Revue canadienne de droit pénal 93 at 113. 
357  Musema, supra note 356 at para. 378. 
358  Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, IT-03-68-T, Judgment (30 June 2006) at paras. 301-305 (ICTY, Trial 
Chamber), online: ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/oric/tjug/en/ori-jud060630e.pdf> (24 April 2010). 
359 ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286 at 132.  
360  I.G. Farben Case, Vol. 8, supra note 202, at 1125. 
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 In this regard, the ICJ Experts Panel describes how:  
 
“many [businesses] have developed close business and political relationships 
with those in power, including governments or armed groups that perpetrate 
gross human rights abuses. Through privatisation and sub-contracting, 
companies now often exercise sensitive functions that were once reserved for 
the state. Businesses in the 21
st 
century operate across borders, through supply 
chains, product distribution, direct operations or relationships within 
corporate groups».362 
 
Considering the growing importance of businesses across the world that carry some 
influence on political and social spheres of society, the scope of responsibility of corporate 
actors may potentially extend to that of a non-military superior.  Furthermore, while the 
new knowledge requisites formulated by the ad hoc tribunals create a higher standard in 
determining guilt than the post-World War II trials, it is still relatively broad and may 
potentially enable the prosecution of corporations and their corporate directors far removed 
from the scene of a crime and its direct operations before national and international 
tribunals. 
 
The ICTR recognized the involvement of a business actor in the Rwandan genocide 
of 1994 in the Kayichema & Ruzindana case, providing a relevant example of various forms 
of participation in international crimes, including that of superior responsibility.  The 
tribunal decided that Ruzindana, a prominent business man engaged in transporting 
merchandise out of Rwanda and importing goods into the country, had taken an active part 
in the killings of thousands of Tutsi men, women and children in the area of Bisesero. Thus, 
the Trial Chamber found that the proof established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Ruzindana had headed a convoy of assailants, transported attackers in his vehicle, 
distributed weapons, orchestrated the assaults, led the groups of attackers, shot at the Tutsi 
refugees; and offered to reward the attackers with cash or beer; as well as personally 
mutilated and murdered individuals during the attack at the Mine at Nyiramuregra Hill.  
                                                                                                                                                    
361  ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. I, supra note 50 at 2. 
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The Chamber decided that by committing these acts, Ruzindana was responsible for 
instigating, ordering, committing and otherwise aiding and abetting in the preparation and 
execution of the massacres that resulted in thousands of murders with the intent to destroy 
the Tutsi ethnic group.363   
 
It must be noted however that business actors involved in international crimes are 
not always incorporated in the same territory on which they operate.  In fact, particularly in 
the case of large MNC’s, their head offices or parent companies are incorporated in one 
country while their subsidiaries are stationed on another territory where the offence took 
place. 
 
Section 3.  Foreign Participation in Collective Crimes in Rwanda or in the Former 
Yugoslavia 
 
The jurisdictions of the ad hoc tribunals are limited to time and territorial 
restrictions.  In this regard, the ICTR is only competent to prosecute persons for crimes that 
took place in Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for crimes committed in 
neighboring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.364  The ICTY Statute 
also provides that the Tribunal will have the power to prosecute persons responsible for 
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991.365 
 
The causes and relationships that may be investigated for the commission of crimes 
under both statutes are not solely restricted to what constituted the borders of Rwanda and 
                                                                                                                                                    
362  ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286 at 2. 
363 Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment (21 May 1999) (ICTR, 
Trial Chamber) online <http://www.ictr.org/default.htm> (accessed 24 April 2010), confirmed by 
Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment (1 June 2001) (ICTR, 
Appeals Chamber), online  <http://www.ictr.org/default.htm> (accessed 24 April 2010). 
364  ICTR Statute, supra note 15, art. 1. 
365  Ibid. 
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the former Yugoslavia at the time of the armed conflicts. For instance, allegations were 
made from an independent commission of the Rwandan government of France’s 
involvement in backing Rwanda’s Hutu government with political, military, diplomatic and 
logistical support during the genocide and training Hutu militias responsible for the 
slaughter of thousands of Tutsis.366   
 
Other countries have also been linked to the Rwandan and Former Yugoslavian 
conflicts through the intermediary of private contractors. 
 
Sub-section 1.  Involvement of Foreign Private Contractors 
 
In 1993, the United States was able to circumvent a United Nations arms embargo 
during the conflict of the Former Yugoslavia367 by referring the Defence Minister of Croatia 
to the services of Military Professional Resources, Incorporated (MPRI).  This American 
company is specialized in providing military training and expertise to governments and 
organizations worldwide.  It is alleged that the instructions of MPRI on a variety of non-
strategic subjects, such as leadership skills and the role of the military, while not directly in 
violation of the arms embargo, was instrumental in the success of the Croatian army’s 
Operation Uruja (or “Storm”) against the Serb-held Krajina region of Croatia.368  Most 
                                                 
366  “France Accused in Rwanda Genocide” BBC News (5 August 2008), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-2/hi/africa/754418.stm> (accessed 27 October 2009).  Relationships 
between both countries, France and Rwanda, were in fact stalled since 2006, after a French judge said 
President Paul Kagame helped spark the genocide, and Rwanda accused France of arming the Hutu 
militias. Both countries apparently restored ties in November 2009 with both countries agreeing to 
appoint ambassadors at the end of long negotiations.  See also, “France to set up Genocide Court”, BBC 
News, (7 January 2010), online: BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/8445629.stm> 
(accessed 27 October 2009): in January 2010, the French government announced that it will set up a new 
panel to try cases of genocide and war crimes committed in France or abroad.   The country is currently 
hearing several cases about Rwandan genocide suspects living in France.  
367  United Nations Security Council Resolution 713, U.N. SCOR (1991), cited in Matthew J. Gaul, 
“Regulating the New Privateers: Private Military Service Contracting and the Modern Marque” (1997-
1998) 31 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1489 at 1489. 
368  Gaul, ibid. at 1489-1490. 
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military analysts agreed that the evidence of American instruction in strategy and tactics 
were unmistakable.369    
 
Similarly, it has been observed that governments increasingly rely on private 
military service contractors like MRPI to disguise their own military objectives, to perform 
military and quasi-military functions abroad.  These corporate enterprises make their own 
profit for the services they offer in return.370 
 
Another form of corporate actors’ involvement in genocide in recent worldwide 
conflict is through the distribution and trade of light arms across borders.  It is alleged, for 
example, that more than a dozen nations have helped fuel the Rwandan war, namely 
through the sales of arms to all sides of the conflict and “[b]y its own admission, the 
Rwanda government bankrupted its economy to pay for those weapons”371 before and 
during the genocide. It seems that Rwandan government forces turned, among others, to 
Russians for the famous Kalashnikov AKM automatic rifles, and other nations, like France, 
Egypt and South Africa.372   
 
While a majority of the suppliers of weapons to the covert arms trade are not 
freelancing private arms dealers, but governments themselves, it is inevitable that 
companies indirectly become involved in such dealings.  For example, a $6 million contract 
between Egypt and Rwanda in March 1992, including the purchase by Rwanda of 60-mm 
and 82-mm mortars, 16,000 mortar shells, 122-mm D-30 howitzers, 3,000 artillery shells, 
rocket-propelled grenades, plastic explosives, antipersonnel land mines, and more than 
three million rounds of small arms ammunition was guaranteed by the nationalized French 
                                                 
369  Roger Cohen, “U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia after Winking at its Buildup” N.Y. Times (28 October 
1995), cited in Gaul, ibid. at 1490.  
370  Gaul, ibid. at 1491. 
371  Stephen D. Goose & Frank Smyth, “Arming Genocide in Rwanda”, (1994) 5 Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, 
86, online: Council on Foreign Relations <http://www.istor.org/stable/20046833?seq=2> (accessed 27 
October 2007). 
372  Ibid. at 89-90. 
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bank, Crédit Lyonnais.373  Moreover, according to Human Rights Watch, an independent 
nongovernmental organization, purchases from independent arms dealers probably include 
Kalashnikov automatic rifles, which are widely available throughout Africa, and Chinese 
stick grenades, also easily obtainable on the open market.374  
 
The realities of corporations’ involvement in international crimes have not been 
translated in the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, which only provides individual 
accountability for international crimes committed by natural persons.375 
 
Sub-section 2.  The Target: High-Ranking Corporate Officers 
 
As described in the previous chapter, the IMT and IMTFE judgments and 
subsequent military court trials conducted by the Allied countries have set the path for trials 
of high-ranking corporate officers before the international tribunals in lieu of corporations.  
In this regard, the responsibility of the individual corporate leaders mirrors the 
corporations’ responsibility before the eyes of justice. This in fact occurred in the Zyklon B 
case where it was inferred “that a competent business person in a leadership position will 
know the context behind the major efforts of his business. (...) Thus, tribunals will impute 
knowledge to certain corporate officials if the officials ordinarily must have knowledge of 
that type to effectively carry out his or her duties”.376 
 
Similarly, in Musema and the Media Case before the ICTR, prosecutors of 
international criminal law “of course attempt to pierce the corporate shell and get at the 
                                                 
373  Ibid. at 89.  
374  Human Rights Watch, Arming Rwanda - The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan 
War, Vol. 6, Issue 1 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1 January 1994), online: UNHCR 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7fc8.html> (accessed 11 October 2009). 
375  ICTR Statute, supra note 15, art. 5 and ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 6.   
376  Jacobson, supra note 175 at 195.  
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individuals behind it”.377  Most often, such individuals will be at a high-level managerial 
position or directors of the corporation who are interchangeably referred to as the “directing 
mind”, the “alter ego”, the “centre" of the corporate personality or the “vital organ" of the 
body corporate.378  
 
Capuano explains that to pierce the corporate veil there must be a sufficient level of 
control by the accused individuals over the corporation, which entails that they:  
 
“(1) are in control of a company or group of companies, and; (2) are            
(i) guilty of a crime, domestic or international as defined in the relevant law, 
(ii) a corporate or personal tort, or (iii) use the company as a sham, facade or 
to perpetrate fraud, or (iv) use the corporate structure to avoid existing legal 
liabilities and obligations that will foreseeably become legally enforceable 
(like prospective contract, enforceable labor rights, payments, foreseeable 
litigation etc), or (v), for any other reason which the courts have deemed 
appropriate to lift the corporate veil, and (3) have done so with male fides or 
in bad faith, capriciously and without legitimate commercial interests”.379 
                                                 
377  William A. Schabas, “Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices”, (2001) 83 
International Review of the Red Cross 439 at 453, Jacobson, ibid. at 231,  Andrew Clapham, “The 
Complexity of International Criminal Law: Looking Beyond Individual Responsibility to the 
Responsibility of Organizations, Corporations and States”, in R. Thakur and P. Malcontent (eds), From 
Sovereign Impunity to International Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (Tokyo: 
United Nations Press, 2004), 233 at 239, all cited in Joanna Kyriakakis, “Australian Prosecution of 
Corporations for International Crimes” (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 809 at 824, 
online: Journal of International Criminal Justice 
<http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/5/4/809> (accessed 6 January 2010). 
378  R. v. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co., 1985 SCC 1, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 at para. 20, online: S.C.R. 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1985/1985scr1-662/1985scr1-662.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2010) 
[hereinafter, Dredge]. 
379  Angelo Capuano, “The Realist's Guide to Piercing the Corporate Veil: Lessons from Hong Kong and 
Singapore” (2009) 1 Australian Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 23, 1 at 3, online: Social Science 
Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369110> (accessed 24 April 2010).  The civil law 
counterpart of this doctrine appears in the Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. c. 64, s. 317 [hereinafter, C.c.Q.]   
thus providing an exception to the principle of the distinct personality of a corporation from their 
members contained in s. 309 C.c.Q.  (its predecessor, the former s. 345 of the Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 
1987, c. 18, was the first article adopted to codify the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil in the world, 
but it was never entered into force). More specifically, s. 317 states that “[i]n no case may a legal person 
set up a juridical personality against a person in good faith if it is set up to dissemble fraud, abuse of 
right or contravention of a rule of public order”.  These provisions address situations in which a 
shareholder of a corporation manipulates and shields himself/herself behind the corporate shell, while 
acting in bad faith to commit a breach of public order.  It is usually applicable in situations where 
corporations are entirely controlled by one shareholder or a limited group of shareholders that use the 
corporation as an instrument to commit their wrongful acts, and otherwise referred to as the “alter ego” 
of the corporation.  It is in fact only under exceptional circumstances that the doctrine of lifting the 
86 
 
 
 The preferred option between individual or corporate prosecution has traditionally 
been divided by two schools of thought.  Advocates of prosecuting individuals support the 
philosophy of “methodological individualism”380 which holds “that only individuals are 
responsible, and that corporate action or corporate responsibility is no more than the sum of 
its individual parts”.381   
 
In contrast, proponents of “enterprise liability” or “collective responsibility”382 
theories argue in response that “the notion that individuals are real, observable, flesh and 
blood, while corporations are legal fictions is false.  Plainly, many features of corporations 
are observable (their assets, factories, decision-making procedures), while many features of 
individuals are not (for example, personality, intention, unconscious mind).383 
                                                                                                                                                    
corporate veil may be used against the directors of the corporation and particularly when a shareholder 
acts simultaneously in this capacity and in the capacity of a director.  Liability of directors is otherwise 
addressed in sections 1457 for contractual matters and 1526 in extra-contractual matters. (See Martel & 
Martel, supra note 36, at I-67- I-87, and specifically, at paras. 1-256-1-263; see also Crête & Rousseau, 
supra note 36, at 105-142) 
380  See e.g. Friedrich August Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: The University Chicago 
Press, 1980), Leonard H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (London : 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969); Eliezer Lederman, “Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: 
Rethinking a Complex Triangle” (1985) 76 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 285, Donald 
Cressey. “The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research’” in William S. Laufar & Freda Adler, 
eds.,  Advances in Criminological Theory Vol. 1, 31(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989) and  
George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (New York, Oxford University Press, 1979) and others, 
cited in Fisse and Braithwaite, supra note 52. 
381  Fisse and Braithwaite, ibid. at 18.  
382  See e.g. Kenneth Elzinga & William Breit, The Antitrust Penalties (New Haven, [Conn.]: Yale 
University Press, 1976), Reinier Kraakman, “Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal 
Controls” (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 857, Christopher Stone, “The Place of Enterprise Liability in the 
Control of Corporate Conduct” (1980) 90 Yale Law Journal 1, David Pearce, Anil Markandya & 
Edward B. Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy (London: Earthscan, 1989), Mitchel Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, “Should Employees be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of 
Corporate Liability”? (1993) 3 International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 13, 239, French, supra 
note 37, Fisse & Braithwaite, ibid.,  Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, “The Allocation of Responsibility 
of for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability” (1986-1988) 11 Sydney Law 
Review 468, Pamela H. Bucy, “Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability” 
(1990-1991) 75 Minnesota Law Review 1095.  
383  Fisse & Braithwaite, ibid. (supra note 52) at 19. The statement to the effect that many features of 
corporations are observable is based on the legal mistake of confusing the corporation and the business 
or enterprise that it contains, which are in fact two very different concepts.  A corporation, for example, 
can exist with no activities, or be used only for the purpose of holding shares in another corporation, i.e. 
a “holding corporation”.  It is a legal structure or a vehicle used to carry out a business. For instance, 
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 More specifically with regards to the commission of international crimes, “there is a 
moral concern that corporations that receive the profits from serious international crimes 
may continue to operate in the economic sphere with effective impunity (...). Finally, and 
perhaps the most commonly cited basis for corporate responsibility, is that this would allow 
access to corporate assets for the benefit of reparations to victims”.384 
 
These various controversies, political implications and startling conclusions of 
criminality based on individual responsibility for collective crimes re-emerged during the 
negotiations to establish a permanent international criminal court. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Professor Dufour refers to other legal structures that may also be used to carry out a business other than 
a corporation, such as an individual business, general partnerships, limited partnerships, undeclared 
partnerships in Quebec or limited liability partnerships in the common law provinces, a trust constituted 
by onerous title in Quebec or business trusts in the common law provinces and cooperatives [See 
Geneviève Dufour, Droit moderne des entreprises, (Montreal: Les Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008) at 16-18, 
n. 45-49].  On the other hand, Professor Dufour defines a business as “an organised economic activity, 
i.e. a set of assets and liabilities, material and human factors that are gathered for an economic purpose 
(and therefore to contribute to the economic cycle of production, circulation and consumption of goods 
and services), for profit or not, thus forming a complete entity, whose owner is a legal entity” [the 
original French version states: l’entreprise est une activité économique organisée, c’est-à-dire un 
ensemble d’actifs et de passifs, de facteurs humains et matériels qui sont réunis en vue d’une finalité 
(donc pour contribuer au cycle économique de production, circulation et consummation de biens et 
services), dans un but lucratif ou non, et forment donc un tout organique, dont une entité jurique va être 
le propriétaire], in ibid. at 15.  There is a debate in Quebec on the difference between a business and the 
carrying on of a business, caused mainly because of the definition of the latter expression in s. 1525 of 
the C.c.Q., supra note  279, without a distinct definition of a “business” in the Code.  After examining 
the positions of various legal authors in Quebec and in Canada on this matter, Professor Dufour 
determines that all positions refer to common elements that emerge from proposed definitions of both 
expressions: “business” and “carrying on of a business”, which are contained in her aforementioned 
definition of a “business”.  See ibid. at 15-33, citing, e.g. Nabil Antaki & Charlaine Bouchard, Droit et 
pratique de l’entreprise, 2d. ed., Vol. 1 (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007) at 195; Nicole 
Lacasse, Droit de l’entreprise, 6d. ed. (Quebec: Les ÉditionsNarval, 2002) at 23-27; Bernard Larochelle, 
Contrat de société et d’association, 2d. ed., (Montreal : Wilson & Lafleur, 2007) at 23; Patrice Vachon, 
« L’entreprise du Code civil du Québec » (1995) Repères 138 at 140 and others. Nevertheless, the 
simple decision-making process of a corporation, even one that does not carry out any business activities 
would be sufficient to submit it to the application of the law under the explanation provided by Fisse & 
Braithwaite. 
384  Kyriakakis, supra note 377 at 825-826. See also Ramasastry, supra note 155 at 96-97.   
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Chapter 3:  The International Criminal Court 
 
The drafters of the Rome Statute undertook to clarify and refine the existing 
international criminal law at the time of its adoption.  Despite interesting proposals and 
discussions to include corporate liability, the final text agreed upon did not contain any 
innovations on the topic and limited the jurisdiction of the ICC to individual criminal 
responsibility.385   
 
Section 1.  The Political Debate over the Jurisdiction Ratione Personae of the ICC  
 
The Rome Conference established that the jurisdiction of the ICC would extend only 
to natural persons. This decision was the result of numerous debates on a contentious draft 
provision, proposed by the French Delegation to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to 
legal persons in addition to natural persons.386 
 
The immediate reaction in the Commission of the Whole towards this proposal was 
far from uniform.387  First, there were many arguments in favor of including corporations as 
potential defendants in a case before the court.  It was argued that assigning responsibility 
on a legal person would increase the assurances of compensating victims, whereas the 
individual criminals may not always have the assets to pay the reparation ordered by the 
Court.  Second, the opprobrium attached to a conviction for an international crime would 
create a stigma on the legal person and thereby, penalize its operations. Third, the value of a 
                                                 
385  Clapham, supra note 100 at 160.   
386  Ibid. at 146. The proposal was contained in paragraphs 23 (5) and (6) of the draft Rome Statute (See UN 
Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 at 49, cited in ibid. 143-144).  
387  Jordan, Tunisia, Tanzania, Algeria and South Korea all expressed interest in the French proposal.  On 
the other hand, notwithstanding the Nuremberg precedent, scepticism about the utility and practicality of 
introducing such a clause was expressed by Australia, China, Syria, Greece, Portugal, Egypt, Poland, 
Slovenia, El Salvador and Yemen.  A third group were doubtful that the French proposal could work as 
it stood but were prepared to work on it to try to develop a viable text.  In this group we could include 
Ukraine, Cuba, Japan, Kenya and Singapore (ibid. at 147).  
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potential conviction was considered by its capacity to deter the commission of war crimes 
or crimes against humanity.388   
 
As the discussions progressed, the difficulties in obtaining a consensus on the 
various implications among delegations became more apparent.  A new text was proposed 
with a number of additions and modifications to respond to the various claims.389  The 
terminology of “legal persons” of the previous version was replaced by “juridical persons” 
to dispel the potential misunderstanding that illegal organizations would escape the Court’s 
jurisdiction.390 Furthermore, as opposed to the precedent of the Nuremberg trials, criminal 
prosecution of an individual would not necessarily flow from his particular position or 
membership in a juridical person declared criminal.391  Inversely, juridical persons would 
only be charged where a natural person in a position of control within it had also been 
charged and convicted on behalf and with the explicit consent of the legal person.392   
 
 This concept of a controlling or a directing mind is consistent with French law, 
according to which a legal entity may be held liable for the acts of individuals with high-
level decision-making authority.  The latter could be part of the corporation’s board of 
directors, the managing director, the superintendent, the manager or anyone else delegated 
by the board of directors.393  This liability doctrine, originating from British case law,394 is 
reflected in several jurisdictions around the world and was influential during the discussions 
of the Rome Conference.395   
                                                 
388  Ibid. at 147.  
389  Ibid. at 150.   
390  Ibid. at 151-152. 
391  Ibid. at 152.  
392  Ibid. at 153-154.   
393  Dredge, supra note 378 at 50.  
394 Lennard’s Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. [1915] A.C. 705, cited in ibid. at 16.  
395  Andrew Clapham, “Extending International Criminal Law beyond the Individual to Corporations and 
Armed Opposition Groups” (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 899 at 914-915.  Clapham 
refers to international treaties where this mode of corporate liability is incorporated, such as the Criminal 
Convention on Corruption adopted in the context of the Council of Europe Joint Action of 22 December 
1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of art. K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, OJ L 358, 31, 12, 
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Notwithstanding these changes, corporate liability became a debatable topic at the 
Rome Conference, particularly since other national jurisdictions follow different rules for 
determining corporate accountability.396  For instance, Australian law incorporates the 
concept of “corporate culture” as an alternate premise for corporate criminal liability in the 
Australian Criminal Code Act, adopted in 1995.397  Protagonists of this theory observe “the 
policies, standing orders, regulations and institutionalized practices of corporations are 
evidence of corporate aims, intentions and knowledge that are not reducible to the aims, 
intentions and knowledge of individuals within the corporation”.398  A third form of 
                                                                                                                                                    
1998, at 2, 4; the Convention on the Fight against Corruption involving Officials of the European 
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, OJ C 195, 25 June 1997, at 2, 11; 
the Convention on the protection of the European Communities financial interests, OJ C 316, 27 
November 1995, at 49, 57. 
396  Clapham, ibid. at 916. 
397  Justice Canada, Corporate Criminal Liability: Discussion Paper – Issues (Ottawa: Justice Canada, 
March 2002), online: Justice Canada <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/jhr-jdp/dp-dt/> 
[hereinafter, Justice Canada, Discussion Paper] (accessed 24 April 2010); Justice Canada, Government 
Response to the Fifteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights - Corporate 
Liability (Ottawa: Justice Canada, November 2002), online: Justice Canada 
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/jhr-jdp/index.html> (accessed 24 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth Report]; Justice Canada, A Plain Language Guide: Bill 
C-45 - Amendments To The Criminal Code Affecting The Criminal Liability Of Organizations (Ottawa: 
Justice Canada, 2004), at 3, online: Justice Canada <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-
min/pub/c45/c45.pdf>  (accessed 24 April 2010) [hereinafter, Justice Canada, A Plain Language 
Guide]. 
398  S. Field and N. Jorg, “Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should we be Going Dutch?” (1991) Crim. 
L.R. 156 at 159, cited in Anne-Marie Boisvert, “Corporate Criminal Liability. A Discussion Paper” 
(Paper presented to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, August 1999) at para. 35, online: ULCC 
<http://www.ulcc.ca/en/criminal/index.cfm?sec=3&sub=3e> (accessed 24 April 2010). An interesting 
Canadian example of how the corporate culture approach may determine criminal liability is the case          
R. v. Transpavé inc., EYB 2008-130943 (17 March 2008), [2008] J.Q. No 1857 (C.Q.) which led to the 
first corporate criminal conviction after the 2003 amendments that were brought to the corporate 
criminal liability regime under the Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 31. The charges were laid 
against Transpavé, Inc., a company based in St-Eustache, Quebec, for criminal negligence causing 
death.  The victim, Steve l’Écuyer, an employee of Transpavé, was crushed by the company’s machine 
while he was attempting to clear a pileup of paving blocks.  It seems that the grab of the machine was 
activated by a control lever that became unstuck.  An inspection later carried out by la  Commission de 
la Santé et de la Sécurité au Travail explained that the light curtain system had been disabled by a pen 
cap, and had been disabled for the majority of time in 2004 and 2005.  The inspectors also discovered 
that the company did not have any type of inspection program to confirm whether guarding systems 
were operational. Training systems for new operators were not reviewed by management. A member of 
management had also noted in the past that the light curtain guarding system was disabled but had not 
taken any action to address the situation. This clearly demonstrated a negligent corporate culture leading 
to the death of an employee in the workplace. A penalty of $100,000.00 was imposed on Transpavé by 
the Court of Quebec as well as an additional $10,000.00 victim assistance surcharge (See Cheryl A. 
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criminal accountability, the “vicarious liability model” or the doctrine of respondeat 
superior is applied in the United States,399 which engages corporate responsibility for the 
acts of its officer and agents acting within the scope of their employment for the benefit of 
the corporation.400 
 
The various legal traditions present at the Rome Conference created an atmosphere 
of criticism and indecision during the discussions on corporate accountability.  In the 
remaining two weeks, the French delegation finally withdrew its proposal, when it became 
clear that a text would not be adopted by consensus.401  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Edwards, “Corporate Criminal Liability Comes to Canada, Transpavé Convicted and Fined for Criminal 
Negligence Causing Death”, Part I, COS Magazine (May-June 2008), online: Heenan Blaikie 
<http://www.heenan.ca/en/media/pdfs/pdf/COS_Mag_Transpave_May_June_PartI2008.pdf;jsessionid=
28D26457376C7406B05491BBC6209AAB> (accessed 26 June 2010).  It must be noted that the concept 
of corporate culture is mainly relevant in “[m]any civil regulatory regimes” which “contain provisions 
stipulating that factors such as the deliberateness of the breach, the seniority of those involved, and the 
corporation's approach to compliance are relevant to the determination of an appropriate penalty; even 
where such provisions are not expressly applied, courts tend to take these factors into account. See, e.g., 
Trade Practices Commission v Dunlop Australia (1980) 30 ALR 469 at 484-5; Trade Practices 
Commission v. TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-375; Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 36 at 41-43; Environment Protection 
Authority v. Energy Services International Pty Ltd [2001] NSWLEC 59 at [22]-[35]; Environment 
Protection Authority v. Middle Harbour Constructions Pty Ltd (2002) 119 LGERA 440 at [57]-[58]”, 
cited in Allens Arthur Robinson, ‘Corporate Culture’ as a  Basis for the Criminal Liability of 
Corporations, (report prepared for the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General 
on Human Rights and Business, February 2008), at 11, n. 17, online: Allens Arthur Robinson 
<http://198.170.85.29/Allens-Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf> 
(accessed 26 June 2010).  One can also imagine for example, a corporate culture of a trucking company 
which encourages its drivers to disobey regulatory speed limits in order to increase its service 
performance.   In fact, to this date, there have been no convictions, even under Australian law, using the 
notion of corporate culture for fault-based crimes, which include international crimes (see infra note 
630, explaining the standard of liability for international crimes).  It would nonetheless be interesting to 
observe “how the development of jurisprudence in Australia on the concept of corporate culture for 
serious corporate misbehaviour could be instructive in the international debate toward models of 
corporate criminal liability” (Kyriakakis, supra note 377 at 826).  
399  The first case defining vicarious liability was developed in the 1909 judgment in New York Central & 
Hudson River Rail Road v. United States 212 U.S 481 (1909), cited in Dredge, supra note 378 at para. 
23. 
400  Egan v. United States 137 F.2d 369 (1943), per Thomas J., at 379 and United States v. Basic 
Construction Co., 771 F.2d 570 (1983) (5th CCA), cited in Dredge, ibid.   
401  Clapham, supra note 100 at 157. 
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According to Clapham, “as long as there is no international criminal court with 
jurisdiction over legal persons, we are unlikely to see an unambiguous international 
standard develop which details the requisite mental engagement of a company before it can 
be said to have committed an international crime. For the moment the field is likely to 
develop according to those national jurisdictions which are among the first to try 
corporations for international crimes.”402 
 
The personal jurisdiction of the Court was thus limited to natural persons only 
pursuant to article 25 (1) of the adopted Statute of the ICC.   
 
Section 2.  Modes of Attribution of Criminal Liability on Corporations for 
International Crimes under the Rome Statute  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC has recognized that the “crimes falling within the 
jurisdiction of this Court – those of ‘the most serious [...] concern to the international 
community as a whole’, and which ‘threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the 
world’ – will almost inevitably concern collective or mass criminality.”403  
 
This excerpt refers to the phenomenon of mass criminality and collective action in 
international crimes, previously explored by the various international tribunals set up since 
the Nuremberg era.  The tendency of the Pre-Trial Chamber has clearly been to cast a wide 
net of liability to include various categories of perpetrators in attributing individual criminal 
liability.  
 
A closer examination of each mode of individual criminal participation listed in                  
articles 25 (3) and 28 of the Rome Statute shows that the scope of liability is large enough 
                                                 
402  Clapham, supra note 395 at 917-918. 
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to include business actors and activities directly or indirectly involved in the commission of 
international crimes. 
 
 Sub-section 1. A New Doctrine of Co-perpetration for Individual 
 Responsibility under Article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute 
 
Professor Kai Ambos, a leading scholar who was a member of the German 
delegation at the Rome Conference, explains that the first part of article 25 (3) (a) of the 
Rome Statute distinguishes between three forms of perpetration: direct or immediate 
perpetration (“as an individual”), co-perpetration (“jointly with another”) and perpetration 
by means (“through another person”).404  
 
Paragraph 1.  Direct Perpetration 
 
 There is little interpretation that can be given to direct perpetration of a crime.  
Importantly, it must be retained that only individuals and no collective entities (including 
corporations) may be held responsible for directly committing a crime under the Rome 
Statute. 
 
 With regards to other perpetration forms in this paragraph, various authors and the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC in the Lubanga405 and Katanga406 confirmations of charges 
                                                                                                                                                    
403  The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on 
Confirmation of Charges (26 September 2008) at para. 501 (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber), online: ICC 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2010) [hereinafter, Katanga]. 
404  Kai Ambos, “Individual Criminal Responsibility, Article 25 Rome Statute” in 1st ed.by Otto Triffterer, 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. – Observers’ Notes, Article by 
Article (München: C.H. Beck – Hart – Nomos, 1999), 475 at 478. See also Ambos, supra note 315 at 
748. 
405  The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Confirmation of Charges (29 
January 2007) (ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber), online: ICC <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc266175.PDF> (accessed 24 April 2010) [hereinafter, Lubanga] 
406  Katanga, supra note 403. 
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decisions have referred to German law to explain the legal concepts of “perpetration by 
means” and “joint or co-perpetration”.   
 
Paragraph 2.  Perpetration by Means 
 
 First, perpetration by means presupposes that the person who commits the crime 
(intermediary, intermédiaire, Tatmittler) can be used as an instrument or a tool (Werkzeug) 
by the indirect perpetrator (auteur médiat).  The indirect perpetrator is, in fact, the master-
mind or "individual in the background" (Hintermann),407 while the intermediary is normally 
an innocent agent, not responsible for the criminal act.408  
 
However, as described by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Katanga confirmation of 
charges decision, there are situations where perpetration by means occurs with a completely 
culpable direct perpetrator.409 In such cases, the "Hintermann" dominates the direct 
perpetrators by way of a hierarchical organizational structure, i.e., 
"Organizationsherrschaft".410   
                                                 
407  Ambos, supra note 404 at 479. See also Ambos, supra note 315, at 752-753. 
408  Ibid.  
409  Katanga, supra note 403.  See also Ambos, ibid. (supra note 404) and Ambos, supra note 315 at 753-
754.  
410  Ambos, ibid. (supra note 404). The German legal concept of “organizationsherrschaft”, currently 
integrated in s. 25 (1) of the German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, as promulgated on 13 November 
1998 in the Federal Law Gazette I, p. 945, p. 3322) was first created by German author Roxin Claus in 
his analysis of Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, supra note 73 [see Claus 
Roxin, Straftaten im Rahmen Organisatorischer Machtapparate (Criminal Acts within the Framework of 
Organizational Apparatus of Hierarchical Power), in Goltdammer's Archiv ffir Strafrecht (Goltdammer's 
Archive of Criminal Law) 193-207 (1963), cited in Mark Osiel, “The Banality of Good: Aligning 
Incentives Against Mass Atrocity” (2005) 105 Columbia Law Journal, 1751 at 1831]. It was  created to 
punish what is called a Schreibtischtäter, the principal of a crime who controls accomplices belonging to 
an organizational entity in such a way that the desired aim is reached with certainty [See C. Roxin, 
Taterschaft und Tatherrschaft (8th edn, De Gruyter, Berlin 2006), pp. 242–52, 704–17, cited in Kai 
Ambos, “Command responsibility and Organisationsherrschaft: ways of attributing international crimes 
to the ‘most responsible’”  in  André Nollkaemper & Harmen Van Der Wilt, eds., System Criminality in 
International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 127 at 142].  Argentine judges first 
used this mode of liability when convicting the country's military juntas for large-scale human rights 
abuses.  German courts later used it to convict high-ranking superiors of the German Democratic 
Republic’s National Defense Counsel for issuing orders to the border guards to shoot East Germans 
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 The Pre-Trial Chamber described that the most important characteristics of this 
apparatus are: (i) the authority and control of its leader; (ii) the automatic compliance of 
his/her subordinates; and (iii) a sufficient number of subordinates in order to ensure that 
their replacement will not affect the successful execution of the plan.411 Importantly, 
criminal responsibility of a person – whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person – must be determined under the “control over the crime” approach 
used for distinguishing between principals and accessories.412   
 
 This mode of liability has not yet been made applicable to corporations under the 
Rome Statute and in national jurisdictions. In fact, it is mostly used to break the barriers 
leading to the responsibility of leaders and politicians in a state bureaucracy.  It is however 
plausible to consider the evolution of international criminal law in this regard, particularly 
with the development of agency theories in common law jurisdictions to hold parent 
corporations liable for acts of their subsidiaries that they control.413 
                                                                                                                                                    
scaling the Berlin Wall [See both cases cited as Camara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Criminal y 
Correccional de la Capital (9 December 1985) 309-I/II Coleccion Oficial de Fallos de la Corte Suprema 
de Justicia de la Nacion (‘Fallos’) 1601–2 and BGHSt 40, 218 (Official collection of the Supreme Court 
judgments in criminal matters) 236 et seq. BGH (1994) NJW 2703, cited and described in Ambos, ibid. 
at 143 and Osiel, ibid.].  The theory of a principal behind the direct perpetrator has also been used in 
Peruvian jurisprudence and most notably against the former President, Alberto Fujimori, for the 
assassination of 25 Peruvians and serious injuries caused to others by Grupo Colina, the paramilitary 
group which he controlled in the 1990’s [see Sentencia de 7.4.2009, Sala Penal Especial de la Corte 
Suprema contra Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, cited in Iván Meini, “La autoría mediata por dominio de la 
organización en el caso Fujimori”. Comentario a la sentencia de fecha 7.4.2009 (Exp. a.v. 19 - 2001) 
emitida por la Sala Penal especial de la Corte Suprema  (2009) 11 Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik, 549 at 602, online : ZIS <http://www.zis-
online.com/dat/ausgabe/2009_11_ger.pdf> (accessed 27 June 2010)]. 
411  Katanga, supra note 403 at paras. 512-517.  
412 Ibid. at para. 510.   
413 On the one hand, Ambos states that, “for the purpose of imputation in criminal law the ‘man’ or people 
in the background are always natural, not juridical persons. This does not deny that system criminality 
(…) refers to situations where collective entities order or encourage, or permit or tolerate the 
commission of international crimes. This collective element precisely concerns the system level of 
macro criminality and explains the existence of a collective or context element in international crimes” 
(see Ambos, supra note 410). The concept has nevertheless been considered to potentially hold directors 
of corporations liable for crimes committed workers and employees [see Thomas Rotsch, “Considering 
the hypertrophy of law” (2009) 3 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 89 at 91 (online: 
ZIS <http://www.zis-online.com/dat/ausgabe/2009_3_ger.pdf> (accessed 27 June 2010)]. Under a 
similar doctrine, the “agency theory”, United States courts have held that parent corporations are liable 
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The control criterion, first established by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga, also 
became an essential element of the concept of co-perpetration developed by the same 
Chamber in the Lubanga confirmation of charges decision.414 
 
Paragraph 3.  Co-perpetration 
 
Co-perpetration, which falls under the expression “jointly with another” in article 25 
(3) (a) of the Rome Statute, “is characterised by a functional division of tasks between the 
different (at least two) co-perpetrators, who are normally interrelated by a common plan or 
agreement. Every co-perpetrator fulfils a certain task which contributes to the commission 
of the crime and without which the commission would not be possible”.415 
 
The agreement or common plan between two or more persons in a co-perpetration 
must include an element of criminality, although it does not need to be specifically directed 
                                                                                                                                                    
for the acts of their subsidiaries acting as their agents on foreign territory in violation of human rights 
and international criminal law [see e.g. Bowoto v Chevron Texaco Corp, 312 F.Supp. 2d 1229 (N.D. Cal. 
2004), Doe v ExxonMobil Corp, 573 F.Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2008), Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 
226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir 2000), and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman Energy, Inc, 244 F.Supp. 2d 
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), all cited in Jonathan C. Drimmer, “Human Rights and Extractive Industries: 
Litigation and Compliance Trends” (2010) 2 Journal of World Energy Law and Business, Vol. 3, 121 at 
125-127, online: Oxford Law Journals <http://jwelb.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/3/2/121>  (accessed 
27 June 2010)]. While there are no authors or jurisprudence that support such a view, this thesis 
proposes that in certain cases, the agent subsidiaries could be considered to be the Tatmittler acting on 
behalf of the parent corporation (Hintermann) (more information will be provided on this subject in the 
last chapter of this thesis).  Also closer to the concept of “organisationsherrschaft”, one can imagine a 
hypothetical situation of mining corporations (the Hintermann) operating in a conflict zone and using 
child labourers (an innocent agent in international criminal law, or the Tatmittler) to carry out violations 
of international criminal law, such as killing other children and families or setting fire to residential 
structures, in order to have access to rebel territory’s resources.  In fact, employment of children under 
eighteen years of age in the mining industry, and particularly small-scale artisanal mining corporations is 
well-documented by international organizations [see, e.g. International Labour Office, Eliminating Child 
Labour in Mining and Quarrying (Geneva: United Nations, 2005), online: 
<http://www.ilo.org/public/portugue/region/eurpro/lisbon/pdf/minas.pdf> (accessed, 27 June 2010) and 
Rukmini Callimachi & Bradley Klapper, Exploited Children Stories (Tenkoto: Associated Press, 2008), 
at 8-15, online: Associated Press < http://www.ap.org/media/pdf/calimachi.pdf> (accessed 27 June 
2010)]. 
414  Lubanga, supra note 405 at paras. 340, 342. 
415  Ambos, supra note 315 at 748-749.    
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at the commission of a crime.416  In this sense, co-perpetration liability under article 25 (1) 
(a) of the Rome Statute resembles the ad hoc tribunals’ JCE III, where the crime committed 
need not necessarily have been part of the common plan or design of the participants.  It 
suffices that the latter were at least aware of the risk of such an outcome.  
 
The mens rea of this mode of liability requires that the suspect fulfil all the 
subjective elements of the crime with which he or she is charged, including any requisite 
dolus specialis or ulterior intent.417  Basing itself on article 30 of the Rome Statute,418 the 
Chamber endorsed the application of dolus eventualis as a minimal level of subjective 
“intent and knowledge” requirement necessary for the crime of co-perpetration, i.e. the 
suspect reconciles himself/herself and accepts the risk that the objective elements of the 
crime may result from his or her actions or omissions.419  
  
In terms of criminal responsibility, dolus eventualis for co-perpetration is very 
closely related to the intention requirements of JCE III as developed in Tadíc, Brdanin and 
other cases of the ad hoc tribunals.  The Pre-Trial Chamber specifies in this regard that “if 
the risk of bringing about the objective elements of the crime is low, the suspect must have 
clearly or expressly accepted the idea that such objective elements may result from his or 
her actions or omissions”.420   
 
                                                 
416  Lubanga, supra note 405 at para. 345.  
417  Lubanga, supra note 405 at para. 349.  
418  Ibid. at 350; Katanga, supra note 403 at para. 528 . Article 30 of the Rome Statute specifies : 
 1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and 
knowledge.  
 2.  For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:  
  (a)   In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
  (b)   In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it  will 
occur in the ordinary course of events. 
 3.  For the purposes of this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events. "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed 
accordingly (Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 30). 
419  Lubanga, ibid. at paras. 351-352; Katanga, ibid. at paras. 529-530. 
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According to Professor Weigend, “[t]he problem with the PTC’s formula is that it 
seems to make punishment depend on a (non-provable) subjective attitude rather than on 
the amount of risk the actor took”.421 It is, in this regard, questionable whether 
foreseeability of risks will be upheld as an acceptable level of intention under the Trial and 
Appeal Chambers future interpretations of article 30 of the Rome Statute in this case.   
 
With respect to corporate actors, these low requisites of knowledge and intent for 
co-perpetration, if endorsed by future Trial Chamber judgments, could potentially cast large 
webs of doubt on the legality of their operations in perilous zones of conflict and war in the 
event of future prosecutions based on international criminal law in domestic jurisdictions.  
Indeed, fluctuations of the stock market in such a globalized and modern business world are 
closely linked to the accessibility of information through increased use of internet and 
progress in communication technology. It would therefore be difficult to justify that the 
corporation as a whole or its representing officers did not possess the proper information 
tools to make prior assessments of legal risks associated with conducting business on 
territories prone to insecurity and violence.  
 
On the other hand, the Pre-Trial Chamber has raised the intent threshold of co-
perpetration in comparison to that of JCE III by requiring that the suspect and the other co-
perpetrators must all be mutually aware and mutually accept that implementing their 
common plan may result in the realisation of the objective elements of the crime.422  
Furthermore, the Lubanga and Katanga Pre-Trial Chamber decisions applied the German 
doctrine of “functional control over the act” (“funktionelle Tatherrschaft”), where 
“although none of the participants has overall control over the offence because they all 
                                                                                                                                                    
420  Lubanga, ibid. at para. 355.  
421  Weigend, supra note 161 at 483-484. See also Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 113 (of the view this level of 
intent is excluded from the strict mens rea requirements of Article 30 of the Rome Statute). 
422  Lubanga, supra note 405 at para. 361, 363 and Katanga, supra note 403 at para. 533.  
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depend on one another for its commission, they all share control because each of them 
could frustrate the commission of the crime by not carrying out his or her task”.423  
 
Co-perpetration therefore differs from the ad hoc tribunals’ common purpose 
doctrine which only requires a significant and substantial contribution in a JCE.424 The 
advantage of the model of co-perpetration is that it “ends the dissatisfaction with the failing 
terminology of complicity liability” in the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and makes each 
co-perpetrator an essential principal to the crime.425    
 
As a means of proving control, the Pre-Trial Chamber refers to the leader’s capacity 
to hire, train, impose discipline, and provide resources to his subordinates.426  Moreover, 
essential contributions before or during the execution stage of the crime may include acts 
such as “designing the attack, supplying weapons and ammunitions, exercising the power 
to move the previously recruited and trained troops to the fields; and/or coordinating and 
monitoring the activities of those troops”.427   
 
Such levels of involvement may be difficult to prove with regards to corporations. 
However, certain types of corporations, particularly MNC’s, have gained substantial 
influence in the world and often carry important roles on the territories in which they 
operate.  
 
Furthermore, the “[p]rincipals to a crime are not limited to those who physically 
carry out the objective elements of the offence, but also include those who, in spite of being 
                                                 
423  Lubanga, ibid. at para. 342 and Katanga, ibid. at 539.  See also Weigend, supra note 161 at 479-480 (on 
the description of the “essential tasks” theory). 
424  Ambos, supra note 315 at 752. See also Héctor Olásolo, “Reflections on the Treatment of the Notions of 
Control of the Crime and Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Stakic Appeal Judgement” (2007) 7 
International Criminal Law Review 143 at 153. 
425  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 113. 
426  Katanga, supra note 403 at para. 513.  
427  Ibid. at para. 526.  
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removed from the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission”.428  In 
counterpart, it would need to be proven that the directors or high-level managers of an 
MNC maintained a significant degree of control over the criminal acts committed at the 
scene of the crime.  
 
Sub-section 2.  Common Purpose Liability under Article 25 (3) (d) of the Rome 
Statute 
 
The common purpose doctrine in article 25 (3) (d) of the Rome Statute states that an 
individual may be held criminally liable if he/she contributes to the commission or 
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common 
purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either “(i) [b]e made with the aim 
of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group where such activity or 
purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) [b]e 
made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime”.429 
 
Although various analogies have been made between the co-perpetration and ad hoc 
tribunal JCE liability doctrines,430 Professors Ambos and Weigend distinguish the various 
forms of liability.431  In this regard, “since the JCE doctrine resembles the law of 
conspiracy, its inclusion in the ICC Statute would conflict with the intent of the Rome 
Statute’s drafters, who explicitly rejected conspiracy and drafted Article 25 (3)(d) as a 
                                                 
428  Ibid. at para. 485. See also Weigend, supra note 162 at 476. 
429  Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 25(3)(d). 
430  Sliedregt would tend to associate JCE I to sub-paragraph 25(3)(d)(i) Rome Statute which requires a 
shared intent by the perpetrators and JCE III to sub-paragraph 25(3)(d)(ii) which provides a lower 
threshold of intent and knowledge, thereby suggesting that the co-perpetrator does not have to share the 
mens rea of the actual perpetrator.  The author adds that JCE II could fall under both sub-paragraphs, 
depending on whether the suspects intended to further the ongoing criminal activity, i.e. the functioning 
of a concentration camp for sub-paragraph (i) or for suspects “who cannot be identified as the ideologists 
behind it but had knowledge of the system and intended to further it” for sub-paragraph (ii) (Sliedregt, 
supra note 91 at 108).   
431  Kai Ambos, “Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility” 1 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, Vol. 5 159 at 172-173 and Weigend, supra note 161 at 176 
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compromise formula”.432 This reasoning is persuasive considering the term “conspiracy” 
included in previous drafts of the Rome Statute was eventually dropped in later 
documents.433  Nevertheless, it must be noted that the mixed conspiracy-complicity concept 
which developed from the IMT and subsequent Nuremberg trials is reflected in article 25 of 
the Rome Statute through the English “common purpose” concept contained in paragraph 
3(d).434   
 
Future interpretations of the ICC Trial Chamber may clarify this paragraph of the 
Rome Statute and the notion of common purpose liability.  At this stage, it is important to 
retain that the ICC legislation and initial case law seems to provide for individual liability 
of various actors that may be incurred through common purpose liability doctrines with 
forseeability as a likely level of intention requirement.   
 
In terms of corporate liability, the ICJ Experts Panel provides some examples of 
common purpose liability’s application to corporations.  One such situation would be where 
the personnel of a contracted security services committed international crimes on civilians. 
In addition to proving that the company and the security provider were acting with the 
common purpose of securing the company’s personnel and assets, and that crimes were 
committed in furtherance of that purpose, “[t]he critical issue will again be one of intention 
and knowledge: to what extent did the company official knowingly contribute to the 
commission of the crimes or the furtherance of the purpose?”.435  Among various factors 
that the courts may consider, foreseeability would be more likely, “where the security 
forces in question have a record of gross human rights abuses”.436  Furthermore, the Panel 
points out that “the level of proximity between the company and the security forces will 
                                                 
432  Ambos, ibid. at 172-173.  
433  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 94-95.  Slieregt describes that article 2(3) of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes 
introduced a conspiracy-complicity concept generating liability only when a person “directly participates 
in planning or conspiring to commit such a crime which in fact occurs”.  
434  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 95.  
435  ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286 at 43.  
436  ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. I, supra note 50 at 29. 
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usually be high”.437  Notably, “the company and the security forces will need to share a 
certain level of information. The security forces may be present on the company’s 
premises, and/or have access to its equipment. At times the company may pay a fee to the 
security providers”.438   
 
Sub-section 3.  Other Modes of Participation under the Rome Statute 
 
Until the ICC future case law addresses the various modes of participation in 
international crimes provided under the Rome Statute, the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence 
describing such modes may be referred to for their definition under existing international 
criminal law. 
 
Paragraph 1.  Orders, Solicits or Induces under Article 25 (3) (b) of the Rome 
Statute 
 
The ICTR/ICTY equivalent of “orders, solicits or induces” under article 25 (3) (b) 
of the Rome Statute is “planned, ordered, instigated” as incorporated in articles 6(1)/7(1) 
ICTR/ICTY Statutes.439   
 
The term “inducing” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as: “to bring on or about, 
to affect, cause, to influence an act or course of conduct, lead by persuasion or reasoning, 
incite by motives, prevail on”.440   According to Sliedregt, “inducing” in the Rome Statute 
“seems to constitute the lowest grade of instigation and is broad enough to cover any type 
of influence causing another person to commit a crime”.441 
 
                                                 
437  Ibid. at 29.  
438  Ibid.  
439  Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 78.  
440  Ibid. at 77. 
441  Ibid.  
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“Soliciting” in Black’s Law Dictionary is defined as “asking, enticing, urgent 
request”.442 
 
With regards to “ordering”, Slieregt refers to the existence of a superior-subordinate 
relationship, de jure or de facto, and an underlying (subordinate) crime.  Furthermore, 
“ordering should be interpreted as implying issuance by a person ‘who is in a position of an 
authority and uses his authority to compel another individual to commit a crime”.443  
 
Paragraph 2.  Aiding and Abetting under Article 25 (3) (c) of the Rome Statute 
 
 Also similar to the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, article 25 (3) (c) of the Rome 
Statute provides that individual criminal responsibility may be held against a person who 
aids, abets or otherwise assists in the commission or attempted commission of a crime for 
the purpose of facilitating its commission.444  While there have been no cases heard by the 
ICC on this form of liability, the District Court of New York has cited a number of services 
and goods that a corporation can provide that would engage its responsibility under aiding 
and abetting liability of the Rome Statute.  This includes the provision of information for 
use by interrogators, selling transportation vehicles, sale of computer and technology to 
support denationalization processes and other ethnic or racial discriminatory measures; and 
selling armaments and related equipment and expertise to assist governments or rebel 
groups in carrying out extrajudicial killings.445 
 
                                                 
442  Ibid.  
443  Ibid. at 78.   
444  Ibid. 88.  
445  In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (SDNY 2009) at paras. 264-296 cited in 
Duane W. Krohnke, “US Federal Courts Rely on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 
Civil Cases”, American Non-governmental Organization Coalition for the International Criminal Court 
(AMICC) (9 November 2009), online: AMICC 
<http://www.amicc.org/docs/Krohnke%20on%20Khulumani.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2010). The 
corporations referred to included GM, Ford, Daimler, IBM, Fujitsu Ltd, and Rheinmetall Group A.G. 
104 
 
 
Paragraph 3.  Direct and Public Incitement to Genocide under Article 25 (3) (e) 
of the Rome Statute 
 
The ICTR Trial Chamber described the actus reus of the offence of incitement to 
commit genocide as: 
 
“[d]irectly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit genocide, whether 
through speeches, shouting or threats uttered in public places or at 
public gatherings, or through the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or 
display of written material or printed matter in public places or at 
public gatherings, or through the public display of placards or posters, 
or through any other means of audiovisual communication”.446 
 
The mens rea of this mode of liability would require an  
 
“intent to directly prompt or provoke another to commit 
genocide.  It implies a desire on the part of the perpetrator 
to create by his actions a particular state of mind necessary 
to commit such a crime in the minds of the person(s) he is 
engaging”.447  
 
Consistent with the ICTR Media Case described in the previous chapter,448 direct 
and public incitement to genocide is also prohibited under article 25 (3) (e) of the Rome 
Statute. 
 
Paragraph 4.  Attempt under Article 25 (3) (f) of the Rome Statute 
 
Finally, article (3) (f) of the Rome Statute provides criminal responsibility for the 
attempt to commit an international crime.  It is generally agreed that punishment for 
attempt is part of international customary law.449 
                                                 
446  Akayesu, supra note 28 at para. 559. See Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 110.  
447  Akayesu, ibid. at  para. 559.  See Sliedregt, ibid.   
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 The codification of attempt under the Rome Statute is in fact novel compared to 
previous international criminal tribunals’ Statutes.  Indeed, conspiracy, incitement and 
attempt were included in relation only to the crime of genocide under articles 2(3)(b),(c) 
and (d)/4(3)(b),(c),(d) ICTR/ICTY Statutes.  Article 25 of the Rome Statute no longer 
mentions conspiracy, retains incitement to genocide and extends the notion of attempt to all 
three crimes.450  Rikhof differentiates the three by explaining that incitement consists in a 
suggestion, conspiracy in an agreement and attempt in an offence that had begun but was 
not yet been completed.451 
 
This mode of participation under the Rome Statute is committed when a crime is 
commenced “by means of a substantial step”.452  Werle underlines that considerable 
doctrinal and jurisprudential efforts by the ICC lie ahead with regards to clarifying the legal 
requirements of attempt under this paragraph.453   
 
Sub-section 4.  Criminal Responsibility of Military Commanders and Other 
Superiors under Article 28 of the Rome Statute 
 
The Rome Statute provides a more detailed description of superior responsibility 
compared to the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals.  First, article 28 Rome Statute draws a 
clear distinction between military commanders in its paragraph (a) and non-military 
superiors in paragraph (b).454 
                                                                                                                                                    
448  Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze, ICTR-99-52-T, 
Judgment (3 December 2003) (ICTR, Trial Chamber) [hereinafter, The Media Case, ICTR Trial 
Chamber] and The Media Case, supra note 291.  Please refer to pages 65-66 above. 
449  Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (The Netherlands, T·M·C Asser Press, 2005) at 
168. 
450  Rikhof, supra note 30 at 705.  
451 Ibid. 
452  Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 25 (1)(f). 
453  Gerhard Werle, supra note 449 at 169.  
454  Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 28. 
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Moreover, contrary to the possibility of invoking the “should have known” intent 
requirement under the ad hoc tribunals’ Statutes, the bar is raised under the Rome Statute 
for non-military commanders who either knew or “consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated that the subordinates were committed or about to commit such 
crimes”.455  Thus, contrary to a military superior who must take the initiative of informing 
himself of his/her subordinates’ activities, non-military superiors do not have a duty to 
inform themselves of every single one of the activities of persons under his control456 nor 
are they required to control their subordinates “twenty-four hours in a day”.457   
 
Other relevant criteria to judge non-military superior responsibility are consistent 
with jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. This includes the duty to take all reasonable 
measures to prevent or repress the crime458 and that the subordinates who committed the 
crime were under the effective responsibility and control of the superior.459   
 
Various authors agree that corporate actors could be held liable under the provisions 
of command responsibility within national jurisdictions as in the ICTR Musema and Media 
cases, described above.460  The ICJ Experts Panel also expresses that “any company 
operating in countries in conflict, or where gross human rights violations or abuses are 
widespread or systematic, should be especially vigilant to exercise due diligence and put 
into place policies and procedures of management oversight to ensure that superiors take 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or punish acts committed by subordinates 
that could amount to crimes”.461  Particularly, the Panel indicates that corporate officials 
                                                 
455  Ibid., art. 28(b)(i). 
456  Boisvert, Dumont & Petrov, supra note 356 at 132. See Ruzindana, ICTR Trial Chamber, supra note 
363 at para. 228. 
457  Boisvert, Dumont & Petrov, ibid. at 135. 
458  Ibid. at 133. 
459  Procureur c. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, arrêt d’appel (30 mai 2001), at para. 76 cited in ibid. at 118. The 
control may be granted by law or exist in facts (Prosecutor v. Musema, supra note 356, at para. 143). 
460  Boisvert, Dumont & Petrov, supra note 356 at 109-111.  See also Manual for the Ratification and 
Implementation of the Rome Statute, supra note 26 at 87.  
461  ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II, supra note 286 at 35.  
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operating in conflict zones conducting private security functions, or mining or resource 
companies which employ their own security personnel must exercise strict control over 
their employees for safety purposes.462   
 
For instance, collaboration with the South African mercenary, Executive Outcomes, 
allowed the Sierra Leonean government to gain control of the diamond region Kono and 
fight the rebels out of this territory.  This caught the attention of the international legal 
community on the agreements entered into between Executive Outcomes and Diamond 
Works, a Canadian company registered at the Toronto Stock Exchange.463 
 
The superior responsibility of Executive Outcomes and Diamond Works over 
violations of international criminal law could not be addressed before the ICC under its 
jurisdiction which only extends to natural persons.  It would therefore be necessary to 
identify the individual actors within the corporation who were the most highly involved and 
against whom the evidence most saliently points to their participation in crimes through 
their business dealings and operations.   
 
The following section provides additional background on the limits of personal 
jurisdiction of the ICC, as well as the alternative possibility of resorting to national 
jurisdictions for prosecution of corporations for international crimes. 
 
 
                                                 
462  Ibid.  
463  Boisvert, Dumont & Petrov, supra note 356 at 109-111; Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie & Ralph Hazleton, 
The Heart of the Matter. Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Ottawa: Partnership Africa 
Canada, January 2000) at 9, online: Partnership Africa Canada 
<http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/diamonds_KP/heart_of_the_matter_summary-Eng-Jan2000.pdf> 
(accessed 21 October 2009); Alain Deneault, Delphine Abadie & William Sacher, Noir Canada. Pillage, 
corruption et criminalité en Afrique (Montréal, Écosociété, 2008) at 184-186; KAIROS, Africa’s 
Blessing, Africa’s Curse.  The Legacy of Resource Extraction in Africa (Toronto: Thistle Printing Ltd., 
2004) at 13. 
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Section 3.  Personal Liability of the Alter Ego of a Corporation:  Issues of Jurisdiction 
and the Complementarity Principle 
 
As described above, the ICC solely has jurisdiction over natural persons and not 
over organizations or States.  
 
Similarly to the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals, corporate liability may be 
indirectly addressed before the ICC by prosecuting the individual alter ego of a 
corporation.  Nevertheless, jurisdiction for international crimes extends beyond the 
boundaries of the ICC.  Indeed, national jurisdictions still remain fully competent to resort 
to their own judicial authorities and legislation for the application of international criminal 
law.  In this regard, Williams and Castel suggest that “the essence of a crime of 
international law would require that it belong to the jurisdiction of all States”.464 In fact, 
international criminal law privileges sovereignty and equality of States.  These principles 
continue to dominate international relations.465  Sovereignty is in fact so sacred that the 
State Parties to the Rome Conference chose to confer prerogative to national jurisdictions 
to judge international crimes before the ICC. As a result, the principle of complementarity 
was ultimately enshrined in the Rome Statute, under the provisions of its Preamble and 
article 1.466 
 
 
 
                                                 
464  Dumont & Gallié, supra note 62 at 110.  
465  Buck, supra note 55 at 125-126. 
466  The Rome Statute, supra note 20 states in its preamble, paragraph 10: “Emphasizing that the 
International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions”.  Furthermore, according to article 1: “[a]n International Criminal Court ("the Court") is 
hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this 
Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning 
of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.” [emphasis added]. 
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According to this principle, the inadmissibility of a case before the ICC is 
determined under the following circumstances: 
 
“(a)   The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to 
carry out the investigation or prosecution;    
 
  (b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it 
and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless 
the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State 
genuinely to prosecute”.467  
 
Based on these provisions, authors Dumont and Gallié logically interpret that if a 
State party wishes to prosecute ICC crimes it should, at a minimum, enact legislation 
allowing it to apply territorial jurisdiction over such crimes and extra-territorial jurisdiction 
over its nationals who commit crimes abroad.  States should also ensure the existence of 
laws and procedures to carry out such investigations and prosecutions in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of the ICC Statute; grant “universal” or other appropriate heads of 
jurisdiction to all relevant national authorities, in order to facilitate prosecution of ICC 
crimes at a national level, wherever and whenever they may have been committed; and 
implement procedures to enable relevant authorities to take full advantage of the Court’s 
“complementary” jurisdiction.468  
 
The complementarity principle led many States to enact international criminal law 
provisions in their national legislations. This has permitted the prosecution of corporations 
for international crimes in their jurisdictions. Thus, regardless of the omission of legal 
persons from the ICC’s jurisdiction, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, France, Norway, India, Japan and the United States have also introduced some or 
                                                 
467  Rome Statute, ibid. art. 17(1).  
468  Dumont & Gallié, supra note 62, 106-107.  
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all of the international crimes contained within the Rome Statute into their domestic laws as 
applicable to legal persons and with varying degrees of extraterritorial reach”.469 
 
 The next part of this thesis will focus on Canada’s application of international 
criminal law as a case study on the accountability of corporations for international crimes 
within a national jurisdiction.  
 
Part II : Canadian Corporations as Subjects of Liability 
for International Crimes under Canadian Criminal Law 
 
The possibility of prosecuting corporations for criminal offences in Canada is a 
combined product of common law, jurisprudence and legislative developments. The 
Supreme Court of Canada first addressed the accountability of corporations for mens rea 
crimes in 1985 in the case of R. v. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co [hereinafter, “Dredge”].470  
According to the court’s judgment, corporations have been subjects liable for indictable and 
regulatory offences for several decades in most common law jurisdictions, including the 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada. 
 
 With respect to accountability of corporations for international crimes, Canada 
deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute on 7 July 2000.  According to 
sub-section 11 (g) of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, a person may 
be found guilty of an act or an omission if it constituted an offence under Canadian or 
international law and was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by 
the community of nations.471 Nevertheless, since Canada practices a dualist approach with 
respect to the domestic effect of international treaties, the implementation of international 
                                                 
469  2004 FAFO Report, supra note 78 and Kyriakakis, supra note 78.  
470  Dredge, supra note 378.  This case also refers to two previous decisions by lower instance courts, R. v. 
Fane Robinson Ltd., [1941] 3 D.L.R. 409 and R. v. St. Lawrence Corp., [1969] 2 O.R. 305 (C.A.), 
having previously addressed the issue of corporate liability for mens rea crimes based on common law 
jurisprudence imported from England. 
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criminal law of the Rome Statute on its territory requires the adoption of national 
legislation.472  Consistently, Canada adopted CAHWCA473 in 2000.   
 
 The second part of this thesis will describe the legal construction under which 
responsibility for international crimes may be attributed to corporations through the 
combined application of Canadian criminal law, CAHWCA and international criminal law.  
 
Chapter 1: Notorious Examples of Alleged Criminal Activities and 
Potential Violations of International Criminal Law by Canadian 
Corporations 
 
 Multinational corporations often carry out operations that generate profits on various 
territories. They may have a principal residence in one country, with their headquarters 
located in another and several subsidiaries in other countries rich in specific resources, or 
with considerable space or a targeted market of customers.  Examples of this corporate 
activity may be drawn from various sectors of industry. 
                                                                                                                                                    
471  Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S. Q. c. C.-12, art. 11(g). 
472  This rule of British origin was set out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the 1937 Labor 
Conventions case, where Lord Atkin famously wrote: “Within the British Empire there is a well-
established rule that the making of a treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, 
if they entail alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action.” (Attorney General for 
Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario [1937] AC 326 (PC)). Within the federal constitutional system 
of Canada, such legislative transformation of treaty obligations must be done by the legislative authority 
competent on the matter, under sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867.  In this regard, see J. W. 
Perry, “At the Intersection— Australian and International Law”, (1997) 71 Australian LJ 841; and S. 
Donaghue, “Balancing Sovereignty and International Law: The Domestic Impact of International Law in 
Australia”, (1995) 17 Adelaide L Rev 213; and Labor Conventions case, at 351, all cited in Elisabeth 
Eid, “Interaction Between International and Domestic Human Rights Law: A Canadian Perspective” 
(Paper presented to the Sino Canadian International Conference on the Ratification and Implementation 
of Human Rights Covenants, Beijing, China, October 2001) at 2, online: ICCLR 
<http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/E-Eid.PDF> (accessed 25 April 2010). See also 
Charter of human rights and freedoms, supra note 471 and Hélène Dumont, La réception du droit 
international pénal en droit interne à la lumière de l'affaire Mugesera : le Canada aurait-il deux faces de 
Janus? (2007) 1 Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 187 at 189. 
473  CAHWCA, supra note 24.  
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Section 1.  Illustrative Case Studies of Impunity of Corporations despite Publicized 
Allegations of Violations of International Criminal Law 
 
In the past three decades, there has been a considerable increase of multinational 
corporate activities across the world.  In 2003, UNCTAD reported that “the share of global 
GDP generated by MNEs has doubled over the past 25 years.  In 2002, value-added by 
MNEs (3.4 trillion USD) accounted for approximately 10 percent of global GDP, or twice 
the 1982 percentage”.474   
 
This remarkable expansion has outpaced the development of corporate liability 
under international criminal law, thereby creating a shortage of laws governing the conduct 
of multinationals in territories where violations of human rights and international criminal 
law are rampant.  The SRSG on Business and Human Rights refers to this situation as a 
“governance gap” created by globalization, which “provides the permissive environment 
for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation”.475 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
474 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International 
Perspectives, at 23, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2003, Sales No. E.03.II.D.8, (2003), cited in Hansen, 
supra note 41 at 412. 
475  John Ruggie, Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development.  Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 8th Sess., 2008, 
A/HRC/8/5, at 3, online: <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/128/61/PDF/G0812861.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 25 April 2010) 
[hereinafter, 2008 SRSG on Business and Human  Rights Report]. 
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In Canada, it has been recognized that extractive industries, i.e. mining, oil and gas, 
operating in foreign territories where international crimes occur, make a major contribution 
to the nation’s prosperity.  The Government of Canada has in fact reported that: 
 
“[a]t about $79.3 billion in 2007, mining and energy investment is the third-
largest component of Canadian direct investment abroad (stocks), generating 
significant additional exports from Canada. (...) In 2008, over 75 percent of 
the world’s exploration and mining companies were headquartered in 
Canada. These 1293 companies had an interest in some 7809 properties in 
Canada and in over 100 countries around the world.”476 
 
Canadian MNC’s are active in many regions of the world. The Canadian 
Government indicates that simply between 1992 and 1995, foreign properties owned by 
national mining firms had grown by twenty percent (20) and that the majority of these 
projects, close to six hundred (600) existed in Africa alone.477  In Columbia, one of the most 
prosperous countries of the South American continent in terms of natural resources, 
Canadian direct investment stock is reported to amount to $453 million in 2006.478 
According to the Ministry of Mines and Energy of Columbia, fifty-two (52%) of foreign 
companies investing in mining in Colombia are Canadian.479   
 
                                                 
476  DFAIT Canada, Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Stategy for 
the Canadian International Extractive Sector (Ottawa: DFAIT, March 2009) at 3, online: DFAIT  
<http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/CSR-
March2009.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2010).  
477  DFAIT Canada, Mining in Developing countries – Corporate Social Responsibility. The Government’s 
Response to the Report of the Standing committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa: 
DFAIT, October 2005) at 2, online: DFAIT <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/scfait-response-en.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2010).   
478  Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Agri-Food Past, Present & Future Report – Colombia (Ottawa: 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, November 2007), online: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada .  
<http://www.ats-sea.agr.gc.ca/lat/3854_e.htm> (accessed 26 August 2009) in Ibid. at 11. 
479  República de Colombia, Ministerio de Mina y Energía, Colombia Minera: Desarrollo Responsable, n.d. 
Retrieved June 11, 2009 from 
http://www.cafedecolombia.com/eventos/grupodenotables/docs/Octubre6de2008SeminarioDeInversion/
MiningSector.pdf, cited in Mining Watch Canada and CENSAT-Agua Viva, Land and Conflict: 
Resource Extraction, Human Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility: Canadian Companies in 
Colombia, Report prepared for InterPares  (Ottawa: InterPares, September 2009), at 11-12, online: 
InterPares  <http://www.interpares.ca/en/publications/pdf/Land_and_Conflict.pdf> (accessed 25 April 
2010) [hereinafter, InterPares Report].   
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This thesis will focus on four concrete examples of Canadian multinationals, 
subjected to public and legal scrutiny concerning their past and ongoing activities and 
alleged involvement in armed conflicts on the African and South American continents: the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Sudan.   
 
Sub-section 1.  The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
 The Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter, the “DRC”) is located in the 
heart of equatorial central Africa with an area of 2,267,600 square kilometres and a 
population of 62.6 million people.480  The key mineral resources in the country, gold, 
coltan, diamonds, copper and cobalt481 as well as favourable conditions, have created the 
setting for the current ongoing occupation and struggle to exploit these natural resources.482    
 
 In this regard, the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo “stated in September 
2003 that crimes committed in Ituri (Congo) appear to be directly linked to control of 
resource extraction sites and that ‘those who direct mining operations, sell diamonds or 
                                                 
480  “Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo” BBC News (last updated 10 February 2010), online: 
BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1076399.stm> (accessed 25 April 2010). 
481  Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annex to United Nations Security Council, Letter 
dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S 2001/357 (12 
April 2001) at 10-11 (diamonds) [hereinafter, UN Panel of Experts Report 2001]; Addendum to the 
report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annex to United Nations Security Council, Letter 
dated 10 November 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S 
2001/1072 (13 November 2001) at 8 (gold, copper, cobalt) [hereinafter, Addendum to the UN Panel of 
Experts Report 2001];  Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,  Annex to United 
Nations Security Council, Letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, S/2002/1146 (16 October 2002) at 16 (coltan) [hereinafter, Final 
Report of the UN Panel of Experts 2002]; online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2001/sglet01.htm> for exchange of letters in 2001 & 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2002/sglet02.htm> for exchange of letters in 2002 (accessed 25 
April 2010). 
482  UN Panel of Experts Report 2001, ibid. 
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gold extracted in these conditions, launder the dirty money or provide weapons could also 
be authors of the crimes, even if they are based in other countries’”.483  
 
 Corruption in the DRC dates back from its colonization by Belgium and following 
its independence in 1965, under the dictatorship of Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko.484  In 1996, 
the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (hereinafter, the 
“AFDL”), a rebel movement led by the late Laurent-Désiré Kabila, conquered eastern Zaire 
and ousted Mobutu Sese Seko as President with the support of Angolan, Rwandan and 
Ugandan forces.485  A rift between Mr. Kabila and his former allies sparked a new rebellion 
in the country with groups backed by Uganda and Rwanda as of 2 August 1998.  This 
second war became known as “Africa’s first world war”, resulting in the deaths of 3.5 
million people.486 
 
 Further instability occurred after the assassination of Laurent Kabila in 2001.487  
The following year, the Sun City Global and All Inclusive Peace Agreement was signed.  A 
transitional government was set up in June 2003 with Joseph Kabila, son of Laurent Kabila, 
as leader of the nation.488  Nevertheless, despite the withdrawal of foreign troops, economic 
interests and criminal groups, linked to the armies of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the 
DRC continued to benefit from micro-conflicts existing in the country.489 
 
                                                 
483  Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to Second Assembly 
of States Parties to the Rome Statute, 8 September 2003 in Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold 
(New York: HRW, June 2005), online: Anglo Gold Corp. 
<http://www.anglogold.com/NR/rdonlyres/CBB6C75C-EE9C-439E-962F-
DDB5C52FB968/0/HRWDRCreport.pdf> (accessed 25 April 2010).     
484  “Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo”, supra note 480.  
485  UN Panel of Experts Report 2001, supra note 481. 
486  Ibid. at 7, “Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo”, supra note 480, Human Rights Watch, 
supra note 483 at 12. 
487  “Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo”, ibid.  
488  Human Rights Watch, supra note 483 at 12.  
489  Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts 2002, supra note 481 at 5. 
116 
 
 
 In 2005, various business transactions and agreements existing on the Congolese 
territory were studied by the Congolese Special Parliamentary Commission Charged with 
Examining the Validity of Economic and Financial Agreements Signed during the 1996-
1997 and 1998 Wars.490  The primary mission of this commission, set up in 2003 was to 
assess the legality of contracts signed in the DRC during the two armed conflicts. 
 
 The report of the Commission, surnamed the Lutundula Report after its Chairman, 
Christophe Lutundula Atola, provides a detailed examination of various contracts with 
foreign companies in the DRC. Among others, the Canadian companies, Lundin Group, 
Banro, Mindev, Barrick Gold, South Atlantic Resources, Anvil Mining, American Mineral 
Fields and Tenke Mining, were identified as having established contracts under the Mobutu 
era or directly with the AFDL forces prior to their taking of power.  Meanwhile, the DRC’s 
two largest mining companies, previously State-owned under the Mobutu regime, 
Bakwanga Mining and Gégamines, have been severely deprived in their share of the profits 
under the weak government administration.491   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
490  This commission was set-up in the DRC pursuant to Resolutions DIC/CEF/04 and DIC/CEF/01 of the 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City, South Africa in 2003, attended by delegates of the Government 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy, the Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo, the main organizations and parties of the political opposition as well as 
representatives of the forces vives of the Country, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation 
Movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy-National and the Mai-Mai, at Sun City, Republic of 
South Africa, on 2 April 2003.   Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations. Final Act, Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue, Sun City, South Africa, April 2003, online: Congonline 
<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/ic-drc-2apr.pdf> (accessed 21 October 2009). 
491  Assemblée nationale, Commission spéciale chargée de l’examen de la validité des conventions à 
caractère économique et financier conclues pendant les guerres de 1996-1997 (« Commission 
Lutundula »), Rapport des travaux – 1ère partie (Kinshasa, Commission Lutundula, 2005), at 8, online : 
Congonline <http://www.congonline.com/documents/Rapport_Lutundula_pillage_2006.pdf> (accessed 
25 April 2010) [hereinafter, Lutundula Report]. 
117 
 
 
 The report describes the situation as follows: 
 
« L'absence d'un Etat exerçant une autorité réelle partout sur un 
territoire vaste de 2.345.000 Km2, la situation de guerre et l'instabilité 
politique créent une opportunité de prédation à grande échelle qui 
transforme la République Démocratique du Congo en un espace 
économique de libre-service où se croisent les réseaux les plus divers 
et se côtoient les hommes d'affaires de tous calibres et horizons pour 
exploiter le cuivre, le cobalt et les métaux associés, le diamant, l’or, la 
cassitérite, le coltan, le bois, le café…De deux côtés de la ligne de 
front se développe une économie de guerre (…)».492 
 
 The Lutundula Report caused significant controversy and was only released on 
February 20, 2006.493   Prior to the report, however, in 2000, the United Nations Security 
Council had already expressed concern that the quest for Congo’s natural resources was the 
principal cause of the deadly war.  As a result, a panel of experts was appointed, the U.N. 
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (hereinafter, the “U.N. Panel of Experts”), to 
look into the matter. 
 
In its separate report, the U.N. Panel of Experts underlined the role that domestic 
and foreign companies played in financing the armed conflicts of the DRC as follows: 
 
“The role of the private sector in the exploitation of natural resources and the 
continuation of the war has been vital.  A number of companies have been 
involved and have fuelled the war directly, trading arms for natural resources.  
Others have facilitated access to financial resources, which are used to purchase 
weapons.  Companies trading minerals, which the Panel considered to be ‘the 
engine of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ have prepared 
the field for illegal mining activities in the country’”.494 
 
                                                 
492  Ibid. at 9.  
493  “Kinross Gold and Katanga Mining: Part of the Pillage of the Democratic Republic of Congo?”, Mining 
Watch Canada (Saturday, 8 April 2006), online: Mining Watch Canada 
<http://www.miningwatch.ca/en/kinross-gold-and-katanga-mining-part-pillage-democratic-republic-
congo> (accessed 25 April 2010).  
494  UN Panel of Experts Report 2001, supra note 481 at 41-42. 
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The U.N. Panel of Experts’ report, released in 2002, provided a list of companies 
which directly or indirectly “contribute to the ongoing conflict and to human rights abuses”, 
in violation of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.495 Among these 
companies, the Panel identified five Canadian companies: First Quantum Minerals, 
Harambee Mining Corporation, International Panorama Resources Corp., Melkior 
Resources Inc. and Tenke Mining Corporation.496 
 
No further investigations were conducted on the activities of the companies listed in 
2002 by the Panel of Experts.  Moreover, the final report of the U.N. Panel of Experts in 
2003 determined that all issues with the forty-two companies on the list had been 
resolved.497  It did however add an “important caveat in their final report stressing that 
‘resolution should not be seen as invalidating the panel’s earlier findings with regard to the 
activities of these [companies]”.498 
 
In addition to the companies mentioned above, on 17 October 2006, a military judge 
in the DRC stated that three former employees of a Canadian mining company Anvil 
Mining Ltd. (hereinafter, “Anvil Mining”) should face prosecution for complicity in war 
crimes committed in the village of Kilwa at the Dikulushi mine in October 2004.499  One of 
the accused individuals was Pierre Mercier, a Canadian manager of Anvil.500  Such 
                                                 
495  OECD Guidelines, supra note 5. 
496  Report of the UN Panel of Experts 2002, supra note 481 at Annex III, 8-9.  
497  Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms 
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Annex to United Nations Security Council, Letter 
dated 23 October 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2003/1027 at 9 (para. 23),  online: United Nations 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_presandsg_letters03.html> (accessed 26 April 2010) [hereinafter, 
Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts 2003]. 
498  Ibid. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 483 at 64.  
499 Kelly Patterson, “African Tribunal cites Canadian company for role in massacre”; Ottawa Citizen, (17 
October 2006) online: National Post <http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=d7c6d1ea-3fb7-
4a10-84df-9595122e8908&k=15342> (accessed 2 February 2009).  
500  Ibid. See also, Andrew Geoghagan, “Australian Mining Company Cleared of Congo War Crimes”, 
Australian Broadcasting Commission (29 June 2007), online: ABC 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/29/1965195.htm?section=justin> (accessed 2 February 
2009) (South Africans Peter Van Niekerk and Cedric Kirsten faced the same charge); Joe Bavier, 
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accusations followed a report by the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (hereinafter, “MONUC”), published in 2005, which found 
that the copper-mining company’s subsidiary loaned a plane and vehicles to the Congolese 
government troops, the Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(hereinafter, the “FARDC”).  It also stated that Anvil drivers helped transport corpses after 
the massacre. The soldiers killed between seventy to a hundred civilians, including women 
and children, to suppress a rebellion led by a poorly organised and underfunded group, the 
Movement for the Liberation of Katanga Province.501 Nevertheless, in June 2007, the 
president of the military tribunal, Colonel Joseph Moskako, acquitted the three accused 
employees qualifying the claims as groundless.502   
 
Aside from the Australian Federal Police investigation, Anvil Mining was also 
“being investigated by Canadian authorities over their possible role in assisting in the 
conduct of hostilities”.503 Such investigations could eventually lead to a prosecution of the 
corporation before Canadian courts.504  It must be acknowledged however that a 
prosecution against Anvil Mining may prompt a number of credible defences, such as the 
absence of criminal intent and the right to defend its employees.   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
“Congo Court Acquits Anvil Employees”, News.com.au (29 June 2007), online: News.com.au 
<http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21987977-29277,00.html> (accessed 2 February 2009).   
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Canadian courts, the person accused would be the corporation, contrary to its representatives that were 
prosecuted before the Congolese military tribunal.  Therefore, the principle of res judicata would not 
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In fact, when asked about its involvement in the Kilwa massacre: 
 
“Anvil confirmed it loaned a plane and vehicles to the army, but said it ‘had 
absolutely no choice’ but to accede to a government request for logistical support. 
‘When the army arrives with AK-47s ... you give them what they want,' said 
Anvil spokesman Robert LaValliere, recalling that troops had commandeered 
vehicles at gunpoint in a previous clash with rebels earlier that year. He added 
that companies are obliged by law to comply with Congolese government 
requests.”505 
 
MONUC’s report of the massacre also confirmed that the insurgents had become 
“more aggressive” towards the employees of Anvil mining at the company’s petrol depot, 
when they refused to help them communicate with the “white people” of the company.506 
 
If a Canadian national jurisdiction were seized of this case in the future, the court 
would have the difficult task of weighing various ethical considerations and ambiguous 
decisions that were made under the violent circumstances of war. Furthermore, 
jurisdictional issues may arise with regards to the control of Anvil Mining over its 
subsidiary in the RDC.    
 
Before studying such legal questions on jurisdiction that will be analyzed in the last 
chapter of this thesis, the following paragraphs describe the 1991-1999 armed conflict in 
Sierra Leone, another example of an African country where Canadian mining companies 
operations are interwoven in the web of politics and violence, raising questions of corporate 
participation in international crimes.   
 
Sub-section 2.  Sierra Leone 
 
After a period of colonization by the British Empire that began in 1808, Sierra 
Leone gained its independence in 1961.507  For the two following decades, the despotic 
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Government of the All People’s Congress, led by Siaka Stevens, ruled the country until 
Stevens’ retirement and replacement by Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh.508  
 
In 1991, a civil war broke out with a rebellion led by former army corporal Foday 
Sankoh and his party, the Revolutionary United Front (hereinafter, “RUF”).  A succession 
of military coups followed thereafter. The election of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in 
1996 created a brief period of stability, until he was ousted by Major Johnny Paul Koroma 
of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (hereinafter, “AFRC”) in 1997.  Kabbah fled 
to Guinea to mobilize international support.509   
 
In October 1997, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Sierra Leone, 
barring the supply of arms and petroleum products.  In March 1998, Kabbah returned to 
power.   
 
The consequences of this war were abominable in terms of human lives and 
destruction.  In fact, “between 1991 and 1999, the war took over 75,000 lives, caused half a 
million Sierra Leoneans to become refugees, and has displaced half of the country’s             
4.5 million people”.510 
 
A peace accord between the government and the RUF was signed in July 1999 and 
the war officially ended in January 2002, as declared by the United Nations.  One year 
later, Kabbah won a landslide victory in national elections.  In 2004, a UN-backed war 
crimes tribunal opened courthouse to try senior militia leaders from both sides of the civil 
war.   Finally, in August 2007, Ernest Bai Koroma won the presidency after national 
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elections and his party, the All People's Congress, formerly in opposition, obtained a 
majority in parliament.511  
 
In the aftermath of the peace accord and presidential election, the Sierra Leone 
Working Group (hereinafter, “SLWG”), created under the auspices of the Canadian and 
African NGO coalition, Partnership Africa Canada, published a study entitled Heart of the 
Matter on the problems related to mining and selling diamonds inside Sierra Leone and 
internationally. According to the SLWG, diamonds were central to the conflict in Sierra 
Leone and as a result, a highly criminalized war economy had developed a momentum of 
its own.512 
 
The authors allege that the Canadian firm, DiamondWorks, registered on the 
Toronto stock exchange, and its acquisition, Branch Energy Ltd., a private company 
registered on the Isle of Man, had “apparent but much-denied connections” with the two 
major international security firms, Executive Outcomes (hereinafter, “EO”) and Sandline, 
operating in Sierra Leone.513   In particular, in 1995, EO provided 200 soldiers, air support 
and sophisticated equipment in order to push the RUF back from Freetown within a week 
and clear the major diamond areas of Kono.514  Sandline, a British security company, is the 
only company, according to BBC News, that continued to supply “logistical support” 
including rifles to Kabbah allies despite the 1997 UN Security Council embargo imposed 
on the supply of arms.515  
 
The SLWG claims that shortly after EO took control of the diamond areas, Branch 
Energy secured a 25-year lease on Sierra Leonean diamond concessions.516 Furthermore, in 
1995, DiamondWorks’ Sierra Leone country manager was seconded – as a “private citizen” 
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– to Sandline, in connection with a controversial arms’ shipment intended for the briefly 
exiled government of Tejan Kabbah.517 
 
These same events are reported by several other authors, including Deneault, 
Delphine and Sacher in Noir Canada518 and the 2004 Report of KAIROS organization, 
entitled Africa’s Blessing.  Africa’s Curse.  The Legacy of Resource Extraction in Africa.519   
 
Dealings with security personnel on the field have caused other organizations in the 
world to question activities of multinationals in high legal-risk zones marred by decades-
long violent conflict and armed rebellion.  For instance, corporations operating in 
Colombia, including Canadian corporations, have recently been exposed to a level of 
scrutiny and questioning over the legality of their agreements with government troops or 
paramilitary elements.520 
 
Sub-section 3.  Colombia 
 
One of the most renowned and dangerous conflicts currently taking place in 
Colombia, the fourth largest country of South America, has been greatly motivated by the 
abundance of natural resources of this country.  Initially, this rich territory drew Spanish 
conquerors in 1525, who were later defeated by Simon Bolívar, a Venezuelan political 
leader and his troops in 1819 in their struggle for the independence of Latin America.  
Thereafter, the Republic of Grán Colombia was formed with Panama, Ecuador and 
Venezuela. The separation of the two latter countries in 1830 dissolved the Grán Colombia.  
A forty-five year dictatorship followed by the Conservative Party.  Decades of violent and 
political conflict between Conservatives and Liberals ensued and eventually, a truce was 
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agreed upon in 1958, creating a coalition party, the National Front, and banning all other 
parties from political power.   
 
Colombia’s prosperity in oil reserves, gold, silver, emeralds, platinum and coal have 
encouraged other parties to fight for power and control over its territory against the 
National Front.521  This resulted in the creation of various rebel groups and opposition 
parties in the 1960s and 1970s, including the Leftist National Liberation Army and Maoist 
People’s Liberation Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (hereinafter, 
“FARC”), the National People’s Alliance, and the Left-wing M-19 guerrilla group.522  The 
largest of the guerrilla groups is currently the FARC.  It is heavily funded by the drug trade 
and has been fighting with the national government for over four decades with an escalation 
of conflict in the 1990s.523 
 
Since the election of President Alvaro Uribe Velez on 7 August 2002, violence has 
decreased, but the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency reports:  
 
“insurgents continue attacks against civilians and large areas of the 
countryside are under guerrilla influence or are contested by security forces.  
More than 31,000 former paramilitaries had demobilized by the end of 2006 
and the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) as a formal 
organization had ceased to function. In the wake of the paramilitary 
demobilization, emerging criminal groups arose, whose members include 
some former paramilitaries.”524 
 
A report prepared by Mining Watch Canada and the Colombian nongovernmental 
organization, CENSAT-Agua Viva, for another Canadian NGO, InterPares  (hereinafter, 
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the “InterPares Report”) has studied various allegations of implication of Canadian 
companies in Colombia’s armed conflict.525   
 
According to the InterPares Report, paramilitaries and their successors control 
between two and seven million hectares of stolen land.526  Furthermore, there seems to be a 
relationship between the displacements and conflict in Colombia and the resources of the 
country. Indeed, “resource-rich regions are the source of 87 per cent of forced 
displacements, 82 per cent of the violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law, and 83 per cent of murders of union leaders”.527  A UN Report in 2006 similarly noted 
that “the conflict has been complicated by interests in the cocoa industry and the 
development of new plantation farms for bananas and palm oil-producing trees, the illegal 
drug trade and exploitation of huge deposits of oil and other mineral resources found across 
the country’s major regions.”528 
 
The InterPares Report refers to questionable activities of certain multinationals to 
secure their investments, which have directly and/or indirectly supported paramilitary 
groups.  The latter function as irregular forces for territorial consolidation in extractive 
projects, whether operating on their own or under a more explicit understanding with 
transnational corporations.529  In particular, “[b]oth the high levels of violence and the 
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presence of illegal armed groups raise serious concerns about the potential for Canadian 
investment to benefit from or be complicit in the conflict”530.   
 
Namely, the InterPares Report identified certain legal risks for the companies who 
contracted with the Colombian Army for private security services, “[g]iven the documented 
relationship between the Army and Carlos Castaño’s AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia or United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) paramilitaries”.531 In fact, the Army 
itself is alleged to be responsible for massive and serious human rights abuses and its 
operations are designed to protect the interests of international mining companies in the 
area.”532 
 
For example, in February 2007, B2Gold, a Canadian company, acquired the rights 
of Avasca Andean Resources in a joint-venture exploration project in Sur de Bolívar with 
AngloGold Ashanti, a South African company operating in the region since 2003, and its 
subsidiary, Kedaha SA.533 According to an interview with B2Gold conducted by InterPares, 
its security department works exclusively with the Colombian Army.   
 
Similarly, B2Gold, as well as another Canadian company, Colombia Goldfields 
Ltd., are carrying out mining operations in the department of Antioquia, with one of the 
highest rates of violence and forced displacement in Colombia.534   It is alleged that through 
security arrangements with the Colombian government “[p]eople have been dispossessed 
and removed from the community to make way for mega-mining projects”535 of these 
companies. 
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Another security alliance with the Colombian Army was established with Greystar 
Resources Ltd., a Canadian mining corporation, which first came to the region in 1995.   
The InterPares Report alleges that, previous to the year 2000, Greystar “had a relationship 
of ‘coexistence’ with insurgents, a reflection of its keen awareness of the absence of the 
State and the control exercised by the guerrillas”, such as FARC.536 It left the country after 
one of its executives was kidnapped by guerrillas but returned in 2003, after President 
Uribe came into power.537   
 
It seems that, in the interest of securing its commercial operations, Greystar has 
indirectly become involved in the political violent climate of the country once again.  More 
specifically, Greystar “provided logistical support to establish a base for security operations 
in the area, and part of the troops’ mandate is to ensure the viability of mining 
operations”.538  Perhaps coincidentally, InterPares reports that Greystar’s return to the area 
was preceded by a series of military operations, including one particularly extensive 
campaign.539  According to the InterPares Report, “[s]oon thereafter, the Army was able to 
re-establish control over the area and put in place sufficient controls that Greystar could 
return.540 
 
Finally, InterPares refers to the case of Nexen Inc., the third largest oil exploration 
company in Canada, operating in partnership with Repsol, a Spanish-Argentine energy 
company in an exploration oil drilling project located in the department of Tolina.  This 
property is owned by the aforementioned companies in association with the Colombian and 
Brazilian oil production companies, Ecopetrol and Petrobras.541  Most oil companies 
operating in this area employ ex-members of the Colombian security forces.542  Although 
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Nexen’s policies seem to be very thorough and respectful of recognized CSR standards, 
according to the InterPares Report, its partnerships, security arrangements and operations 
in a high-conflict zone have generated risks of benefitting from earlier appropriation of 
lands and titles, contributing to consolidation of paramilitaries in new groupings and to 
marginalization of Indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians.543 
 
These examples have not been investigated by Canadian authorities, but the 
InterPares Report nevertheless represents one witness account of potential violations of 
international criminal law by Canadian corporations.   
 
Another alleged demonstration of the interrelatedness of commercial oil operations 
and violence is linked to the ongoing armed conflict in the Republic of Sudan and the 
operations of Talisman Energy, addressed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.544 
 
Sub-section 4.  Sudan 
 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa with a population of approximately                   
39.4 million people.545  The Sudanese conflict dates back to the period when it was a 
British-Egyptian condominium from 1898 to 1956.  After the First World War, the British 
Colonial Rule established the “Southern Policy” which “proscribed the teaching of Arabic 
                                                 
543  Ibid. at 56.  
544  Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)  01 Civ. 
9882 (DLC) (Opinion & Order), online: Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 
<http://www.nysd.uscourts.gove/courtweb/pdf/D02NYSC/06-03562.pdf>  (accessed 26 April 2010) 
[hereinafter, Talisman Energy, SDNY 2006], aff’d by US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in  
F.3d 244 (2d Cir 2009), Docket No. 07-0016-cv, online: Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 
<http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/fa0db23d-6de5-4fed-acdc-24b6911c7089/1/doc/07-
0016-cv_opn.pdf>  (accessed 26 April 2010) [hereinafter, Talisman Energy, 2d Cir 2009]. 
545 “Country Profile: Sudan”, BBC News, (updated 29 January 2009), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/820864.stm> (accessed 6 February 2009).   
129 
 
 
and Islam in the three southern provinces and encouraged the use of English and conversion 
to Christianity”.546  
 
After Sudan’s independence in 1956, a rebellion led by General Abboud gradually 
intensified and a campaign was initiated to extend Islam to the south.  By 1963, it had taken 
the form of a “full-fledged civil war”.547  In 1972, an agreement was signed in Addis Ababa 
to end Sudan’s first civil war.  A period of peace followed for about eleven years. 
 
The situation in Sudan newly deteriorated after the discovery of oil in the southern 
provinces by the oil company Chevron in 1979.  The Government proceeded to divide the 
country into numbered “blocks” in order to expand its reach on oil resources and grant 
concessions.  In 1983, Sudan was transformed into an Islamic State and the second civil 
war began between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army against the Government forces.548   
 
Regardless of the ongoing conflict, oil revenues in Sudan increased by almost 900% 
in three years, from $61 million in 1999 to almost $600 million in 2001.549  According to 
Kobrick, “the dramatic increase in resources available to the government in Khartoum 
resulted in a very significant increase in military expenditure and the purchase of modern 
weapons, including helicopter gunships” and the manufacturing of tanks and artillery.550 
 
The dangerous conditions in the region, amplified by the kidnapping of three 
expatriate Chevron employees in 1984, caused the company to suspend its operations and 
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withdraw from Sudan.  On 28 August 1993, the Canadian company, State Petroleum 
Company (hereinafter, the “SPC”), entered into a production-sharing agreement with the 
government of Sudan, acquiring a large part of what had been Chevron’s concession.  In 
May 1994, Arakis Energy Corporation, another Canadian company, acquired SPC, which 
became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Arakis.551 
 
To better meet Arakis’ production quotas, SPC entered into a Consortium 
Agreement on 28 February 1997 with the China National Petroleum Corporation, Petronas 
Carigali Overseas SDN BHD and Sudapet Ltd. The Consortium Members established the 
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company Limited (hereinafter, “GNPOC”), which 
thereafter concluded agreements with the Sudanese government to conduct operations.552 
 
This Agreement was signed at a time when the political turmoil occurring in Sudan 
was exposed to the international community.  Notably, the United Nations condemned the 
country for gross violations of human rights in 1992 and the Security Council imposed 
diplomatic sanctions on the government of Sudan in 1996.  Moreover, pursuant to the 
United States Anti-Terrorism Act signed in April 1996 and an executive order enacted 
under the International Emergency Powers Acts in November 1997, all Sudanese assets in 
the United States were frozen and a ban was imposed on all bank loans, investments, and 
trade with that country.553  
 
As a consequence of these political stances, as well as some pressure applied from 
the Canadian government to withdraw its operations, Arakis was unable to raise the 
                                                                                                                                                    
550  Randolph Martin, “Sudan’s Perfect War”, (2002) 81 Foreign Aff. 111 at 118-19, cited in Kobrick, ibid. 
at 442.  
551  Kobrick, ibid. at 434 and See also, Talisman Energy, SDNY 2006 at 15. (The shares of GNPOC were 
40% owned by CNPC, 30% owned by Petronas, 25% owned by SPC and 5% owned by Sudapet.  All of 
the Consortium Members were wholly owned respectively by the governments of China, Malaysia and 
Sudan, except of SPC). 
552  Talisman Energy, SDNY 2006, ibid. at 15-17. 
553  Kobrick, supra note 546, at 445.  
131 
 
 
necessary funds to complete its project.554  On October 1998, Talisman Energy, a Canadian 
subsidiary of British Petroleum and the second largest independent oil company in Canada, 
headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, acquired the outstanding shares of Arakis.555   
 
Once the acquisition was completed, high-level security arrangements were 
concluded between the GNPOC concession and the Government of Sudan for “about 1,000 
military and police officers assigned to protect the oilfield operations themselves; about 
1,300 intelligence officers who worked to gather intelligence in the communities within the 
concession; and about 5,000 military personnel who were stationed in the concession”.556  
GNPOC also had its own security force, which was unarmed and served as a liaison with 
the Government forces.557 
 
In November 2001, a $1 billion class-action lawsuit was filed against Talisman, on 
behalf of the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and a number of individual plaintiffs, former 
and current residents of Sudan, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.  The suit, filed under the Aliens Tort Claims Act558 of the United States,559 charged 
Talisman with conspiracy, aiding and abetting with the Government of Sudan to commit 
genocide, torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity.  The alleged criminal acts 
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included rape, enslavement, targeted attacks by the military on civilians, as well as 
widespread and systematic forcible transfer of civilian population.560   
 
In March 2003, a federal district court judge ruled that the case was properly 
brought in the Manhattan Federal Court561. On 12 September 2006, however, Judge Denise 
Côté from the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, dismissed the 
case and allowed only summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to submit 
sufficient admissible evidence to proceed to trial on their claims.562   
 
On 26 February 2007, the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.563   
 
In reaction to this appeal, the Canadian government filed an amicus curiae brief to 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in May 2007, arguing that “the U.S. cannot claim 
jurisdiction in the case, and warns such a move would ‘create friction in Canada-U.S. 
relations’”.564 The Canadian government also stated that the suit would have “‘a chilling 
effect on Canadian firms engaging in Sudan’, noting the government is using the promise 
of more Canadian investment to pressure Sudan into ending the savage civil war in 
Darfur”.565    
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Similarly, the U.S. District Court’s judgment summarized the Canadian 
government’s positive role in supporting Sudan through its companies’ investments, as 
follows:  
 
“Canada, as a matter of national policy holds out the promise of the 
reinstatement of support services for Canadian companies engaged in trade 
with the Sudan as an incentive for the Sudan to resolve its internal disputes 
peacefully, believing that engagement and economic development of the 
country is the best route to bringing peace and the rule of law”.566   
 
 
 The appellate court affirmed the Southern District Court of New York’s dismissal of 
the law suit on 2 October 2009.567  This included the finding of the district court of an 
“insufficient nexus between Canada’s foreign policy and the specific allegations in the 
complaint because the litigation did not require judging Canada’s policy of 5 constructive 
engagement with the Sudan, but ‘merely’ judging ‘whether Talisman acted outside the 
bounds of customary international law while doing business in Sudan’”.568   
 
 Since the filing of the original suit, on 12 March 2003, Talisman and Goal Olie sold 
TGNBV to ONGC Videsh Ltd., an Indian oil and gas company.569   
 
 The case, however, remains significantly important in terms of corporate 
responsibility for international crimes, both in the United States and Canada and may even 
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extraterritorial jurisdiction (see Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 10 
9882 (DLC), 2005 WL 2082846 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) at 1, cited in Talisman Energy, 2d Cir 2009, 
supra note 544 at 19.   
567  Talisman Energy, 2d Cir 2009, supra note 544.  
568  Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 10 9882 (DLC), 2005 WL 2082846 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) at 5-8, cited in Talisman Energy, 2d Cir 2009, supra note 544 at 20.   
569  Talisman Energy, SDNY 2006, supra note 544 at 22.  
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carry some far-reaching effects on other territories. Namely, important questions were 
addressed and could even be dealt with in the future before a Canadian court in separate 
criminal law proceedings. For instance, it would be necessary to determine the proper 
forum for such judicial proceedings, i.e. the United States’, Canadian or Sudanese courts?   
 
With such notorious examples and allegations against Canadian corporations’ 
responsibility for international crimes, it could be considered unethical for the Canadian 
government to adopt a passive attitude.  Indeed, the U.N. Panel of Experts has affirmed that 
“Governments of the countries where the individuals, companies and financial institutions 
that are systematically and actively involved in these activities are based should assume 
their share of the responsibility (...)”570 and that “Governments with jurisdiction over these 
enterprises are complicit themselves when they do not take remedial measures”.571   
 
The following chapters will summarize how it is possible to prosecute a Canadian 
corporation under Canadian law for international crimes committed overseas. 
 
Chapter 2.  International Crimes in Canadian Criminal Law 
 
In Part I of this thesis, it was established that existing international criminal 
tribunals do not have jurisdiction to judge the accountability of corporations for alleged 
direct commissions or accomplice participation in international crimes.   
 
Corporations do not however enjoy complete immunity from responsibility for 
international crimes. As described in the previous chapter, public accounts and procedures 
have already been initiated on other territories for potential liability of Canadian 
corporations for international crimes.  The last chapter of this thesis will use Canada as an 
example of jurisdiction of national courts to judge allegations against corporations of 
                                                 
570  Report of the UN Panel of Experts 2002, supra note 481 at 31.  
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violations of international criminal law, either through national legislation incorporating 
international criminal law or through the domestic application of international customary 
law. 
 
More specifically, Canadian legislation provides jurisdiction over the three core 
international crimes contained in the Rome Statute and the inchoate offences related to 
these crimes, as well as the crime of torture.  
 
Section 1.  The Core Crimes of CAHWCA 
 
The three core international crimes described in CAHWCA are crimes against 
humanity, genocide and war crimes and are identical to those provided for in the Rome 
Statute.572  In this regard, sub-sections 4(4) and 6(4) of CAHWCA573 specify that the 
crimes identified in articles 6, 7 and 8 (2) of the Rome Statute are, as of 17 July 1998, 
crimes according to customary international law.574   
 
It is important to note that, under CAHWCA, existing or developing rules of 
international law should not be prejudiced in any way,575 thereby enlarging the scope of 
definitions to the law before 17 July 1998 and possible developments that may take place 
after this date. At present, customary international law has not progressed significantly 
                                                                                                                                                    
571  Ibid. 
572  CAHWCA, supra note 24, s. 4(3) (for offences committed within Canada) and 6 (3) (for offences 
committed outside Canada).   
573  CAHWCA, ibid. s. 4(4) (for offences committed within Canada) and 6(4) for offences committed 
outside Canada). 
574  CAHWCA, ibid. s. 6 (5).  This paragraph also interprets that the offence of crimes against humanity was 
part of customary international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized 
by the community of nations before the coming into force of either of the following: a)  the Agreement 
for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis, signed at London 
on August 8, 1945; and (b) the Proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated 
January 19, 1946.  
575  CAHWCA, ibid.ss. 4(4) and 6(4).  See also Rosenberg, supra note 80, at 233. 
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since the implementation of the Rome Statute.576  It is therefore highly relevant to refer to 
the definitions of international crimes in the Rome Statute, international jurisprudence and 
the Elements of Crimes, a legal commentary adopted by the Assembly of States Parties of 
the ICC for the interpretation of articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute.577 
 
Canadian legislation also provides for the preventative punishment of behaviour 
before it aggravates, otherwise referred to as “inchoate offences”.578 
 
Section 2.  Inchoate Crimes of the Criminal Code and CAHWCA 
 
Canadian criminal law prohibits a greater number of incomplete crimes or 
“inchoate” offences579 than the Rome Statute and other treaties of international tribunals.   
 
Four types of general inchoate offences are included in Canadian criminal law: 
conspiracy, attempt, accessory after the fact and counselling in sub-section 464(a) of the 
Criminal Code.580  They are regulated in sections 463 to 465, which include specific 
                                                 
576  Grondin, supra note 300 at 445. 
577  Pursuant to article 9 of the Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the 
interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8, consistent with the Statute. The provisions of the 
Statute, including article 21 and the general principles set out in Part 3, are applicable to the Elements of 
Crimes.  They are published in a document entitled: Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3(part II-B), 
(adopted and entered into force on 9 September 2002), online: ICC <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Elements+of+Crimes.htm> (accessed 26 
April 2010).  
578  Rikhof, supra note 30 at 1125, n.16.  
579  The reason that inchoate behaviour is made criminal has been explained by the Supreme Court as 
follows: “If the primary act (for example, killing), is harmful, society will want people not to do it.  
Equally, it will not want them event to try to do it, or to counsel or incite others to do it.  For while the 
act itself causes actual harm, attempting to do it, or counselling, inciting or procuring someone else to do 
it, are sources of potential harm – they increase the likelihood of that particular harm’s occurrence.  
Accordingly, society is justified in taking certain measures in respect of them: outlawing them with 
sanctions, and authorizing interventions to prevent the harm from materializing” (See Hamilton v. The 
Queen, 2005 SCC 47, 29 July 2005 § 25, cited in Rikhof, ibid. at 1132) 
580  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 464(a). 
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punishments for each offence,581 in conjunction with sections 22 to 24 of the Criminal 
Code.582   Moreover, CAHWCA provides that these same inchoate offences can also be 
committed in respect to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in sub-sections 
4(1.1) and 6(1.1) of CAHWCA.583  
 
The Criminal Code also prohibits the more specific inchoate offences of advocating 
or promoting genocide in section 318 and inciting or promoting hatred in section 319.584 
 
Each of these inchoate offences will be examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
Sub-section 1.  Conspiracy 
 
The crime of conspiracy is derived from common law and has been integrated as an 
inchoate offence under paragraph 465 (1) (c) of the Criminal Code.585   Its commission with 
relation to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide is also regulated under 
paragraphs 4 (1.1) and 6 (1.1) of CAWHCA.   
 
Generally, conspiracy in Canadian law may be defined as « an agreement between 
two or more people to commit an indictable offence.  The principal factor of this offence is 
thus the intention to commit the indictable offence”.586  There exist two material elements 
                                                 
581  Criminal Code, ibid., s. 463 (regulates punishments for attempts and accessories after the fact), art. 464 
(regulates the offence of counselling and its punishments), art. 465 (defines a conspiracy and regulates 
its punishment). 
582  Criminal Code, ibid., s. 22 (defines the act of counselling), s. 23 (defines the act of an accessory after the 
fact), s. 24 (defines attempt).  
583  CAHWCA, supra note 24, ss. 4(1.1), 6(1.1).  See also Rikhof, supra note 30 at 1125. 
584  Criminal Code, ibid. s. 318, 319. 
585  Criminal Code, ibid. s. 461(1)(c) provides that : «every one who conspires with any one to commit an 
indictable offence not provided for in paragraph (a) or (b) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
the same punishment as that to which an accused who is guilty of that offence would, on conviction, be 
liable».  
586  R. c. Valcourt, 2007 QCCA 59, EYB 2007-112310 at para. 43 and R. c. Couture, 2007 QCCA 1609, 
EYB 2007-126227 at para. 150, cited in Sophie Bourque et al., Droit pénal. Infractions, moyens de 
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to this offence: the agreement and the illegal purpose.  It is not necessary for each 
conspirator to enter the agreement with the purpose of accomplishing the indictable 
offence(s), but rather, it must be proven that the conspirators agreed to participate in the 
agreement at any given time.587 
 
It is therefore possible in Canada to prosecute two or more corporations588 or one or 
more corporation(s) and a physical person589 for conspiracy to commit international 
crimes.590    
 
The other inchoate crimes in Canadian law are not necessarily committed by 
concluding a prior agreement, such as the offence of counselling.  
 
Sub-section 2.  Counselling 
 
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a decision to deport Léon 
Mugesera, a Rwandan politician with permanent residency in Canada for incitement to 
commit murder, genocide and hatred, as well as for committing crimes against humanity.591 
 
With regards to incitement to commit murder, it was determined that Mr. Mugesera 
had pronounced a hateful speech against the Rwandan Tutsi population on 22 November 
                                                                                                                                                    
défense et peine – Collection de droit 2005-2006, Vol. 12, École du Barreau du Québec (collaborator), 
ed. by Christian Boulet,  (Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2005) at 59.  
587  R. c. Couture, ibid. at para. 152, cited in Sophie Bourque et al., ibid.  
588  Regina v. Dominion Steel & Coal Corp., 1956 O.W.N. 753, 116 C.C.C. 117 (H.C.), cited in Leonard H. 
Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups, (1977) 9 Ottawa L. Rev. 247 at  257.  
589  Regina v. Can. Liquid Air Ltd., 20 C.R.N.S. 208 (B.C.S.C. 1972), Rex v. Martin, 40 Man. R. 524, [1933] 
1 D.L.R. 434 (C.A. 1932), Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3rd Cir. 1960), Nelson Radio & 
Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), all cited Leigh, ibid. at 256.   
590  Sophie Bourque et al,, supra note 586 at 60.  
591  Mugesera was deported only on the basis of grave crimes contained in sub-section 7 (3.76) of the 
Criminal Code and not of international crimes in CAHWCA. Sub-section 7 (3.76) of the Criminal Code 
was applicable for deportation before October 2000 and CAHWCA was applicable only after this date, 
by virtue of the former Immigration Act of Canada L.R.C. 1985, ch. I-2 (replaced by the Immigration 
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1992 infront of about one thousand attendants of a radical Hutu political party’s assembly. 
This speech took place before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.  Mugesera was accused, 
among others, of actively promoting, advocating, or encouraging the commission of 
murder.  More generally, he was accused of “counselling” to commit murder under sub-
section 464 (a) of the Criminal Code.592 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated that counselling includes procuring, 
soliciting or inciting pursuant to the definition provided in sub-section 22 (3) of the 
Criminal Code.  If the statements pronounced are likely to incite and are made with a view 
to inciting the commission of the offence, the requisite elements of the crime of counselling 
will be met.593  The definition will be analyzed in more details below in the section of this 
thesis related to counselling as a form of complicity in criminal law.594  
 
The offence of counselling is similar to the two other inchoate offences for which 
Mugesera was convicted: advocating or promoting genocide and incitement to hatred.  
Counselling is more generally directed to the criminal purpose of any offence counselled,595 
while the two other offences encompass preparatory activities that lead more specifically to 
genocide or hate propaganda.596  The following paragraphs will describe these specific 
inchoate offences in greater detail. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, ch. 27) (See Hélène Dumont, supra note 472 at 195.  See also 
Rikhof, supra note 30 at 1123. 
592  Mugesera c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l’Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 R.C.S. 
100, online : SCC <http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2005/2005scc40/2005scc40.html>  (accessed 26 
April 2010) [hereinafter, Mugesera]. 
593  Ibid. at paras. 63-64.  See Rikhof, supra note 30 at 1125.  See also Hamilton v. R., 2005 SCC 47, 29 July 
2005, para. 29, cited in Rikhof, supra note 30 at 1125.  
594  Mugesera, ibid. at para. 63.  
595 Ibid. at para. 64.  
596  Rikhof, supra note 30 at 1132. 
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Sub-section 3.  Advocating or Promoting Genocide  
 
 The offence of advocating or promoting genocide is materialized through words 
rather than physical actions.  Professor Dumont points out that the intellectual essence of 
such a crime requires a complex qualification process that must be positioned in time and in 
its legal context.597  In Mugesera, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that the offence 
defined in section 318 of the Criminal Code was equivalent to public and direct incitement.  
In this regard, a vague or indirect suggestion is not sufficient for this kind of offence.  
Furthermore, the direct element of incitement “should be viewed in light of its cultural and 
linguistic content”.598  A person convicted of this offence is liable to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding five years.599 
 
 The person advocating or promoting genocide must have the intention to prompt or 
provoke another to commit genocide, as well as the specific intent to commit genocide, i.e. 
an intent to destroy in whole or in part any identifiable group, namely any section of the 
public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin.600  
 
 Since there were no Canadian judicial precedents on the interpretation of section 
318 Criminal Code at the time of the Mugesera judgment, the court examined principles of 
international law existing on the date that he had pronounced his controversial speech in 
1992601. Namely, the court relied on the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, 
which was almost textually replicated in section 318 of the Criminal Code.602   The Court 
further stated the rule that domestic law must be interpreted in conformity with 
                                                 
597  Dumont, supra note 472 at 192.  
598  Mugesera, supra note 592 at para. 87, referring to the Akayesu case (supra note 28), cited in Rikhof, 
supra note 30 at 1126. See also Dumont, ibid. at 193. 
599  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 318(1). 
600  Mugesera, supra note 592 at paras. 88-89, quoting the Akayesu (supra note 28) and Media cases (supra 
note 291), cited in Rikhof, supra note 30 at 1126.  
601  At the time of the Mugesera Supreme Court of Canada judgment, there were no Canadian precedents on 
the application of this specific article.  (See Dumont, supra note 472 at 194).  
602  Dumont, ibid. at 194. 
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international customary law, in the absence of any contradictory domestic laws.603  This 
paved the way for international jurisprudence and law to be used as important sources of 
reference for the analysis of Criminal Code provisions.604  
 
 The Court also referred to international law when interpreting the subsequent 
section 319 of the Criminal Code for the offence of inciting or promoting hatred. 
 
 Sub-section 4.  Inciting or Promoting Hatred 
 
 There are two different offences in section 319 of the Criminal Code:                  
(i) communicating statements in any public place where such incitement is likely to lead to 
a breach of the peace; and (ii) communicating statements, other than in a private 
communication, wilfully promoting hatred.605  A person convicted of this offence can be 
held liable of an indictable offence and imprisonment not exceeding two years.606 
 
 Promoting hatred was interpreted by the court as actively supporting or instigating, 
and more than mere encouragement.  Moreover, hatred was defined as an “emotion of an 
intense and extreme nature that is clearly associated with vilification and detestation”.607  
The accused must have had a conscious purpose to promote hatred against an identifiable 
group or foreseen that the promotion of hatred against the group was certain to result.608  
   
                                                 
603  Baker c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration) [1999] 2 R.C.S. 817, cited in 
Mugesera, supra note 592 at para. 82. (See Dumont, ibid. at 195).  
604  Dumont, ibid.  (Dumont enumerates the following judgments that the Supreme Court relied on, cited at 
195 : Le procureur c/ Akayesu, aff. n° ICTR -96-4, 2 sept. 1998, confirmé par n° ICTR-964-A, 1er juin 
2001, Le procureur c/ Nahimana, Barayagwisa et Ngeze, aff. n° ICTR-99-52-T-I (affaire des Médias) 
[en appel]). 
605  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 319. 
606  Ibid., s. 319(1)(a). 
607  Mugesera, supra note 592 at  para. 101, cited in Rikhof, supra note 30 at 1126.  
608  Mugesera, ibid. at para. 104-105.  See Rikhof, ibid.  
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 Similarly to advocating or promoting genocide, promotion of hatred must be 
interpreted within its cultural and historical context.609   The type of speech provided for in 
section 319 of the Criminal Code is nevertheless broader than incitement, as stated by the 
ICTR in the Media Case as follows:  “... hate speech lies not only in the injury to the self-
dignity of target group members but also in the credence that may be given to the speech, 
which may promote discrimination and even violence”.610  
 
 Thus, the Supreme Court followed international jurisprudence in elevating hate 
crime to a specific inchoate offence by including it within the crime against humanity.611 
 
 Aside from the inchoate offences of promoting or advocating genocide and inciting 
or promoting hatred, directly related to the international crimes of genocide and crimes 
against humanity, respectively, CAHWCA and the Criminal Code provide for two more 
general inchoate offences with a temporal component: complicity after the fact and attempt.  
The first, complicity after the fact, is committed after the commission of an offence, while 
the second, attempt, is committed prior to the offence. 
 
 Sub-section 5.  Complicity after the Fact 
 
The Rome Statute does not contain any provisions relating to accomplices after the 
fact of a crime that has already been committed. On the other hand, section 23 of the 
Criminal Code provides that a person who receives, comforts or assists another person who 
was a party to an offence, could be convicted of the same offence.  
 
 Two conditions are required to establish the criminal intention of an accomplice 
after the fact: (i) knowledge that a person participated in a criminal offence; and (ii) the 
                                                 
609  Ibid. 
610  Media Case, supra note 291 para. 1078, cited in Mugesera, ibid. para. 147. See Rikhof, supra note 30 at 
1131.     
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intention to assist that person to escape.  The term “escape” must be interpreted largely as 
“escaping justice”.  This includes hiding evidence and making false statements.612 
 
 The ICJ Panel of Experts refers to a leading example of the case of Walther Funk, a 
Nazi businessman, to describe the offence of accessory after the fact.613  The IMT judgment 
determined that Funk, President of the Reichbank since January 1939, had agreed that “the 
Reichbank was to receive certain gold and jewels and currency from the SS and instructed 
his subordinates, who were to work out the details, not to ask too many questions.  As a 
result of this agreement the SS sent to the Reichbank the personal belongings taken from 
the victims who had been exterminated in the concentration camps”.614  Funk was therefore 
declared guilty as an accessory after the fact in the crimes committed against the 
concentration camp victims.615 
 
 The fourth inchoate offence listed in sub-sections 4 (1.1)/6 (1.1) of CAHWCA is 
attempt. 
 
 Sub-section 6.  Attempt 
 
 With respect to the crime attempt, the Supreme Court of Canada has established the 
following test, based on sub-section 24 (1) of the Criminal Code: the «act must be beyond 
                                                                                                                                                    
611  Rikhof, ibid. at 1132-1133.  
612  R. c. Knuff, (1980) 52 C.C.C. (2d) 523 (Alta. C.A.); R. c. French, (1978) 37 C.C.C. (2d) 201, aff’d in 
[1980] 1 R.C.S. 158, cited in Bourque et al. supra note 586 at 70.  
613  Funk held several titles, including Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for War Economy 
since early 1938, President of the Reichbank since 1939, member of the Ministerial Council for the 
Defence of the Reich since August 1939 and of the Central Planning Planning Board in September 1943 
(Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York: Knopf, 1992) 
at 398, cited in ICJ Expert Panel Report, Vol. II at 14.  
614  Ibid.  
615  Ibid. 
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preparation and go so far toward the commission of the completed offence that but for 
some intervention he is prevented or desists from the completion thereof».616  
 
 The definition of attempt under the Criminal Code is different from that under 
article 25 (3) (f) of the Rome Statute which states that the attempted crime “does not occur 
because of circumstances independent” of the accused’s intentions, whereas, under 
Canadian law, a person may be accused of attempt for a completed crime. 
 
Violations of international criminal law do not only extend to the core crimes 
contained in the Rome Statute and related inchoate offences.  The international community 
has thus recognized the importance of prosecuting all crimes of a reprehensible nature, 
regardless of jurisdictional barriers that apply to other crimes. 
 
Section 3.  Torture 
 
Torture is widely recognized as a crime that shocks the conscience of the 
international community and compels its prosecution under all national jurisdictions of the 
world.  Universal jurisdiction over the crime was recognized in 1998, when General 
Augusto Pinochet, the former President of Chile, was indicted by the Spanish magistrate 
Baltasar Garzón of the Audiencia Nacional.   
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada recognizes that there are three compelling 
indicia supporting that the prohibition of torture has become customary law.617  First, there 
is the great number of multilateral instruments that explicitly prohibit torture.618 Second, no 
                                                 
616  The King v. Quinton, [1947] R.C.S. 234 at 236, online: SCC 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1947/1947scr0-234/1947scr0-234.html> (accessed 27 April 2010).  
617  Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 62-65 
[hereinafter, Suresh]. 
618  See e.g. 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 75, art. 3 (common to each convention); Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), art. 5; Declaration on 
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
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State has ever legalized torture or admitted to its deliberate practice.619   Furthermore, it is 
considered by many academics to be an emerging, if not established peremptory norm.620 
Thus, Canada and any other civilized nation of the world, cannot derogate from 
internationally recognized rules prohibiting torture.621 
 
Namely, the act of torture is prohibited under the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter, the “UN 
Convention against Torture”),622 ratified by 146 countries of the world, including Canada 
on 28 September 1989.  Article 4 of the Convention requires all its parties to ensure that 
torture is recognized as a criminal offence in their respective jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
according to article 5, “[e]ach party is required to establish jurisdiction over the crime when 
committed on its territory, by one of its nationals, against one of its nationals (if the State 
                                                                                                                                                    
Treatment or Punishment, GA Res. 3452 (XXX), UN Doc. A/10034 (1975); International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966), Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, art. 7, European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 3; American Convention on 
Human Rights (1969), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art. 5; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1981), 21 I.L.M. 58, art. 5; Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981), 9:2 The Muslim 
World League Journal 25, art. VII, all cited in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at 62.  
619  Ibid. at 63.  
620 Lauri, Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status. Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Co., 1988 at 509; Malcolm N. Shaw, 
International Law (4th ed. 1997) at 203-204; Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999) 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, No. IT-95-17/1-T, 
December 10, 1998); R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No. 3), [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.).  Others do not explicitly set it out as a peremptory norm; however, 
they do generally accept that the protection of human rights or humanitarian rights is a peremptory 
norm: see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed. 1998) at 515, and C. Emanuelli, 
Droit international public: Contribution à l’étude du droit international selon une perspective 
canadienne (1998), at sections 251, 1394 and 1396.  All references contained in this footnote are cited in 
ibid. at 64.  
621  Suresh, supra note 617.  See Dumont, supra note 472 at 197.  
622  UN Convention against Torture, supra note 75, art.1 defines torture as: “any act by which severe pain or 
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third 
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 
an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions”.   
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feels it appropriate) or in any case in which the accused is present on its territory and it does 
not extradite him or her”.623 
 
 Accordingly, section 269.1 of the Criminal Code prohibits the crime of torture.624   
This crime is considered to be of a serious nature and a grave concern in Canada and across 
the world.  It nonetheless remains a very controversial topic and the details on how the 
crime is carried out have received various interpretations, particularly with regards to 
treatment of Guantanamo Bay prison detainees and terror suspects.625  Reports of torture in 
the past years have in fact referred to investigations by the International Committee of the 
Red Cross on “a system devised to break the will of the prisoners at Guantánamo (...) and 
make them wholly dependent on their interrogators through ‘humiliating acts, solitary 
confinement, temperature extremes, use of forced positions’”.626 
 
Since November 2009, there has also been growing publicity and parliamentary 
discussions in Canada over the alleged torture faced by captives transferred by the 
Canadian military to local Afghan authorities and alleged knowledge of the situation by the 
                                                 
623  Ibid. arts. 4, 5. Bruce Broomhall, supra note 80 at 404. 
624  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 269.1. 
625  The United States occupies the Naval Base at Guantánamo Base, which comprises 45 square miles of 
land and water along the southeast coast of Cuba, pursuant to a 1903 Lease Agreement executed with the 
newly independent Republic of Cuba in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War: On September 11, 
2001, agents of the al Qaeda terrorist organization hijacked commercial airplanes and attacked the 
World Trade Center in New York City and the national headquarters of the Department of Defense in 
Arlington, Virginia. Since early 2002, the U. S. military has held more than 640 non-Americans captured 
abroad.at the Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks. See Rasul v. 
Bush, (03-334) 542 U.S. 466 (2004), Opinion of the Court, online: University of Cornell Law School 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/03-334P.ZO> (accessed 27 April 2010) at 2. 
626  Neil A. Lewis, “Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo”, The New York Times (30 November 
2004), online: New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30gitmo.html?8bl=&pagewanted=print&po> (accessed 
27 April 2010). See also Amnesty International, Afghanistan. Detainees Transferred to Torture: ISAF 
Complicity? Index: ASA 11/011/2007, (London, Amnesty International Publications, 2007), online: 
Amnesty Canada <http://www.amnesty.ca/amnestynews/upload/ASA110112007.pdf> (accessed 27 
April 2010).   
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Canadian government.627   As mentioned in Part I, Chapter 2 of this thesis, in the event that 
the allegations of torture were proven, any private contractors, if any, that were hired for 
guarding and protecting detention premises, as well as conducting interrogation services 
may also be accused of participating in the offence of torture against the transferred 
detainees.628  
 
The serious nature of torture and the three core international crimes described 
previously has conferred upon them the status of being the most reprehensible indictable 
crimes under Canadian law.   
 
Section 4.  International Crimes are Mens Rea Crimes under Canadian Legislation 
 
According to CAHWCA, persons who commit any of the crimes contained in the 
Act are liable for “indictable offences”.629  Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
already stated that a subjective mens rea is required to convict a person of an international 
crime.630  
                                                 
627  Richard Colvin, a former Canadian diplomat who served in Afghanistan for seventeen months, testified 
that from the very beginning in May 2006 his warnings were sent to the senior ranks of the military on 
torture that the transfer detainees had suffered.  According to Colvin, his warnings were ignored by the 
Canadian government. See Steve Chase, “Canada Complicit in Torture of innocent Afghans, diplomat 
says” The Globe and Mail (18 November 2009), online: The Globe and Mail 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-complicit-in-torture-of-innocent-afghans-
diplomat-says/article1369069/> (accessed 27 April 2010).  The former judge, Honorable Frank 
Iacobucci, was appointed by the government to review the disclosure bans by government lawyers on 
hundreds of documents related to detainee transfers. See also Janice Tibbetts, “Tories Accused of 
contempt for detainees stance”, The Montreal Gazette (5 March 2010), online: The Montreal Gazette 
<http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Retired+judge+resolve+Afghan+detainees+documents+dispute/
2645675/story.html> (accessed 27 April 2010) and Juliet O’Neil, “Stop Transferring Afghan Detainees, 
Amnesty Lawyer tells Canada” The Montreal Gazette (17 March 2010), online: The Montreal Gazette 
<http://www.montrealgazette.com/news/Stop+transferring+Afghan+detainees+Amnesty+lawyer+tells+
Canada/2694699/story.html> (accessed 27 April 2010).   
628  Please refer to pages 59-62 above.. 
629  CAHWCA, supra note 24, ss. 4(1), 6(1). 
630  R v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 816, online: SCC <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1994/1994scr1-
701/1994scr1-701.html> (accessed 27 April 2010) [hereinafter, Finta].   The decision stated that the 
stigma attached to a crime against humanity or a war crime was so serious that only a subjective mens 
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The liability of corporations for the commission of international crimes in Canada 
will therefore be studied under rules applicable for subjective intention crimes in the next 
chapter of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3: Canadian Corporations as Subjects of Criminal Liability in 
Canada 
 
 The mental element for fault-based crimes in Canada requires the Crown, i.e. the 
Prosecutor, to establish a subjective mens rea.  Where the stigma attached to the offence is 
so damageable to a person, such as murder or theft, a specific intention to accomplish the 
consequence of the crime is necessary.631  In such situations, “the accused must (i) know a 
fact (e.g. that goods are stolen), or (ii) have a specified intent, either to achieve a certain 
outcome (e.g. to mislead) or to do a certain act (e.g. to intentionally apply force to another 
person).632  In the other cases, this subjective state of mind is replaced by that of wilful 
blindness or recklessness, which, under Canadian criminal law, are interpreted as lower-level 
subjective intentions.633 
 
 All fault-based crimes in the Criminal Code are committed by direct perpetrators, with 
or without accomplices.634  In addition to this, CAHWCA provides for an additional mode of 
                                                                                                                                                    
rea could be used to determine guilt of an accused person.  The analysis would be analogous for 
genocide and torture. 
631  R v. Vaillancourt; 1987 SCC 78, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636, online: SCC 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1987/1987scr2-636/1987scr2-636.html> (accessed 27 April 2010); R 
v. Logan [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731, online : SCC <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990scr2-
731/1990scr2-731.html> (accessed 27 April 2010).   
632  Justice Canada, A Plain Language Guide, supra note 397 at 2. 
633  R. v. Sansregret [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, online : SCC <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1985/1985scr1-
570/1985scr1-570.html> (accessed 27 April 2010).  Wilful blindness is defined as the attitude of one “who 
has become aware of the need for some inquiry declines to make the inquiry because he does not wish to 
know the truth.  He would prefer to remain ignorant (…) in deliberately failing to inquire when he knows 
there is reason for inquiry”.  Recklessness takes place when a person “who, aware that there is danger that 
his conduct could bring about the result prohibited by the criminal law, nevertheless persists, despite the risk.   
It is, in other words, the conduct of one who sees the risk and who takes the chance”. 
634  Criminal Code, supra note 31, ss. 21, 22. 
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liability inherited from international criminal law, i.e. liability of military commanders and 
other superiors.635 
 
Section 1.  Canadian Corporations as Perpetrators of International Crimes 
 
According to sub-section 21 (a) of the Criminal Code, “every one” is a party to an 
offence who “actually commits it”.  
 
It seems furthermore, that the terms “every one”, “person” and “owner” may be 
used interchangeably throughout the Criminal Code.  More specifically, section 2 of the 
Criminal Code provides that the terms “every one”, “person” and “owner” and “other 
similar expressions” include Her Majesty and an organization.  The same article defines 
“organization” as “a public body, body corporate, society, company, firm, partnership, 
trade union or municipality, or an association of persons”.636 
 
Consistently, under CAHWCA, it is possible to convict any “person” who commits, 
inside637 or outside Canada,638 genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.  The term 
“person” in CAHWCA is analogous to the definition of “person” in the Criminal Code, 
according to sub-section 2 (2) of CAHWCA, which states that “words and expressions used 
in this Act have the same meaning as in the Criminal Code”.639 Moreover, sub-section 34 
(2) of the Interpretation Act of Canada states that “all the provisions of the Criminal Code 
relating to indictable offences apply to indictable offences created by enactment”,640 hence 
the three core international crimes defined in CAWHCA.  
 
                                                 
635  CAHWCA, supra note 24, ss. 5, 7. 
636  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 2. 
637  CAHWCA, supra note 31, s. 4(1). 
638  Ibid., s. 6(1) 
639  CAHWCA, supra note 31, s. 2(2).   
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Sub-Section 1.  A Canadian Organization  
 
The definition of a “person” in section 2 of the Criminal Code broadly encompasses 
a number of possibilities for prosecution of corporations.  Indeed, the Canada Business 
Corporations Act provides that a “body corporate” includes a company or other body 
corporate wherever or however incorporated and that a “corporation” means a body 
corporate incorporated under the Act. The definition of “entity” is even larger and includes 
“a body corporate, a partnership, a trust, a joint venture or an unincorporated association or 
organization”.641  This therefore includes non-profit and charitable organizations, although 
this thesis limits itself to responsibility of profit-making corporations for international 
crimes.642 
 
Based on these definitions, it would be possible to convict a foreign or Canadian 
corporation under the Criminal Code and CAHWCA, wherever and however incorporated. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
640  Interpretation Act of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 34(2).  See also the same argumentation given by 
Cory Wanless, “Corporate Liability for International Crimes under Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity 
and War Crimes Act” (2009) 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice 201 at 207. 
641  Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 2 (1).  Corporations are incorporated in 
Canada under the Canada Business Corporations Act or under provincial statutes (see Dufour, supra 
note 383, at 16, n. 45). 
642  The Criminal Code definition of “person” includes bodies in addition to corporations and it is important 
to ensure that the same rules for attributing corporate liability apply to all forms of joint enterprises 
carried out by individuals, regardless of their structure.  Indeed, in the recent years preceding the 
adoption of Bill C-45, it had been determined that neither the terms “person” nor “corporation” would 
cover all “bodies” that may be involved in a crime.  This would include a biker gang, for example.  
Similarly, in 2001, the terrorism offences defined an “entity” as a person, group, trust, partnership or 
fund or an unincorporated association or organization (See Justice Canada, A Plain Language Guide, 
supra note 397 at 4).  In 1992, the Supreme Court had also decided that unions can be guilty of crimes in 
United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901, 71 C.C.C. (3d) 225, 89 
D.L.R. (4th) 609 (See Justice Canada, A Plain Language Guide, supra note 397 at 6-7). 
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Sub-section 2.  A Canadian Multinational Corporation 
 
As explained in the introduction, the term “corporation” used in this thesis, is meant 
to include MNC’s, defined by the Draft Norms on Responsibilities of TNC’s and Other643 
as “an economic entity operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities 
operating in two or more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home 
country or country of activity, and whether taken individually or collectively”.644   
 
The Canada Business Corporations Act is also applicable to Canadian MNC’s and 
defines each of its entities as affiliated bodies corporate, either “(a) if one of them is the 
subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same body corporate or each of them 
is controlled by the same person; and (b) if two bodies corporate are affiliated with the 
same body corporate at the same time, they are deemed to be affiliated with each other”.645 
 
These terms and definitions which are all comprised in the meaning of an 
“organization”, a subject of liability under Canadian criminal law, are particularly 
innovative.  Significantly, through CAHWCA, the door is opened for prosecution of 
corporations for international crimes before Canadian courts.   
 
In this regard, the Criminal Code regulates the various modes of participation in 
crimes, which are applicable to CAHWCA, by interpretation, under sub-sections 34 (2) of 
the Interpretation Act of Canada and 2 (2) of CAHWCA, described above. 
 
 
 
                                                 
643  Draft Norms on Responsibilities of TNC’s and Other, supra note 39.  
644 Ibid. See also Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, supra note 40; Similarly, Detlev F. Vagts 
defines the MNE as “a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by ties of common 
ownership and responsive to a common management strategy” (See Vagts, supra note 38 at 740).   
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Sub-section 3.  Perpetrators under paragraph 21 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code 
 
Under paragraph 21 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code, every one who “actually 
commits” an offence, becomes a party to the latter.646  This is consistent with article 25 (3) 
(a) of the Rome Statute.647 
 
Since the provisions of the Criminal Code are applicable to the application of 
CAHWCA, pursuant to sub-section 34 (2) of the Interpretation Act of Canada,648 the 
interpretation of “commits” in sub-sections 4(1)/6(1) of CAHWCA will be consistent with 
the explanations provided below for paragraph 21 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code. 
  
Paragraph 1.  The Direct Author  
 
Very little interpretation can be given to paragraph 21 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code 
when the principal perpetrator of an offence has physically committed the acts which led to 
the realization of the offence.  In such a case, an actor is referred to as the principal author 
of an offence if that person actually does or contributes to the doing of the actus reus with 
the requisite mens rea of an offence.  As seen above, the person may include a human 
being, a corporation or another form of organization.649 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
645  Canada Business Corporations Act, supra note 641, s. 2(2). 
646  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 21(1)(a). 
647  Rome Statute, supra note 20, s. 25(3)(a). 
648  Interpretation Act of Canada, supra note 640, s. 34(2). 
649  R. v. Mammolita, [1983] O.J. No. 151 (Q.L.) (Ont. C.A.), cited in Amissi Manirabona, La responsabilité 
pénale des sociétés canadiennes pour les crimes contre l’environnement survenus à l’étranger, (LL.D. 
Thesis, Université de Montréal, 2010) [unpublished] at 145-146. 
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Specifically in terms of corporate liability, the corporation must have personally and 
directly taken part in the original activities which led to the offence rather than simply have 
assets in other corporations which took part in the said offence.650 
 
Paragraph 2.  Co-perpetrators  
 
Each person of a group may also be held individually liable as a principal to an 
offence under paragraph 21 (1) (a) of the Criminal Code if each of those persons had acted 
wilfully in committing the offence.651  Manirabona, adds that co-perpetration requires that 
an agreement is made prior or spontaneously with the commission of the offence.652 This 
theory of co-perpetration, developed in Canadian jurisprudence, is similar to the one 
adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC in the Lubanga case, discussed previously in 
Part II, Chapter 3 of this thesis.653  
 
The various partners of joint venture corporations developing projects in conflict 
zones or high legal-risk territories are particularly susceptible to become involved in co-
perpetration of international crimes, due to the high level of cooperation between entities in 
achieving common financial, commercial or technical goals.654 
 
 
 
                                                 
650  Cynthia D. Wallace, The Multinational Enterprise and Legal Control, Host State Sovereignty in an Era 
of Economic Globalization (The Hague/London, New York: Martins Nijhoff Publishers, 2002) at 140, 
cited in Manirabona, ibid. at 145.  
651  R. v. Mammolita, [1983] O.J. No. 151 (Q.L.) (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 12-13, cited in Manirabona, ibid. at 
145-146.   
652  Manirabona, ibid. at 147.  
653  Please refer to pages 96-100 above. 
654  By definition, a joint venture is considered as a form of collaboration, generally on a contractual level, 
reuniting two or more corporations with the purpose of accomplishing a common commercial, financial 
or technical goal.  See Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law, 2d ed., 
(Oxford/Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 66 and Larry A. DiMattea, Law of International 
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Paragraph 3.  The Innocent Agent 
 
The theory of perpetration by means provided for in international criminal law in 
the Katanga case, discussed in the previous Chapter 3 of this thesis655 is also reflected in 
common law through the concept of “innocent agency”.656  The British Columbia Court of 
Appeals has also recognized that “a person who commits an offence by means of an 
instrument ‘whose movements are regulated’ by him, actually commits the offence 
himself”.657 
 
 In some common law jurisdictions, it is accepted that “[a] subsidiary may operate as 
the agent of the parent company such that the parent company is liable for the actions of the 
subsidiary”.658  Nevertheless, the “agency theory is inappropriate in most cases because 
both parties (the parent and subsidiary) must agree that the subsidiary is acting on behalf of 
the parent (...). Subsidiaries are frequently used to ‘shield the parent corporation from 
liability’ and therefore parent companies are careful not to act as though they have 
consented to having their subsidiaries act as agents”.659 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Contracting, 2d ed., (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business/Kluwer Law International, 
2009) at 380-381, cited in Manirabona, ibid. at 148. 
655  Please refer to pages 94-96above. 
656  R. v. Palmer & Hudson (1804), 2 Leach 978, 168 E.R. 586; R v. Mazeau (1840), 9 Car. & P. 676, 173 
E.R. 1006; R. v. Bleasdale (1948) 2 Car. & K. 765, 175 E.R. 321; R. v. Dowey (1868), 11 Cox C.C. 
115 ; R. v. Butt (1884), 15 Cox C.C. 564), all cited in Berryman v. R, paras. 11-15 
657   R. v. MacFadden (1971), 16 C.R.N.S. 251, 5 C.C.C. (2d) 204, 4 N.B.R. (2d) 59, cited in R. v. Berryman, 
1990 CarswellBC 174, 48 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105, 57 C.C.C. (3d) 375, 78 C.R. (3d) 376 at para. 27. 
658  Hansen, supra note 40 at 434.  
659  Ibid.  Among various facts considered under common law to decide that a subsidiary acted as an agent 
of the parent corporation, the courts took into account that the subsidiary’s shares were wholly owned by 
the parent corporation, that it had the same address as the parent, that the parent corporation’s directors 
and officers controlled the subsidiary through board membership or through an investor’s office, etc. 
(see United States tort law cases and other examples referred to in supra note 413). Additional 
information will also be provided in the last chapter of this thesis linking these agency theories to 
superior-subordinate relationships and perpetration by means modes of liability for international crimes. 
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In addition to the actual commission of an offence through the actions of a principal 
author, sub-section 21 (1) of the Criminal Code provides for criminal liability of every one 
who aids or abets another person in committing an offence.   
 
Sub-section 4.  Canadian Corporations as Accomplices in the Commission of 
International Crimes 
 
 The SRSG on Business and Human Rights states that “few companies may ever 
directly commit acts that amount to international crimes.  But there is greater risk of their 
facing allegations of ‘complicity’ in such crimes.  With nuanced differences, most national 
legal systems recognize complicity as a concept”.660 
 
 When determining a corporation’s involvement in international crimes, mere 
presence in a country and paying taxes are unlikely to create liability.  On the other hand, 
derived indirect economic benefit from the wrongful conduct of others may do so, 
depending on such facts as the closeness of the company’s association with those actors.  
However, even where a corporation did not intend for a crime to occur, its liability may be 
incurred if it knew, or should have known, that it was providing assistance that had a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime.661 
 
 In this regard, in Canada, as in international criminal law, there exist various modes 
of criminal complicity recognized by law.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
660  2007 SRSG on Business and Human Rights Report, supra note 285 at 18. 
661  Ibid.  
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Paragraph 1.  Complicity by Aiding and Abetting under sub-sections 21 (b) and 
(c) of the Criminal Code 
 
Pursuant to sub-sections 21 (1) (b) and (c) of the Criminal Code, every one who 
aids or abets an offence will be considered a party to that offence as if the person actually 
committed it.  Through a joint reading of this section and the aforementioned sub-section           
34 (2) of the Interpretation Act of Canada, it is probable that these modes of criminal 
participation are implicitly comprised under the expression «commits» of sub-sections 
4(1)/6(1) of CAHWCA.  
 
A.  The Meaning 
 
Criminal liability is triggered if a person knowingly contributed to the commission 
of the offence with the purpose of facilitating its commission through action or omission 
with a view to aiding someone.662  
 
Abetting, on the other hand, constitutes a different form of complicity than aiding, 
because it seeks to instigate the principal or principals to accomplish the crime by taking 
active steps in this perspective.663  
 
B. Examples 
 
 Although there have been no judgments rendered to date by Canadian courts for 
corporate criminal liability for international crimes, it is possible to refer to rulings of other 
common law jurisdictions as a source of reference. In this regard, the District Court of New 
                                                 
662  R. v. Dunlop and Sylvester, [1979] 2 R.C.S. 881, online: SCC 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1979/1979scr2-881/1979scr2-881.html> (accessed 27 April 2010) 
and R. v. Greyeyes [1997] 2 R.C.S. 825, REJB 1997-01540, online: SCC 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1997/1997scr2-825/1997scr2-825.html>  (accessed 27 April 2010). 
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York determined that a number of situations may be used as sufficient claims to proceed to 
litigation against a corporation under aiding and abetting liability.   
 
 Among others, the District Court referred to (i) the provision of information to 
facilitate arrests and for use by interrogators; (ii) participation in interrogations; (iii) sales 
of transportation vehicles to government defence forces and police units; (iv) sales of 
computer hardware, software and the provision of other technological support to 
governments in carrying out unlawful breaches against human rights; and (v) sales of 
armaments and related equipment and expertise to the government with knowledge that 
they would be used for extrajudicial killings or other underlying acts of international 
crimes.664 
 
 Such forms of liability were also recognized by the ICJ Panel of Experts as 
described previously in Part II, Chapter 3 of this thesis.665 
 
 These examples attest to the fact that corporations may act as accomplices in 
international crimes through aiding or abetting.  Two other forms of complicity in criminal 
law, conspiring and counselling, also exist that would engage a corporation’s liability.  
 
Paragraph 2.  Complicity by Conspiring under sub-section 21 (2) of the Criminal 
Code 
 
 One of the other forms of complicity in Canadian criminal law is contained in sub-
section 21 (2) of the Criminal Code, which states that “where two or more persons form an 
intention to carry out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of 
them, in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew or 
                                                                                                                                                    
663  R. c. Curran, (1978) 38 C.C.C. (2d) 151, leave to appeal to SCC refused in [1978] 1 S.C.R. xi; R. c. 
Dunlop and Sylvester, ibid. (See Bourque et al., supra note 586 at 67.  
664  Khulumani District Court (remanded), paras. 15-20, cited in Krohnke, supra note 445.  
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ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable consequence 
of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.”666   
 
 As opposed to the inchoate offence of conspiracy described under section 465 of the 
Criminal Code, conspiring as a form of complicity requires that the offence be completed 
in order to charge the parties of the common plan to participation in a criminal offence.  In 
this sense, the wording of sub-section 21 (2) Criminal Code is also almost identical to that 
of article 25 (3) (d) of the Rome Statute and resembles common purpose liability 
formulated under international criminal law jurisprudence, described above in Part I, 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 
 Similarly, counselling can also be an inchoate offence or a form of accomplice 
liability, depending on whether the offence counselled is committed or not. 
 
Paragraph 3.  Complicity by Counselling under Sub-section 22 (3) of the                   
Criminal Code 
 
Although in the Mugesera case, the accused was found guilty of counselling to 
commit an offence which was not committed, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on the 
definition provided in sub-section 22 (3) of the Criminal Code to define the inchoate crime 
as the act of procuring, soliciting or inciting.667 
 
 The same definition is therefore used for the inchoate crime of counselling 
incomplete crimes as the one for counselling as a mode of complicit participation in a 
crime, pursuant to sub-sections 22 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.  Thus, “[w]here a 
person counsels another person to be a party to an offence and that other person is 
                                                                                                                                                    
665  Please refer to page 102 above. 
666  Bourque et al., supra note 586, p. 68.  
667  Mugesera, supra note 592 at para. 63. 
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afterwards a party to that offence, the person who counselled is a party to that offence, 
notwithstanding that the offence was committed in a way different from that which was 
counselled”.668 
 
According to paragraph 4 (2) (a) CAHWCA, every person who commits an 
international crime shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life, if an intentional killing 
forms the basis of the offence.  In all other cases, paragraph 4 (2) (b) CAHWCA provides 
that a person who commits an international crime is liable to imprisonment for life.   
 
On a theoretical level, Canadian law, like the Rome Statute, considers that the 
principal perpetrator and the accomplice are equal on the level of determination of 
sentencing, as discussed previously in Part I, Chapter 2 of this thesis.669 Notwithstanding, 
the practice of Canadian tribunals is to reduce the sentence for accomplices compared to 
that which would be imposed on the principal perpetrator of the crime.670  Accused 
corporations may therefore attempt to plead reduced sentences before Canadian Courts if 
they are prosecuted for participation in violations to international criminal law, provided an 
intentional killing was not the basis of the offence. 
 
                                                 
668  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 22 (1).  See also para. 22 (2) of the Criminal Code which provides that 
“[e]very one who counsels another person to be a party to an offence is a party to every offence that the 
other commits in consequence of the counselling that the person who counselled knew or ought to have 
known was likely to be committed in consequence of the counselling”. 
669  For international law, refer to Elements of Crimes, supra note 577. (See Grondin, supra note 300 at 453.  
See also p. 66, n. 307 of this thesis referring to Sliedregt, supra note 91 at 63. For Canadian law, see 
Chile Eboe-Osuji, “‘Complicity in Genocide’ versus ‘Aiding and Abetting Genocide’” (2005) 3 Journal 
of International Criminal Justice 56 at 73. 
670 See Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 718.1, which provides: “A sentence must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”. See also R v. M (C A), [1996] 1 
S.C.R. 500; DPP for Northern Ireland v. Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350 per Lord Edmund-Davies at 150 
(House of Lords); Gould & Co Ltd v. Houghton [1921] 1KB 509, per Lord Reading C.J. at 518 (King’s 
Bench Division); and C.C. Ruby, Sentencing, 5th ed., (Toronto: Butterworths,1999),167, especially at 
229, all cited in Chile Eboe-Osuji, ibid. at 71.  Furthermore, where the law provides flexibility in the 
degree of sentencing, judges have discretion to impose sentences according to the roles of each 
defendant concerned in the same criminal transaction, pursuant to Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 
718.3(1),(2) Chile Eboe-Osuji, ibid. at 70. 
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A final form of participation in international crimes is liability of military and civil 
superiors and is indicated as a separate and punishable offence under CAHWCA.671 
 
Sub-section 4.  Canadian Corporations as Superiors Accountable for 
International Crimes 
  
Sections 5 to 7 of CAWHCA innovate in Canadian law and introduce the notion of 
criminal liability of military and civil superiors, under almost identical terms to those of the 
Rome Statute.  This is a significant precedent: even if at present, the doctrine of superior 
responsibility has not been applied against corporations, the possibility may be introduced 
in Canadian law.672   In this regard, CAHWCA allows the prosecution of corporations that 
were not present during the perpetration of an international crime, with the condition 
however that they knowingly or consciously refused to take into account existing 
information on their commission.673  
 
 Indeed, pursuant to sub-sections 5(2)/7(2) of CAHWCA, a superior, other than 
military, may be declared guilty if the accused: (i) consciously disregarded information that 
clearly indicated that an offence was about to be committed or was being committed;                   
(ii) when the person about to commit or committing the crime was under the superior’s 
effective authority and control; and (iii) knowing that that person was about to commit or is 
committing such an offence, failed to take, as soon as practicable, all necessary and 
reasonable measures within the superior’s power to prevent or repress the commission of 
the offence or further commission of offences or failed to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution as soon as practicable.674 
                                                 
671  CAHWCA, supra note 24, s. 5/7. 
672  Ibid., s. 5(2).  
673  Ibid., s. 5 (2).  
674  It is not certain whether, under constitutional requirements in Canada, recklessness, as provided in sub-
section 22.2 (c) of the Criminal Code, will be sufficient as a psychological element for a specific 
intention crime, such as genocide.  Nonetheless, and paradoxically, this does not seem to cause any issue 
to establish a criminal responsibility by virtue of the command or superior responsibility doctrine under 
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In addition to the examples cited previously in Part I, Chapter 2, where business 
leaders were held criminally responsible for the act of their subordinates675 it is also 
possible that in cases where a subsidiary is considered to have acted on behalf of a parent 
corporation, non-military superior liability may be invoked against the latter.676 
 
As with accomplice liability, a person who commits an international crime under 
superior responsibility in CAHWCA is liable for an indictable offence and life 
imprisonment.677 
 
 In the case of corporations, sub-section 735 (1) of the Criminal Code provides that 
an organization convicted of an offence is liable, in lieu of any imprisonment that is 
prescribed, to be fined in an amount that is in the discretion of the court for indictable 
offences.  Furthermore, a sentence imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence 
and the degree of responsibility of the offender, pursuant to section 718.1 of the Criminal 
Code. It may therefore be assumed that for sentences imposing life imprisonment in 
CAHWCA, a corporation will be held liable to pay a considerable fine.   
 
 Additional details on sentencing corporations for international crimes will be 
provided in the Chapter 4 below.  It is important however to first study the evolution of 
corporate criminal liability in Canada for the commission of indictable offences. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
the jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals. (See Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić et al., supra note 348, paras. 
333-343).   
675  Please refer to pages 76-81 above. 
676  See also page154above, where it is explained that in some common law jurisdictions, a subsidiary may 
be considered to be the “agent of a parent corporation”.  The agency theory may also be linked to the 
“perpetration by means” mode of liability if it is deemed applicable to corporations in the future, as 
described previously in Part I, Chapter 3 of this thesis and will be further described in the last chapter of 
this thesis. 
677  CAHWCA, supra note 24, ss. 5(3)/7(3). 
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Chapter 4: The Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability in Canada 
 
 The increasingly dominant position carried out by corporations since the Second 
World War and the need to address broad policy questions on the use of criminal law to 
deal with corporate behaviour was explicitly underlined by the Canadian Law Reform 
Commission in 1976 in a working paper entitled Criminal Responsibility for Group 
Action.678  
 
Before this date, corporations had been subjects liable for indictable and regulatory 
offences for several decades in most common law jurisdictions, including the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada.    
 
Initially, they were held guilty of property offences in common law jurisdictions, 
such as nuisance and nonfeasance in seventeenth-century England. Their legal 
accountability thereafter gradually expanded to a greater range of offences.  The courts 
began applying criminal sanctions to corporations only in the late 19th century as large 
firms, particularly railroads, played an increasingly important role in the economy.  Rules 
were adopted on a case-by-case basis where the courts made the corporation responsible for 
the actions of the individuals who committed the physical act of the crime.679 
 
Section 1.  Historical Evolution of Corporate Criminal Liability in Canada 
 
Corporate accountability was initially included in the Canadian Criminal Code of 
1892, which made it punishable for a corporation to break a contract with a municipal 
                                                 
678  Law Reform Commission of Canada, Criminal Responsibility for Group Action, Working Paper no. 16, 
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1976) at 1, 4, 5. 
679  French, supra note 37 at 174.  See also Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth Report, supra 
note 397 at 4. 
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corporation for supply of electric light, power, gas or water.680  In 1906, the Criminal Code 
was amended and included the term “corporation” in the definition of the term “person”.681    
 
For the first time, in 1941, a Canadian court decided that a corporation could be 
held criminally responsible as a “person” for crimes involving active wrongdoing in Rex v. 
Fane Robinson Ltd.682   
 
Four decades later, a case was brought before the Ontario Court of Appeals against 
a group of corporations that conspired to submit collusive bids to a call for sealed tenders 
by Canadian public agencies for dredging and marine construction projects from February 
1967 to April 1973.683  The court convicted five individuals who maintained high-level, 
decision-making positions of the corporations, including presidents and directors, for 
defrauding and conspiring to defraud the public under the 1970 Criminal Code of 
Canada.684  Furthermore, and significantly, eight companies were held criminally liable for 
the same offences.685 
 
                                                 
680  S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 521 (2), cited in Leigh, supra note 589 at 250. This study was prepared as a 
background paper for the use of the Law Reform Commission of Canada in preparing its working paper 
no. 16 (supra note 678).  It was published with the consent of the Law Reform Commission of Canada.  
See also, Law Reform Commission, supra note 678 at 7.   
681  R.S.C. 1906, c. 146, s. 2 (13), cited in Leigh, ibid. at 250.  See also, Law Reform Commission of 
Canada, ibid. at 7. 
682  Rex. v. Fane Robinson Ltd., [1941] 2 W.W.R. 235, 76 C.C.C. 1961, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 409 (Alta. C.A.), 
cited in Law Reform Commission of Canada, ibid. at 7.  See also, Leigh, ibid. at 250. 
683  R. v. McNamara, (1981), 56 C.C.C. (2d) 193 (CarswellOnt 1243).  The following were corporations 
convicted and their corresponding fines :  (i) Canadian Dredge and Dock Company Ltd.:  $1,000,000.00; 
(ii) Pitts Engineering Construction Ltd. :$1,000,000.00, (iii) C.A. Pitts General Contractors Ltd.: $ 
50,000.00, (iv) Sceptre Dredging Ltd.: $450,000.00, (v) Marine Industries Ltd: $ 650,000.00, (vi) 
McNamara Corp.: $2,000,000.00, (vii) J.P. Porter Company Ltd.: $1,000,000.00, (viii) Richelieu 
Dredging Corp. Inc.: $500,000.00.   Also, the following individuals were the individuals convicted with 
their corresponding prison sentences: (i) Sydney Cooper of Pitts Engineering : three years; (ii) Albert 
Gill of Sceptre Dredging Ltd.: two years; (iii) Frank Hamata of Sceptre Dredging Ltd.: two years less a 
day; (iv) Jean Simard of Marine Industries Ltd.:  three years; (v) Harold McNamara of McNamara 
Corp.: five years.   
684  Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 338(1), 423(1)(d). 
685  R. v. McNamara, supra note 683. 
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An appeal was allowed before the Supreme Court of Canada, instituted by four of 
the convicted companies: Canadian Dredge and Dock Company, Marine Industries, J.P. 
Porter Company and Richelieu Dredging Company.  The appeal was rejected and criminal 
liability of the appellants was upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dredge686 in 
1985.  
 
Sub-section 1.  Importation of the Identification Theory for Liability of 
Corporations for Mens Rea Crimes 
 
In Dredge, the Supreme Court of Canada imported the identification theory of 
British case law as it was defined in the House of Lords Lennard’s Carrying Co. v. Asiatic 
Petroleum Co.687 This same theory had been applied in previous Canadian jurisprudence, 
including the English decision of Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass,688 and Canadian 
lower-courts decisions, Rex v. Fane Robinson Ltd,689 R. v. J.J. Beamish Construction Co.690 
and R. v. St. Lawrence Corp.691 
 
Henceforth, corporations would be held liable for the acts of individuals who 
represented the “directing mind of the company”.  This theory seeks to identify such 
individuals who could be part of the corporation’s board of directors, the managing 
director, the superintendent, the manager or anyone else delegated by the board of directors, 
while having governing executive authority of the corporation.692  Because of their high-
level decision-making authority, these individuals were said to represent the very existence 
of the company and could not be dissociated from it.  In other terms, they were considered 
                                                 
686  Dredge, supra note 378. 
687 [1915] A.C. 705, (see ibid. at para. 16).  
688  [1972] AC 153, (see Dredge, ibid. at para. 20).  
689  Rex. v. Fane Robinson Ltd., [1941] 2 W.W.R. 235, 76 C.C.C. 1961, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 409 (Alta. C.A.) 
(see Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 678 at 7 and Leigh, supra note 589 at 250. 
690  [1966] 2 O.R. 867 (H.C.), at p. 891, per Jessup J. (see Dredge, supra note 378 at para. 19). 
691  [1969] 2 O.R. 305 (C.A.) at 320 per Schroeder J.A. (see Dredge, ibid).  
692  Dredge, supra note 398 at para. 50. 
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the “alter ego” of the company.693 The Court explained that this idea is employed as a 
“direct descendant of Blackstone's famous theorem: The husband and the wife in law are 
one and that one is the husband".694 
 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada set out three conditions for the 
identification theory to operate: that the action of the directing mind “(a) was within the 
field of operation assigned to him; (b) was not totally in fraud of the corporation; and (c) 
was by design or result partly for the benefit of the company.”695    
 
Despite this flexible approach, the 1985 Supreme Court’s decision posed a series of 
problems in its subsequent practical application. This led the Canadian government to 
revise the doctrine and liability regimes of other common law jurisdictions. 
 
Sub-section 2.  The Westray Mining Disaster of 1992 
 
Government deliberations to adopt legislation on corporate criminal liability were 
already underway since 1987.  Simultaneous to these discussions, the topic of corporate 
liability was gaining ground on popular Canadian territory after a methane gas mining 
explosion took place in Plymouth, Nova Scotia in 1992.  Twenty-six (26) miners of the 
mining company Curragh Inc. were killed as a result of the explosion.696 
                                                 
693  Ibid.  at para. 38.  The Supreme Court of Canada phrases this requirement in the following manner : “In 
order to trigger its operation and through it corporate criminal liability for the actions of the employee 
(who must generally be liable himself), the actor-employee who physically committed the offence must 
be the ego", the centre" of the corporate personality, the vital organ" of the body corporate, the alter 
ego" of the employer corporation or its directing mind" (ibid. at para. 20).   
694  Ibid. para. 20 
695  Dredge, ibid. at para. 65. See also Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397 and Justice Canada 
Response to the JUST Fifteenth Report, supra note 397 at 6.  
696 Westray Campaign: Corporate Criminal Responsibility and the Westray Mine Disaster 
‹www.uswa.ca/eng/hse/bkg468_2.htm›, cited in Christopher M. Little & Natasha Savoline, Corporate 
Criminal Liability in Canada : The Criminalization of Occupational Health and Safety Offences, paper 
presented at Filion Wakely Thorup Angeletti, LLP Annual Seminar (Toronto: Filion Wakely Thorup 
Angeletti, LLP, 2003) at  3.  See also Mr. Justice Richard, The Westray Story: A Predictable Path to 
Disaster, Report of Mr. Justice Richard (November 1997), cited in Steven Bittle, “Constituting the 
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This unfortunate event, surnamed the “Westray Mining Disaster” triggered an 
immediate reactive response from the United Steelworkers of America, representing the 
Westray Coal underground and surface employees.  The written submissions of the United 
Steelworkers of America to the Westray Mine Public Inquiry Commission were in fact 
categorical in blaming public officials responsible for regulating the mine as well as the 
operator of the mine for not acting prudently and following widely accepted safe mining 
practices.697   
 
On October 5, 1992, following investigations led by the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police and three separate inquiries on the matter, the Attorney General and Public 
Prosecution Service charged the company and Messrs. Gerald James Phillips and Roger 
James Parry, two of the mine’s managerial staff with fifty-two offences under the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act,698 in an attempt to affix the blame on them for the 
explosion and deaths.699 The trial, however, was halted in mid-course by a decision of the 
judge to stay the proceedings on the basis that: “[t]he entire proceedings were tainted by 
prosecutors who were playing to an enraged public, and playing to win”.700   
 
The controversy created by this mining project fell from government and judicial 
echelons onto public outrage.701 The publicity surrounding the event took an even greater 
toll following the November 1997 report entitled The Westray Story: A Predictable Path to 
                                                                                                                                                    
Corporate Criminal: Corporate Criminal Liability in Post-Westray Canada”, in 5 Governing the 
Corporation: Mapping the Loci of Power in Corporate Governance Design (Belfast: Queen’s University 
Belfast, 20-21 September 2004) at 3. 
697  United Steelworkers of America, “Written Submissions of the United Steelworkers of America” 
(submitted to Westray Mine Public Inquiry Commission, Stellarton, Nova Scotia, August 1996), online: 
Westray Mine Public Inquiry, United Steelworkers Union <http://www.alts.net/ns1625/wrpi99a.html> 
(accessed 27 April 2010).  
698  R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 320 (the “OHSA”), a provincial statute of Nova Scotia.  
699  R. v. Curragh Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 537 at para. 30. 
700  Ibid. at para. 121. 
701  United Steelworkers of America, supra note 697.  
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Disaster702 of the appointed Commissioner under the Public Inquiries Act703 and Special 
Examiner under the Coal Mines Regulation Act,704 Mr. Justice K. Peter Richard.  The report 
found that senior executives, including the President of the company had been grossly 
negligent in complying with occupational health and safety standards,705 which contributed 
to the explosion. 
 
Among the various recommendations of Justice Richard, Recommendation 73 
provided:  
 
“The Government of Canada, through the Department of Justice, 
should institute a study of the accountability of corporate executives 
and directors for the wrongful or negligent acts of the corporation and 
should introduce in the Parliament of Canada such amendments to 
legislation as are necessary to ensure that corporate executives and 
directors are held properly accountable for workplace safety”.706 
 
Further to these findings, victims’ families, associations and advocates of 
criminalization of occupational health and safety violations launched an intense lobbying 
campaign against what they considered to be a failure of justice.707 Moreover, “at the same 
time that the aftermath of Westray was unfolding, a series of high profile corporate fraud 
cases in the United States, including the Enron and WorldCom cases, and the poison water 
scandal in Walkerton, Ontario were contributing to an overall climate of concern with 
respect to unregulated neo-liberal (corporate) activities”.708 
                                                 
702  Richard, Justice K. P., The Westray story: A predictable path to disaster. Report of the Westray Mine 
Public Inquiry, Vol. 1: Executive Summary (Halifax, NS: Government Printer, 1997). 
703  R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 372 
704  R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 73. (See R. v. Curragh Inc., supra note 699 at paras. 24-25). 
705 See Bittle, supra note 696, 4. See also Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397. 
706  Bittle, ibid..   
707  Ibid.,  
708  S. BITTLE, supra note 59, p. 5. See also “The Enron Affair”, BBC News (17 February 2003), online: 
BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/business/2002/enron/default.stm> (accessed 27 April 
2010); “WorldCom Wall Street scandal”, BBC News (1 July 2002), online: BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2077838.stm>  (accessed 27 April 2010); and “INDEPTH: Inside 
Walkerton. Walkerton Report Highlight”, CBC News (January 2002), online: CBC News 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/walkerton/walkerton_report.html> (accessed 27 April 2010) (The 
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As a result of all this controversy, and pursuant to the recommendations of                   
Mr. Justice K. Peter Richard, the Government of Canada agreed to revisit the judicial 
construction of corporate criminal liability.709  
 
Sub-section 3.  Legislative Discussions on Corporate Criminal Liability in 
Canada 
 
In response to the Westray Inquiry’s recommendations, the Canadian House of 
Commons studied various legislative proposals between 1999 and 2002 for enhanced 
criminal accountability of corporations and senior corporate officials.710   
 
The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights held hearings in May 2002 
to study one of the final proposals for legislation on corporate criminal liability, Bill                 
C-284, sponsored by M.P. Beverley Desjarlais of the New Democratic Party, and 
thoroughly debated in the Parliament.711  
 
During its deliberations, the Committee considered various models of liability for 
corporations applied in different common law systems of the world.  First, it was agreed 
that the identification theory, as defined in Dredge,712 was too restrictive since it applied 
only to acts of individuals with decision-making authority, without taking into account 
other individuals and the corporation’s responsibility as a whole.713 
                                                                                                                                                    
poisonous water caused (7) people to die and more than two-thousand three hundred (2,300) people to 
suffer various illnesses after drinking tap water contaminated with deadly E.coli).      
709  Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397.  
710  Justice Canada,  A Plain Language Guide, supra note 397 at 5. See also Bittle, supra note 696 at 6 (the 
first initiatives were presented by the minority New Democratic Party (N.D.P.) of Canada at the 36th 
Parliament in 1999 through Bill C-468 introduced by Ms. Alexa McDonough from the region where the 
Westray tragedy occurred.  The second proposal was introduced during the following Parliament in 
September 2001 through Bill-C-259, sponsored by N.D.P. Member of Parliament, Ms. Beverly 
Dejarlais). 
711  Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth Report, supra note 397 at 1, 2.  
712  Dredge supra note 378. 
713  Little & Savoline,, supra note 696 at 6. 
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Paragraph 1.  Criticism of the Identification Doctrine  
 
Critics of the identification doctrine mainly contend that the notion of a “directing 
mind” is too limited and thereby conduces to an excess of exonerations for corporate 
wrongdoing.   This was the view adopted by the government in 1999, as described by 
Professor Boisvert in a discussion paper presented at the Uniform Law Conference of 
Canada held during the same year.  According to this view, restricting corporate 
responsibility to the actions of individuals with “governing executive authority, i.e. those 
with decision-making power and discretion to design a policy, rather than the individuals 
who implement it,714 fails to consider that “in multifaceted companies, lower-level 
management may be the ones interpreting, applying and even creating corporate policy”715. 
In addition, “linking the corporation's liability to the wrongful acts of its senior officials 
clearly constitutes an encouragement to isolate the latter to ensure they are unaware of any 
doubtful practices by the corporation”.716 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
714  Rhône (The) v. Peter A.B. Widener (The) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 497 at 523.  See Boisvert, supra note 398 at 
para. 23.   
715  Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397. 
716  See, for example, Bucy, supra note 382 at 1105; Celia Wells, "Corporate Liability and Consumer 
Protection: Tesco v. Natrass Revisited", (1994) 57 Modern L. Rev. 817; S. Field and N. Jorg, "Corporate 
Liability and Manslaughter: Should we be Going Dutch?", [1991] Crim. L.R. 156 at 158, cited in 
Boisvert, supra note 398, para. 33. See also Justice Canada Discussion Paper, ibid.   
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Professor Boisvert added in her paper that “[f]ocusing on the state of mind of the 
senior management works to the benefit of the larger entities and to the detriment of the 
smaller ones and this is unfair”.717  This view is consistent with Fisse’s statement that: 
 
“[o]ffences committed on behalf of large organizations often occur at the level 
of middle or lower-tier management, yet the Tesco principle requires proof of 
fault of a top-tier manager or a delegate in the very restricted sense of a 
person given full discretion to act independently of instructions in relation to 
part of the functions of the board.  Perversely, the Tesco principle works best 
in the context of small companies, where fault on the part of a top manager is 
usually much easier to prove and where there is relatively little need to 
impose corporate criminal liability”.718 
 
From another viewpoint, the identification theory may also be too broad since it 
automatically attributes “to the corporation the moral turpitude of an individual even 
though the organization itself, as an entity, has committed no wrong in the strict sense of 
the word”.719 
 
The government discussions that followed were therefore aimed at finding a 
common ground on the subject of corporate criminal liability that would effectively assist 
in implementing a new legislation.   
 
Paragraph 2.  Consideration of the Corporate Culture Approach  
 
Particularly relevant to the government discussions, it was observed that Bill C-284 
proposed a similar approach to that of the Australian Criminal Code Act, adopted in 1995, 
which incorporates the concept of “corporate culture” as a premise for corporate criminal 
liability.720  
                                                 
717  Brent Fisse, "Criminal Law: The Attribution of Liability to Corporations: A Statutory Model" (1991) 13 
Sydney L.R. 277 at 278.  See also Bucy, ibid. note 382 at 1104; Boisvert, supra note 398 at para. 33. 
718  Fisse, ibid. at 277.  See also Bittle, supra note 696 at 6. 
719  Fisse, supra note 717 at 277.  See Boisvert, supra note 398 at para. 34.   
720  Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397; Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth 
Report, supra note 397 at 10, Justice Canada,  A Plain Language Guide, supra note 397 at 3.   
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Corporate culture or “organizational blameworthiness” has been developed from 
extensive sociological and philosophical literature, by eminent authors such as Peter 
French, Pamela Bucy, Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite.  The concept serves as a tool 
under Australian law to elaborate criminal accountability mechanisms for corporations. As 
stated by Fisse and Braithwaite, “[i]f we understood how organizations decide to break the 
law or how they drift into breaking the law, we might be able to prescribe legal 
accountability principles which are consonant with organizational realities”.721 
 
In this regard, French explains that corporate internal decision (CID) structures 
comprised of the organizational flowchart, procedural rules and policies mirror “collective 
choice, influenced by organizational factors, including bargaining and teamwork” and 
constitute the intention of a corporation.722  
 
Pamela Bucy sustains in this regard that the criminal intention of a corporation will 
be determined where: “there exists a corporate ethos that encouraged the particular criminal 
conduct at issue”.723 The term “ethos” ( ) was first referred to by the ancient Greek 
philosopher Aristotle in his dissertation, Rhetoric, to describe the personal character of a 
public speaker, based on the audience’s perception on his ability to form a judgment, his 
integrity and truthfulness.724 
 
Australian law has incorporated the concept of corporate culture by attributing 
criminal liability to a corporation through a “compliance culture” test under paragraphs 
12.3 (2) (d) and (e) of the Australian Criminal Code Act. These paragraphs provide that 
liability may arise from the existence of a corporate culture that “directed, encouraged, 
                                                 
721  Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 52 at 101.  
722  French, supra note 37 at 41.  French expresses that “corporate internal decision structures license the 
descriptive transformation of events as intentional actions and expose the corporate character of those 
events” 
723  Bucy, supra note 382 at 1127-1128.  
724  Bucy, supra note 382 at 1122-1123.  
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tolerated or led to non-compliance” with the relevant law, or the failure of the body 
corporate “to create and maintain a corporate culture that required compliance with the 
relevant provision”.725  “Corporate culture” is defined in the Australian code as “an attitude, 
policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in 
the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities take place”.726  Furthermore, 
paragraph 12.3 (2) (e) provides that organizational blameworthiness amounts in a failure of 
the body corporate to create and maintain a corporate culture that required compliance.  
 
 Based on corporate culture literature and the Australian legislation model, 
Professor Boisvert argued before the Committee hearings that “some offences may be 
committed as a result of systemic or organizational pressure originating directly from the 
corporate context”.727  
 
In reviewing Bill-C-284, the Government of Canada pointed out at the Committee 
hearings that Australian law provides a more comprehensive definition of “corporate 
culture” which was lacking from Bill C-284.728  Furthermore, the Government noted that, 
despite extensive literature on the topic, on a practical level, corporate culture remained an 
untested basis for criminal liability at the time.  In particular, at the time of the discussions, 
the federal government of Australia had not allowed for its new law to be tested in a 
criminal prosecution for death or injury, restricting its application only for sentencing 
regulatory offences.  It was also noted that “criminal law is primarily the responsibility of 
Australia’s states, which have thus far generally retained the identification theory model”729 
                                                 
725  Criminal Code Act 1905 (Cth.), s. 12.3(2)(e)(d.  
726  Ibid., s. 12.3(6).  
727  Wells, supra note 716 at 820-821; John Coffee, "'No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick': An 
Unscandalized Inquiry Into The Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1981) Michigan L. Rev. 386; Don 
Hanna, "Corporate Criminal Liability", (1988-89) 31 Crim. L. Q. 452, 474-479. Bucy, supra note 382 at 
1104-1105.  See all, cited in Boisvert, supra note 398 at para. 34.    
728  Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397 and Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth 
Report, supra note 397.  
729  Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth Report, ibid. and Justice Canada,  A Plain Language 
Guide, supra note 397 at 11, n. 18.. See also page 90 above and supra note 398, with examples on how 
173 
 
 
Considering the need for clarity in the law, “corporate culture” was therefore regarded as 
too vague to constitute the necessary corporate mens rea.730   
 
Aside from the topic of corporate culture, the Committee hearings also studied 
corporate liability mechanisms applied in the United Kingdom and the United States.  
 
Paragraph 3.  The Rejection of the Vicarious Liability Doctrine 
 
The 2002 Government’s Response to the Fifteenth Report of the Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Corporate Liability also noted that the United 
States’ vicarious liability model of corporate liability was not the preferred option of any 
witness before the Standing Committee.731  The leading case on this liability theory, 
otherwise known as the doctrine of respondeat superior, was the 1909 judgment in New 
York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United States732 based on the Elkins Act, a statute 
that specifically imposed liability on the corporation for the acts of its agents, employees, 
managers, etc. (without limitation).733 
 
The rules of vicarious liability were restated in 1943 by the Court of Appeal of the 
8th Circuit in Egan v. United States in the following manner: 
 
“The test of corporate responsibility for the acts of its officers and 
agents, whether such acts be criminal or tortuous, is whether the agent 
or officer in doing the thing complained of was engaged in employing 
the corporate powers actually authorized ‘for the benefit of the 
corporation while acting within the scope of his employment in the 
business of the principal.’”734 
                                                                                                                                                    
corporate culture may serve as a basis to hold corporations liable for negligence-based offences and 
manslaughter and how its practical application is limited mostly to regulatory offences at this moment. 
730  Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth Report, ibid.  
731  Ibid.     
732  212 U.S. 509 (1909).  
733  French, supra note 37 at 178.   
734  137 F.2d 369 (1943), per Thomas J., at 379; see also United States v. Basic Construction Co., 771 F.2d 
570 (1983) (5th CCA), both cited in Dredge, supra note 378 at para. 23.  
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In a 2002 discussions paper, the Government of Canada enunciated the following 
objections to adopting the vicarious liability approach: 1) it distorts the notion of fault, 
which is readily transferred to the company without proof of its efforts to prevent illegal 
activity by employees; and 2) the vicarious liability approach has already been rejected by 
Canadian courts who recognize that criminal law makes an individual responsible only for 
crimes in which he or she is the primary actor.735 
 
The Supreme Court contends in this regard that “[t]he criminal law has never 
applied the maxim ‘respondeat superior’, and to seek to ingraft from without what has not 
taken spontaneous growth might prove an experiment foredoomed to failure”.736 
 
In its Response to the Fifteenth Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and 
Human Rights, the Government promised to table legislative reforms that would best reflect 
the views and concerns discussed at the hearings.737  Bill C-284 was finally withdrawn at 
its second reading stage in February 2002.738  Nine months later, a new legislative proposal 
was presented and eventually adopted as the current criminal liability basis for corporations 
in Canada. 
 
Section 2.  Adoption and Implementation of Bill C-45 (the Westray Bill)  
 
 In November 2003, the Canadian Parliament formally addressed the aforementioned 
recommendations by adopting Bill C-45739 to amend the Criminal Code for all federal 
criminal offences.740 
                                                 
735  Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397.  
736  C.R.N. Winn., The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations" (1929), 3 Camb. L.J. 398, at 407 in 
Dredge, supra note 378 at para. 20.  
737  Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth Report, supra note 397.   
738  Justice Canada, A Plain Language Guide, supra note 397 at 5 (its subject-matter was referred for study 
by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights in February 2002). 
739  Bill C-45, An Act to amend the Criminal Code that imposes criminal liability on corporations and 
organizations, 2d. Sess., 37th Parl., 2003. 
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 Henceforth, the law “eradicates the distinction between those who create or set 
policy and those charged with managing its implementation”.741  Indeed, as Macpherson 
indicates, the prosecution no longer has to prove that a person is a “directing mind” of a 
corporation but rather that a ‘senior officer’ was implicated in the criminal activity”.742 
 
The new law defines a senior officer, in the new section 2 of the Criminal Code as a 
“representative who plays an important role in the establishment of an organization’s 
policies or is responsible for managing an important aspect of the organization’s activities 
and, in the case of a body corporate, includes a director, its chief officer and its chief 
financial officer”743.  Thus, the class of persons engaging the liability of the corporation is 
expanded to include individuals who exercise delegated, operational activity.744  In this 
respect, the function of the individual, rather than any particular title is the new focus.745  
 
Other significant modifications to the identification doctrine of Canadian common 
law appear in the Criminal Code provisions pertaining specifically to criminal liability of 
organizations: sections 22.1 and 22.2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
740  These amendments do not apply to offences of either absolute or strict liability (see Darcy L. 
Macpherson, supra note 398, at 253. 
741  Macpherson ibid. at 259. 
742  Ibid. at 258. 
743  Criminal Code, supra note 31,  s. 2. 
744  Justice Canada Response to the JUST Fifteenth Report, supra note 397 at 5.  
745  Justice Canada, A Plain Language Guide, supra note 397 at 5-10.  
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Specifically with respect to international crimes, section 22.2 of the Criminal Code 
is applicable to indictable, fault-based offences and provides:  
 
“In respect of an offence that requires the prosecution to prove fault – other than 
negligence – an organization is a party to the offence if, with the intent at least in part 
to benefit the organization, one of its senior officers: 
a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence; 
b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting within the 
scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of the 
organization so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the offence; 
or 
c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to the 
offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to 
the offence”.746 
  
According to Macpherson, the first two sub-sections of this section simply put 
Justice Estey’s comments from Dredge into statutory form.747  The author points out that 
most substantial change to the law is in sub-section 22.2 (c), extending corporate liability in 
four ways.  
 
First, the section no longer requires active participation in the offence by someone 
acting in a managerial capacity or control position.748 The application of agency is therefore 
enlarged and closer to vicarious liability.  
 
 Furthermore, “the section does not require the senior officer who becomes aware of 
the misconduct to have any power in the area of the corporation’s business and affairs 
                                                 
746  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 22.2 Bill C-45 has also partly integrated the concept of corporate 
culture in s. 22.1 of the Criminal Code for negligence-based offences.  The section states in its last 
paragraph that  “criminal liability may be determined in circumstances where conduct of senior officers 
collectively, departed – markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably 
be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being a party to an offence”. The joint-
liability language actually treats the corporation’s decision-making as a cohesive whole, rather than 
viewing corporate decisions in an individualized way, thus taking into account collective-decision 
making processes [see, Darcy Macpherson, “Extending Corporate Criminal Liability?: Some Thoughts 
on Bill C-45” (2003-2004) 30 Manitoba Law Journal 253 at 272-273, online: Robson Hall Faculty of 
Law <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=darcy_macpherson> 
(accessed 28 April 2010)].  
747  Macpherson, supra note 398 at 259-260.  
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where the crime is being or will be committed”.749 In this context, it “alleviates the activity-
specific nature of the designation”750 that was necessary in the common-law construed 
identification doctrine. 
 
 Third, the law provides that knowledge of a senior officer that a company 
representative is being a party to an offence is sufficient to convict the corporation of an 
indictable offence.  On the other hand, the senior officer may simultaneously be acquitted 
because such knowledge is insufficient in the case of individual liability.751 
 
  Finally, Bill C-45 creates a responsibility on the senior officer to take all reasonable 
measures to stop a representative that he is aware is or about to be a party to an offence.  
Macpherson mentions that, at a minimum, this sub-section obliges senior officers to 
communicate with one another in order to protect the interests of the corporation.  Under 
this perspective, a senior officer would not be able to justify that he allowed the 
commission of an offence by a representative that was not in his department.752 
 
 Bill C-45 further provides that the offence must be accomplished with the intent, at 
least in part, to benefit the organization.753 This reverses previous common law 
requirements which required proof of an intention to destruct the undertaking of the 
corporation rather than a reasonable doubt as to whether there was intention for the 
corporation to benefit in part.754 This requirement narrows the liability scope to convict a 
corporation under the new legislation compared to the former requirements set out in 
Dredge in 1985.755    
                                                                                                                                                    
748  Ibid. at 262. 
749  Ibid. 
750  Ibid. 
751  R. v Dunlop and Sylvester, supra note 662 at 898.  See also Macpherson supra note 398 at 263. 
752  Macpherson, ibid. at 263.  
753  Ibid. at 263-264.  See Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 22.2(c). 
754  Macpherson, ibid. at 268.   
755  Ibid. at 266 and following. 
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 Thus, a conviction under a combined reading of sections 2 and 22.2 of the Criminal 
Code and CAHWCA makes it possible to punish liable corporations for their commission 
of international crimes and sentence them pursuant to the relevant provisions under 
Canadian legislation, which will be studied in the following chapter.  
 
Chapter 5: Sentencing a Canadian Corporation and an Alter Ego under 
Canadian Criminal Law  
 
 Much to the detriment of corporate liberty of operations, Bill C-45 has increased the 
severity of the sentencing regime for corporate offenders.  Most of the literature on 
collective responsibility was taken into account in the adoption of these legal sentencing 
rules.  
 
This section will study the changes brought to the law in this area in 2003 as well as 
the influence that corporate culture now has on the determination of sentences for a 
corporation, and, as a corollary, the role and impact of corporate image and reputation.  
 
Section 1.  Fundamental Purposes and Principal Guidelines for Sentencing a Criminal 
Organization  
 
According to sub-section 718 (1) of the Criminal Code, the fundamental purpose of 
sentencing is “to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law 
and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions” with 
the objectives of denunciation, deterrence, separating offenders from society (when 
necessary), rehabilitation, reparation and promoting a sense of responsibility and 
acknowledgement of harm done by offenders.756  These purposes are based on underlying 
                                                 
756  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 718. 
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philosophical and historical trends of retribution and deterrence that society has relied on to 
serve justice.757 
 
At the same time, French opines that “retributivism does not, as most theorists will 
tell us, have to be understood in such biblical blood-lust terms”.758 The idea advanced by 
French is that punishment need not always be made in kind. Under this perspective, a 
corporation must be treated in its own uniqueness as a personality that differs from that of a 
human being, while taking into account that clearly, a corporation has another form of 
personality than a human being and cannot be imprisoned.   
 
In order to ensure the consideration of the above purposes as much as possible by 
the courts, the 2003 amendments to the Criminal Code also set out guidelines for judicial 
sentencing in section 718.21 applicable to organizations.759 
 
The first three sub-sections a), b), and c) take into account a list of factors proposed 
by Pamela Bucy that can be referred to as circumstantial evidence of a guilty corporate 
ethos, i.e. advantages drawn by the organization as a result of the offence committed, the 
degree of planning involved in carrying out the offence and attempts of the corporation to 
conceal information and evidence.760  In this regard, Bucy underlines the importance of 
investigating offences in depth and examining “who did it, who contributed to its success 
and which (if any) higher echelon officials ‘recklessly tolerated it’”.761 
 
                                                 
757  Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 52 at 45. 
758  French explains, in this respect that: “If a corporation has no body to kick (leaving to God the business 
of souls and eternal damnation), how can it repay in kind for its felonious behaviour?  It has no eye to be 
exchanged for an eye that was blinded by unsafe working conditions.  Or so the story is meant to go.” 
(See French, supra note 37 at 187-188). 
759  For an analysis of these sentencing guidelines, see Macpherson, supra note 398 at 274-283.  See also 
Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 718.21.  
760 Bucy, supra note 382 at 1121-1146. 
761  Ibid. at 1138. 
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The following sub-sections d) and e) calculate the “impact that the sentence would 
have on the economic viability of the organization and the continued employment of its 
employees” as well as the costs to public authorities of investigation and prosecution of the 
offence.  These provisions follow the rationale of Fisse and Braithwaite’s literature on the 
importance of effectiveness and a deterrent impact on organizational crime, without 
completely depleting resources available.762 
 
Finally, the last sub-sections f) to j) emphasize the need to investigate the 
corporation’s reactive measures to an offence before imposing court-ordered sentences, 
consistent with the accountability models proposed by French, Bucy, Fisse and 
Braithwaite763.  This includes regulatory penalties already imposed, as well as prior and 
similar convictions on the corporation; penalties imposed by the corporation on a 
representative for their role in the commission of the offence; and restitutions that the 
corporation is ordered to make to the victims of the offence.  
 
It is evident that the sentencing guidelines were inspired by much of the 
philosophical and legal literature that emerged in the 1970s and 1980’s on the concept of 
corporate culture, once again following the route proposed by Professor Boisvert to 
effectively fulfill objectives of punishment and deterrence, while favouring a positive 
reforming impact on a corporation’s culture.764 
 
 
 
                                                 
762  Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 52 at 64, 189-190. 
763  Reactive corporate policy is based on the Principle of Responsive Adjustment (PRA) elaborated by the 
ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle.  It “captures the notion that the causally responsible party for an 
untoward event should adopt specific courses of future action calculated to prevent repetition” (See 
French, supra note 37 at 61-62, 156, 165-166).  See also Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 382 at 47-48 
(the authors state: “corporate blameworthiness can be judged within a reactive timeframe, a timeframe 
which generates the concept of reactive corporate fault”); Bucy, supra note 382 at 1138-1139. 
764  Boisvert, supra note 398 at para. 4.  
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Section 2.  A First Option: Fines  
 
Even before the adoption of Bill C-45, the former Criminal Code of Canada was 
amended in 1995 and provided that fines would be imposed on corporations in place of 
prison sentences765.  This sanction was reintegrated in sub-section 735 (1) of the current 
Criminal Code.766 
 
 In the case of indictable offences, there is no maximum allowable fine, and the 
exact amount of the latter is left to the discretion of the courts.767  Perhaps just as important, 
a result from the modification of the 2004 tax law is the inability for a corporation to use 
the fine as a tax deduction.768 
 
It is quite likely that the fine applied to sentence a corporation will be proportionate 
to the prison sentence provided for the applicable crime.769  For instance, life imprisonment 
may equate to considerable fines that may cause the very destruction of the company. This 
is relevant to international crimes in Canada, for which a person convicted is liable to life 
imprisonment under CAHWCA.770 
 
While this modification is indeed a more effective one, since it focuses on corporate 
profits, an important motivational factor in corporate operations, it should not be mistaken 
as the only effective measure to enforce deterrence or retribution under the fundamental 
principles of criminal law. In this regard, Fisse and Braithwaite have stressed the 
                                                 
765  Macpherson, supra note 398 at 274. 
766  Ibid.  See also, Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 735 (1). 
767  Criminal Code , ibid. s. 735(1)(a).  See also, Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397.   
768  Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended s. 67.5  See Macpherson, supra note 398 at 
274. 
769  As mentioned on page. 161 above, section 718.1 of the Criminal Code provides that a sentence imposed 
is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.  
Furthermore, pursuant to paragraphs 718.3 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code, judges have discretion to 
impose sentences according to the roles of each defendant concerned in the same criminal transaction. 
See Criminal Code, supra note 31, ss. 718.1, 718.3(1)(2). 
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importance of avoiding the “deterrence trap”, commonly referred to as “the impact that the 
sentence would have on the economic viability of the organization and the continued 
employment of its employees” pursuant to sub-section 718.21 (d) of the Criminal Code.771 
  
Another common concern with regards to criminal liability of corporations is the 
spillover effects it may have on innocent parties, such as shareholders, creditors, employees 
or consumers.772    
 
In response to this concern, the majority of the Supreme Court in Dredge judged 
that: “[w]hile it is true that this penalty will feed through to the stockholders, who may well 
be totally innocent as in the case of a large public company, it may be seen as a risk or cost 
associated with the privilege of operating through the corporate vehicle (…).”773   
 
On the other hand, as mentioned previously, the effects of having introduced 
different measures of punishment in the new law have considerably diminished this 
problem.   
 
Section 3.  An Alternative Sentence: The Corporate Probation 
 
Importantly, the adoption of Bill C-45 introduces probation orders unique to 
corporations, including restitution orders, public notification of the offence, and 
requirements to adopt new standards, policies and procedures.774  Companies will therefore 
no longer be able to carry out their operations freely, in circumstances where they have 
violated the law.  The relevant sub-section 732.1 (3.1) of the Criminal Code is non-binding 
on the courts and leaves sufficient discretion to the judge to set and create the conditions 
                                                                                                                                                    
770  CAHWCA, supra note 24, ss. 4 (2)(b), 6(2)(b) and 7(4).  
771  Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 52 at 189.  
772  Ibid. at 188.   
773  Dredge, supra note 378 at para. 33.  See also French, supra note 37 at 188-189. 
774  Criminal Code, supra note, s. 732.1 (3.1) 
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“that the court considers desirable to prevent the organization from committing subsequent 
offences or to remedy the harm caused by the offence”.775 
 
Sub-section 1.  The Doctrinal Point of View 
 
 Literary reflections on the need to escape the “deterrence trap” and alternative 
“ways of remedying the delinquent conduct of corporations”776 were taken into account in 
elaborating the new rules in the Criminal Code for sentencing organizations and 
probationary orders.  
 
Fisse and Braithwaite do however express the concern that probationary directives 
could potentially become an excessively intrusive governmental intervention.  They state 
that in order to prevent such overbearing state control, the sentencing criteria could and 
should be devised so as to maximize freedom of enterprise in compliance systems777.  Sub-
section 732.1 (3.2) of the Criminal Code on sentencing guidelines appeases such 
apprehensions by stating that: 
 
“Before making an order under paragraph (3.1)(b), a court shall consider 
whether it would be more appropriate for another regulatory body to 
supervise the development or implementation of the policies, standards and 
procedures referred to in that paragraph.”778 
 
In this manner, the Court will be the ultimate decision-maker on the need to apply 
more intrusive governmental measures on the corporation.   
 
Furthermore, through probationary orders, corporations are encouraged to change 
their conduct of operations from a more ethical standpoint.  If they do not succeed, further 
                                                 
775  Ibid. s. 732.1(3.1)(g). 
776  Justice Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 397. 
777  Fisse and Braithwaite, supra note 52 at 44-45.  
778  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 732.1(3.2). 
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conditions could be applied or an increase of severity of sanctions ranging from flexible 
conditions of a probationary order, to more restrictive measures, and finally to the 
imposition of a fine.779 
 
Regardless of the ultimate option applied, safeguards must be taken to ensure that 
senior and middle managers responsible for assuring a remedial and disciplinary program 
do not fail in accomplishing their task.  In this sense, Fisse and Braithwaite propose a 
reporting system to be put in place whereby courts are equipped “with the power to insist 
upon monitoring and supervisory controls where necessary to deal with untrustworthy 
defendants”.780   This has in fact been included in paragraph 732.1 (3.1) (d) of the Criminal 
Code. 
 
Sub-section 2.  The Effect of Adverse Publicity as a Probationary Order 
 
Another condition proposed for a corporate probationary order under paragraph 
732.1 (3.1) (f) of the Criminal Code would require a corporation to provide information to 
the public on the offence of which it was convicted, the sentence imposed by the court and 
any measures that the organization is taking to reduce the likelihood of committing a 
subsequent offence.781 
 
The author most referred to by doctrine with regards to the effects of publicity of 
probationary orders on corporations is John Coffee.782  The author conveys that “little doubt 
exists that corporations dislike adverse publicity and that unfavourable publicity emanating 
                                                 
779  Justice Canada, A Plain Language Guide, supra note 397 at 9 and Fisse & Braithwaite, ibid. at 86-87. 
780  Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 52 at 160-161.  
781  Criminal Code, supra note 31, s. 732.1 (3.1) (f). 
782  Coffee takes his example from a report, The Great Oil Spill prepared by John J. McCloy, on the bribery 
committed in the US and abroad by the personnel of the Gulf Oil Corporation during the 1970s.  The 
revelations in the report were eventually “picked up by the press and republished as a paperback best-
seller.” (See Coffee, supra note 727, cited in Fisse & Braithwaite supra note 52 at 139).    The citation of 
the report is John J. McCloy, Nathan W. Pearson & Beverley Matthews, The Great Oil Spill: The Inside 
Report, Gulf Oil’s Bribery and Political Chicanery, (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1976).  
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from an administrative or judicial source has considerable credibility”.783  The results of a 
corporation reporting its offence would indeed cause negative publicity on its reputation 
and image.784  The risk of such a sentence thereby plays an important role “in the strategy 
to prevent and remedy criminal intent within a corporate culture by recognizing that 
corporate actors are ‘motivationally complex’”.785  In fact, while profit and loss are “the 
engine of corporate deterrence… in bureaucratic practice, if not standard economic theory, 
corporations serve many non-monetary goals”.786 Another author, Robert Gordon, 
enumerates seven non-financial considerations in this respect: “the urge for power, the 
desire for prestige, the creative urge, the need to identify with a group, the desire for 
security, the urge for adventure, and the desire to serve others”.787 
 
The idea of adopting paragraph 732.1 (3.1) (f) of the Criminal Code is therefore, as 
stated by the Government of Canada, for the corporation to avoid such negative publicity 
that could potentially affect consumer, as well as investors’ and qualified human resources’ 
confidence.788 
 
There may also be circumstances in which it is more practicable or effective to 
prosecute responsible individuals within the corporation rather than the entity itself. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
783  French, supra note 37 at 195.  
784  Bucy, supra note 382 at 1160.  See also Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicity on 
Corporate Offenders (Albany : State University of New York Press, 1983). 
785  Fisse and Braithwaite, supra note 52 at 190.  
786  Ibid. at 81.  
787  Robert A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation (Berkeley: University of California, 
1961) at 305 cited in Fisse and Braithwaite, supra note 52 at 81.  See also Hans van der Haas, The 
Enterprise in Transition (London, New York: Tavistock Publications, 1967), cited in French supra note 
37 at 190-191 (on the effects of shame in the notion of guilt).  
788  Justice Canada, A Plain Language Guide, supra note 397 at 9.  
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Section 4.  Sanctioning the Alter Ego 
 
 The Government of Canada has not yet expressed its concrete will to prosecute 
corporations for international crimes under the provisions of CAHWCA.  In 2005, it 
confirmed the potential of such prosecutions, while simultaneously expressing the problems 
that may arise from extraterritorial application of Canadian law789 and concerns of 
international comity.790 
 
 Furthermore, it must be noted that once a corporation is dissolved in Canada, 
criminal proceedings may only be brought against it within two years after its 
dissolution.791 
 
 It is therefore possible to assume that the Government may resort to prosecution of 
individual corporate actors under CAHWCA for political or practical purposes, if they are 
or were the “directing minds” behind corporate decisions that amounted to an offence under 
the Act792.   
 
                                                 
789  Challenges include conflict with the sovereignty of foreign states; conflicts where states have legislation 
that differs from that of Canada; and difficulties with Canadian officials taking enforcement action in 
foreign states. Canada has objected to the extraterritorial application of other states’ laws and 
jurisdiction to Canadians and Canadian businesses where there is no sufficient nexus to those states or 
where the action undermines Canadian legislative authority or Canadian policy in the area. As an 
exception, the Government nevertheless confirmed that extraterritoriality of the law may apply  in cases 
where there is a sufficient nexus to Canada or where the international community has agreed on the need 
for such jurisdiction, as well as for certain offences determined so important to prosecute by the 
international community, such as torture, terrorism and crimes identified in CAHWCA (See DFAIT 
Canada, supra note 477 at 9).  
790  Ibid. 
791  Canada Business Corporations Act, supra note 641, s. 226(2)(b).  If the proceedings have already 
commenced before the corporation’s dissolution, they may be continued, pursuant to s. 226(2)(a).  
792  DFAIT Canada, supra note 477 at 9. 
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 There is also nothing that precludes simultaneous proceedings against both the 
corporation and the directing mind or alter ego of the corporation.  The conviction of one 
does not however necessarily entail that of the other.793 
 
This legal framework under which corporations may be tried and sentenced under 
Canadian criminal law for international crimes is conditional to jurisdiction of Canadian 
courts, which will be studied in the last chapter of this thesis.  
 
Chapter 6: Jurisdiction of Canadian Criminal Courts for the Prosecution 
of Canadian Corporations’ Alleged Overseas Commissions of 
International Crimes  
 
The Statute of Westminster, 1931794 conferred on Canada the authority to make laws 
having extraterritorial operation.  This power allowed Canada to enact legislation such as 
CAHWCA.795  In contrast to all Canadian laws that punish offences committed on 
Canadian territory, CAHWCA provides that a person who has committed a crime of 
genocide, a crime against humanity or a war crime abroad can be prosecuted in Canada 
under certain conditions that will be described below.796 
 
Previous to the adoption of CAHWCA and developments from Canadian 
jurisprudence, there was considerable ambiguity concerning extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
relation to crimes of international law. 
 
                                                 
793  Macpherson, supra note 398 at 280. 
794  (U.K), 22 & 23 Geo. V, c. 4, s. 3. 
795  R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 at para. 66, online: SCC 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/2007/2007scc26/2007scc26.html> (accessed 28 April 2010).  
796  R. c. Munyaneza, [2009] J.Q. no 12271 (2009 SQ 2201), Montreal 500-73-002500-052 (S.Q.) at para. 
65. 
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In part, this is due to the provisions of section 6 of the Criminal Code to the effect 
that, subject to any contrary legal provisions, no person shall be convicted or discharged of 
an offence committed outside Canada.797  This is consistent with the principle of 
territoriality or sovereign integrity, “which dictates that a state has exclusive sovereignty 
over all persons, citizens or aliens, and all property, real or personal within its own 
territory”.798 
 
There exist nevertheless a set of exceptions to the principle of territoriality and the 
application of criminal law. 
 
Section 1.  Crimes with an Extraterritorial Dimension  
 
 Certain crimes require that Canadian law extends its application across borders in 
order to properly address all the unlawful acts committed in accomplishment of the totality 
of the crime.  
 
Sub-section 1.  Crimes Committed in Canada and Overseas by a Corporation 
(the Nexus Theory) 
 
  In Canada, extraterritorial jurisdiction of criminal law is applicable where the acts 
that constitute the offence have a “real and substantial link” or a “sufficient nexus” to 
Canada.  In other terms, while much of the activity may have occurred outside Canada, a 
significant portion of the acts took place in Canada.799   Thus, when the impact of a crime is 
felt in Canada, it becomes punishable.800 
 
                                                 
797  CAHWCA, supra note 24, s. 6 (2) 
798  Finta, supra note 630 at 806.  See also Lotus Case, supra note 61 at 18 (cited in Finta). 
799  DFAIT, supra note 477 at 19. The test of a ‘real and substantial link” was applied by the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, online: SCC 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1985/1985scr2-178/1985scr2-178.html> (accessed 28 April 2010).   
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Sub-section 2.  The Issue of Conspiracy: Sub-sections 465 (3) and (4) of the 
Criminal Code 
 
 A specific example of extraterritorial Canadian subject-matter jurisdiction under the 
nexus theory is the crime of conspiracy as identified in the case R. v. Libman, rendered by 
the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985.801  In this regard, sub-section 465 (3) of the 
Criminal Code provides that everyone who, while in Canada, conspires with anyone to 
commit a crime in a place outside Canada that is an offence under the laws of that place 
shall be deemed to have conspired to do that thing in Canada.  Furthermore, according to 
sub-section 465 (4) of the Criminal Code, everyone who conspires with another person 
outside of Canada to commit an offence in Canada shall be deemed to have conspired in 
Canada. 
 
 Canadian criminal law also provides for other bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction to 
judge crimes with a foreign component to their alleged commission.    
 
Section 2.  The Personality Principle under Section 8 of CAHWCA 
 
 As a result of political difficulties associated with expansive universal jurisdiction 
legislations,802 Canada chose to legislate limited extraterritorial jurisdiction that would 
                                                                                                                                                    
800  Ibid. at para. 59. 
801  Ibid. at para. 9 (under the former Criminal Code, supra note 684 provisions, the relevant paragraphs that 
applied were paragraph 423 (3) for conspiracies to commit crimes outside Canada and 423 (4) for 
conspiracies outside Canada to commit crimes in Canada). 
802  See, for example, the difficulties encountered by Belgium, with its controversial universal jurisdiction 
Law of 16 June 1993 para. “concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 additional thereto”, as amended 
by the Law of 10 February 1999 “concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law”, article 7, cited in Arrest Warrant, supra note 63 at para. 15. See also 
Vandermeersch, supra note 56 at 601.  Under this law, Belgium attempt to convict a number of famous 
political figures such as law after indictments were issued against Ariel Sharon, Yassir Arafat, Fidel 
Castro, George Bush, Dick Cheney and Colin Powell among others (See Wanless, supra note 640 at 
215).   
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ensure a personal or territorial connection with its adjudicating bodies803 under section 8 of 
CAHWCA.    
 
 First, sub-section 8 (a) of CAHWCA provides for an enlarged personal jurisdiction 
of Canadian courts.  Its provisions almost textually replicate the predecessor paragraph                  
7 (3.71) (a) of the former Criminal Code.  The latter was enacted in the mid-1980’s in 
response to the Deschênes Commission Report, named after the judge responsible for 
investigating the presence of Nazi criminals in Canada for the purpose of formulating 
recommendations for future criminal prosecutions against them.804 
 
 Sub-section 1.  Active Personality Jurisdiction 
 
 Similarly to its predecessor, paragraphs 8 a) (i) and (ii) of CAHWCA provide for an 
active personality jurisdiction of Canadian courts over persons who were Canadian citizens, 
were employed by Canada in a civilian or military capacity, were citizens of a state that 
was engaged in an armed conflict against Canada, or were employed in a civilian or 
military capacity by such a state.  
 
 In the case of corporations, problems may arise with respect to the application of 
these provisions of CAHWCA, and particularly in determining the citizenship of a 
corporation.  As stated by Cory Wanless, “throughout the Criminal Code, the word citizen 
is used in accordance with its meaning in the Citizenship Act. Because corporations simply 
are not considered Canadian citizens within the meaning of the Citizenship Act, CAHWCA 
likely does not extend jurisdiction to corporations based on the principle of active 
personality”.805 
 
                                                 
803  Wanless, ibid. at 215.  
804  Commission Deschênes, created by Order in Council no. 1985-348 referred to in Dumont, supra note 
472 at 189.  
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This thesis nevertheless supports the view that under CAHWCA, Canadian courts 
would have jurisdiction to judge corporations incorporated in Canada as though they were 
Canadian citizens, which is consistent with the 1970 ICJ opinion in the Barcelona Traction 
Case that corporations are nationals of their country of incorporation.806  This is also the 
most traditional and predominant factor identified by doctrine to determine the nationality 
of a corporation in common law States.807   
 
For instance, despite the complex business structure existing between Talisman and 
GNPOC,808 Canadian courts would have jurisdiction to judge a prosecution against 
Talisman, a Canadian subsidiary corporation.  It must be noted, however, that once the case 
is before the courts, the latter may encounter the same difficulties as the American courts in 
attributing responsibility for alleged acts, such as operating airstrips or upgrading runways, 
directly to Talisman.809    
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
805  Wanless, supra note 640 at 216, citing Citizenship Act, R.S.C 1985, c. C-29.   
806  Barcelona Traction Case,supra note 36 at 9. See Hansen, supra note 41 at  432. 
807  Linda A. Mabry, « Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy : Rethinking the Concept of 
Corporate Nationality », (1999) 87 Geo. L.J. 563 at 583; Sara L. Seck, « Home State Responsibility and 
Local Communities : The Case of Global Mining » (2008) 11 Yale Hum. Res. & Dev. L.J., 177 at 187 
cited in Amissi M. Manirabona, « Le droit pénal des organizations face à l’internationalisation de la 
conduite criminelle : Le cas de la société Anvil Mining Ltd. au Congo » (2009) 3 Canadian Criminal 
Law Review, Vol. 13, 217 at 231-232.  It must however be noted that some continental systems have 
begun to look to the place of the corporations ‘seat’, its principal office. Furthermore, numerous statutes 
now define corporate nationality in terms of stock ownership, management or “control” generally (See 
Vagts, supra note 38 at 740-741). 
808  Talisman Energy, SDNY 2006, supra note 544 at 82.  This complex business structure was described by 
the Court as follows: “After it acquired Arakis, Talisman transferred the interests that Arakis had held in 
GNPOC Project Agreements to State Petroleum Corporation B.V., an indirect subsidiary of Talisman, 
which was renamed Talisman (Greater Nile) B.V. or TGNBV on December 10, 1998.  TGNBV was a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Goal Olie-en-Gasexploratie B.V. (Goal Olie).  In the period that it owned 
TGNBV, Goal Olie was wholly owned by two English companies, first Supertest Petroleum (U.K.) 
Limited (“Supertest”) and then Igniteserve Limited (“Igniteserve”).  Both Supertest and Igniteserve were 
wholly owned by Talisman Energy (UK) Limited (“Talisman UK”).  Talisman UK was a direct and 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Talisman.” (see Talisman Energy, SDNY 2006, supra note 544 at 22).   
809  Ibid.  
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Sub-section 2.  Passive Personal Jurisdiction 
 
 In addition to jurisdiction based on the accused’s nationality or employment by a 
State, paragraphs 8 a) (iii) and (iv) of CAHWCA also provide that Canadian courts have 
passive personal jurisdiction if, at the time that the war crime, crimes against humanity or 
genocide was alleged to be committed, the victim of the alleged offence was a Canadian 
citizen or the victim of the alleged offence was a citizen of a state that was allied with 
Canada in an armed conflict.  
 
 This would be the case, for example if former residents of Sudan who obtained 
citizenship in Canada would refer the case of Talisman Energy to Canadian courts, just as it 
was done in the United States. 
 
 On the other hand, the plaintiffs of the New York District Court’s case of The 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy810 would not be able to invoke this head 
of jurisdiction since they are former residents of Sudan or current residents of the United 
States and not Canadian citizens.  They may however be able to institute criminal 
proceedings before Canadian Courts under other heads of jurisdiction provided under 
section 8 of CAHWCA.  
 
Section 3.  The Principle of Universality under Section 8 of CAHWCA 
  
Even where the accused person or the victims are not Canadian citizens, or do not 
fall under any of the requirements of sub-section 8 a), CAHWCA also provides for a 
limited universal jurisdiction, provided that the person accused is present in Canada.811 
 
                                                 
810  Ibid. 
811 CAHWCA, supra note 24, s. 8 (b). 
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Indeed, as another exception to the territoriality rule for jurisdiction in section 6 of 
the Criminal Code, the principle of universality “permits the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
state in respect of criminal acts committed by non-nationals against non-nationals wherever 
they take place.  Jurisdiction is based upon the accused’s attack upon the international order 
as a whole and is of common concern to all mankind as a sort of international public 
policy.”812 More specifically, while accepting that concerns of international comity 
normally called for restraint in the extraterritorial application of Canadian criminal law,813 
the Supreme Court of Canada has also held that it is no longer possible to remain 
indifferent to the protection of the people living in other countries.814 
 
Sub-section 1.  The Presence of the Corporation in Canada 
 
 Pursuant to the principle of universality, sub-section 8 b) of CAHWCA provides 
that if an accused person is present in Canada, it would be possible to prosecute the 
individual or organization before Canadian courts for alleged international crimes.  
 
 Some complexities may arise however in determining the presence of a corporation 
on Canadian territory.  This is due to the limited shareholder liability scheme of an MNC, 
which creates a corporate veil that shields parent companies, often incorporated in one 
territory, for the actions of their subsidiaries, incorporated in another territory.815 This 
limited liability approach, also known as the “entity law approach” poses a real problem on 
a jurisdictional level, as in the Barcelona Traction Case where the ICJ refused to lift the 
corporate veil to determine the real control relationship of Belgian shareholders of the 
                                                 
812  Gillian Triggs, "Australia's War Crimes Trials: A Moral Necessity or Legal Minefield?"(1987) 16 
M.U.L.R. 382 at 389, cited in Finta, supra note 630 at 806. 
813  R. v. Libman, supra note 799 at 183-184 (See Manirabona, supra note 807 at 221). 
814  R. c. Libman, ibid. at 213-214 (See Manirabona, ibid. at 221). 
815  Hansen adds that an even more insurmountable barrier is that posed by the logistical challenges of 
transnational litigation involving multiple corporate entities (i.e. arranging cooperation among states in 
enforcement matters, tracking corporate finances and dissolution, witness subpoenas, evidence 
gathering, etc.). (See Hansen, supra note 41 at 431). 
194 
 
 
Barcelona Traction Company. The Court decided that since the corporation was 
incorporated in Canada, only the latter country could sue the corporation.816 
 
Some common law jurisdictions use the “agency theory” to overcome the entity law 
approach, where it can be determined that a subsidiary operated as the agent of the parent 
company and that therefore the parent company is liable for the actions of the subsidiary.   
In order for this theory to become applicable, it must be determined that both parties, the 
parent and the subsidiary, agreed that the subsidiary was acting on behalf of the parent.817 
 
In common law, certain factors have been used to determine whether a subsidiary is 
an agent of the parent.  They include  (i) whether the profits were treated as the profits of 
the parent; (ii) if the persons conducting the business were appointed by the parent; (iii) if 
the parent was the head and the brain of the trading venture; (iv) if the parent governed the 
adventure, decided what should be done and what capital should be embarked on the 
venture; (v) if the parent made profits by its skill and direction; and (vi) if the parent was in 
effectual and constant control.818 
 
                                                 
816  Ibid. at 432. 
817  Ibid. at 434. 
818  Smith, Stone and Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham Corporation, [1939] 4 All ER 116, Atkinson J., cited in 
Anil Hargovan & Jason Harris, “Piercing the Corporate Veil in Canada: A comparative analysis”, (2007) 
2 Company Lawyer, Vol. 28, 58, online: Social Science Research Network, 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=980366> (accessed 29 April 2010).  See also supra note 659 on various facts 
considered by common law courts and, in particular, the United States courts to decide that a subsidiary 
was acting as an agent of a parent corporation.  Interestingly, Quebec civil law courts have referred to 
common law decisions, namely Smith, Stone and Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham Corporation, to apply the 
same factors in determining whether a subsidiary is an agent of a parent.  See e.g. Buanderie centrale de 
Montréal Inc. v. Montreal (City); Conseil de la santé et des services sociaux de la région de Montréal 
métropolitain v. Montreal (City), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 29, at 22-24, online: SCC 
<http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1994/1994scr3-29/1994scr3-29.pdf> (accessed 29 June 2010).  The 
Supreme Court emphasized, that “[i]n light of the foregoing cases, a corporation may be regarded as the 
alter ego of another corporation when there is such a close relationship between them that what 
apparently concerns one actually pertains to the activities of the other. Undoubtedly a large number of 
factors can be identified to determine the existence of such a relationship: in my opinion, however, the 
one that is most explicit and most likely to cover all aspects of the concept is control.”, at 24. See also, 
Crête & Rousseau, supra note 36 at 113-115. 
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Furthermore, under the Canada Business Corporations Act, “a body corporate is 
controlled by a person or by two more bodies corporate if (a) securities of the body 
corporate to which are attached more than fifty per cent of the votes that may be cast to 
elect directors of the body corporate are held, other than by way of security only, by or for 
the benefit of that person or by or for the benefit of those bodies corporate; and (b) the 
votes attached to those securities are sufficient, if exercised, to elect a majority of the 
directors of the body corporate”.819  This notion of control is important to determine 
whether a body corporate is a subsidiary of another body corporate.820 
 
Based on this criteria and description of a subsidiary under Canadian law, it seems 
that certain liability mechanisms described previously in this thesis may be applied to hold 
Canadian parent corporations responsible for the acts of their subsidiaries.  A parent 
corporation may for instance be held liable under the superior responsibility doctrine for the 
acts of its subsidiaries which could be considered to be “subordinates” of the said parent 
corporation. In this regard, it would be necessary to prove (i) that the parent corporation 
consciously disregarded information that clearly indicated that an offence was about to be 
committed or was being committed by its subsidiary; (ii) that the subsidiary about to 
commit or committing the crime was under the parent corporation’s effective authority and 
control; and (iii) knowing that that subsidiary was about to commit or is committing such 
an offence, failed to take, as soon as practicable, all necessary and reasonable measures 
within the its power to prevent or repress the commission of the offence or further 
commission of offences or failed to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution as soon as practicable.821   The second element, i.e. the 
control criterion, could be proven using the aforementioned factors to determine that the 
subsidiary was acting as the agent of the parent corporation.  
                                                 
819  Canada Business Corporations Act, supra note 641, s. 226(2)(3). As seen previously Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, at p. 144, a “corporation” means a body corporate incorporated under the Act. 
820  Ibid., s. 226 (2)(5). 
821  Please refer to pages 154, 160-161 above. 
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 Furthermore, this thesis proposes that the “perpetration by means” doctrine 
developed by the International Criminal Court using the concept of 
“organisationsherrschaft” could evolve to include corporate liability in the future. More 
specifically, it could be used in the context of large MNC’s composed of multiple 
subsidiaries operating on many territories. In such an eventuality, the factors used to 
determine an agency theory would assist in establishing the authority and control of the 
parent corporation over its subsidiaries and automatic compliance of the latter in execution 
of a plan.  It may be a very challenging task however to prove that the replacement of 
subsidiaries would not affect the successful execution of the plan.822  Consistent with the 
agency theory, one could imagine situations where the parent’s control over the subsidiary 
included appointment of persons conducting the business, taking important decisions over 
which capital should be spent on the overseas operations, and treating the profits of its 
subsidiary as its own. This of course is hypothetical since, at the moment, the concept of 
“organisationsherrschaft” has only been used for determining natural persons’ liability in 
international and national jurisdictions, as described previously in Part I, Chapter 3 of this 
thesis.   
 
The agency theory could for example be invoked to prosecute Anvil Mining for its   
alleged responsibility for the Kilwa massacre in October 2004. The Canadian parent 
corporation was established that same year specifically for the purpose of acquiring the 
former Australian company, Anvil Mining NL, and thereafter obtained 90% control over 
the Dikulushi mine.823  Manirabona asserts that Anvil Mining maintained a high-level of 
control over Anvil Congo through the intermediary of Anvil Management NL and Mining 
                                                 
822  Please refer to pages 95-96 above and supra notes 410-413.  Namely, the relevant factors to consider to 
establish perpetration by means are: (i) the authority and control of its leader; (ii) the automatic 
compliance of his/her subordinates; and (iii) a sufficient number of subordinates in order to ensure that 
their replacement will not affect the successful execution of the plan (Katanga, supra note 403, at paras. 
512-517). 
823 See Anvil Mining Limited, Can. Stock Rev., March 3, 2006, available at 
http://www.canstock.com/shownews.php?article_id=29, cited in Jonathan Clough, “Punishing the 
Parent: Corporate criminal complicity in human rights abuses” (2007-2008) 33 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 899, at 925.  
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Holdings Ltd., receiving almost all the profits generated by its subsidiary in the Dikulushi 
mine in the DRC.  It seems moreover that the events that took place in Kilwa were 
regularly followed by the board of Anvil Mining and described on its Internet website.824  
On the other hand, Anvil Mining continues to have its principal place of business in 
Australia and it conducts all of its overseas operations in the DRC.825  It is also notable that 
since operations in the DRC were already being carried out by its subsidiaries since 
2002,826 Anvil Mining may not have had sufficient time to gain complete control over 
them.  
 
It must therefore be acknowledged that the evidence seems only to indicate the 
possibility of a sufficient level of control that could lead to Anvil Mining’s prosecution in 
Canada and subsequent conviction over the alleged acts of its subsidiary, Anvil Congo. 
Further investigation would nevertheless need to be carried out to determine which 
corporation, Anvil Mining, Anvil Management NL, Anvil Congo or all were in fact taking 
the necessary decisions and controlling the operations at the Dikulushi mine in 2004.  
Moreover, there is no presumption that a subsidiary acts as the agent of its parent and in 
criminal law, this would need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.827   
 
Of course, corporate accountability is not limited to the corporation per se.  Indeed, 
directors, officers and employees of a corporation are still liable in a personal capacity for 
                                                 
824  Manirabona, supra note 807, at 224-225 (see also Anvil Mining’s Internet website at: 
http://www.anvilmining.com).  
825  Clough, supra note 823. 
826 Anvil Mining, 2006 Annual Report (26 March 2006), at 26, online: Anvil Mining 
<http://www.anvilmining.com/files/Anvil_AR06_lo-res_March26.pdf> (accessed 29 June 2010). 
827  Schabas argues that “[a] subsidiary – even a wholly owned subsidiary – will not generally be found to be 
the ‘alter ego’ of its parent unless the subsidiary is under the complete control of the parent and is 
nothing more than a conduit used by the parent to avoid liability” [See Paul B. Schabas & Tony S.K. 
Wong, “Canadian Criminal Law for Businesses: New Developments and What you Need to Know”, 
(Paper presented at the Seminar Keeping the Collar White: What You Need to Know to Protect Your 
Organization From Criminal Liability, Calgary, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, 25 April 2008), at 6 
online: Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP <http://blakes.com/english/view.asp?ID=2275>  (accessed 29 
April 2010)]. Furthermore, parent corporations are careful not to act as though they have consented to 
having their subsidiaries act as agents, according to Hansen, supra note 41 at 434.  
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criminal offences of a corporation, “depending on their role in the commission of the 
alleged offence and their knowledge of the same”.828 
 
In this regard, individual accountability for international crimes on the basis of sub-
section 8 (b) of CAHWCA does not seem to pose any problems as of yet.  In fact, on 27 
March 2007, the first trial under this Act was instituted before the Criminal Division of the 
Superior Court of Quebec, charging Désiré Munyaneza, a Rwandan living in Canada, for 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed between 1 April and 31 July 
1994 in the Prefecture of Butare in Rwanda.829 The decision was rendered on 22 May 2009 
by the Honourable André Denis J.S.C. and convicted Munyaneza of all three international 
crimes.  
 
It is important to point out, however, that the universal jurisdiction principle had 
already been recognized in Canadian courts for the adjudication of international crimes. 
 
Sub-section 2. The Jurisprudential Recognition of the Principle of Universality 
before the Enactment of Section 8 of CAHWCA in the Finta and Mugesera 
Cases 
 
 Even before the adoption of CAHWCA, Canadian jurisprudence had accepted the 
principle of universality for jurisdiction over international crimes through the prosecution 
of Mr. Imre Finta, a legally trained captain in the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie during the 
Second World War.830  He was acquitted by the Supreme Court of Canada on the basis of 
the defence of obedience of superior orders831 and an absence of a discriminatory intent, 
                                                 
828  Schabas & Wong, ibid. at 6. 
829  R. c. Munyaneza, supra note 796.  
830  For the analysis of universal jurisdiction in this case, see: Finta, supra note 630 at 806-811. 
831  Ibid, at 839-849. According to the Court considering the context of a global war that was taking place at 
the time of the crimes, the the “Baky Order” from the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior under which 
Mr. Finta committed war crimes and crimes against humanity did not appear to be evidently and 
“manifestly illegal” to Finta. 
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determined by the Court to be a necessary element for conviction of crimes against 
humanity.832 The Court nonetheless recognized that the principle of territoriality contained 
in the former section 6 of the Criminal Code was subject to an exception pursuant to 
section 7 (3.71).833  According to the Court, the legal exception applied on condition that 
the alleged crime constituted a war crime or a crime against humanity.  It was therefore the 
nature of the act committed that was of crucial importance in the determination of 
jurisdiction.834 
 
Finta’s acquittal has since been perceived as a failure of Canadian politics to apply 
international criminal law and prosecute war criminals on its territory.835   First, the fact 
that the proceedings were instituted about fifty years after the alleged crimes were 
committed created difficulties in analyzing the accused’s defences of obeying superior 
orders and of acting under duress.836  Furthermore, it has since been determined that the 
need for a discriminatory intent is required as a mens rea only for a crime against humanity 
committed by persecution and not for the other underlying offences of this international 
crime.837 
 
In an article published in 2007, Professor Dumont in fact remarked Canada’s 
reluctance to apply international criminal law before its national courts on the basis of 
universal jurisdiction.  Instead, it seems that the more frequent strategy to address the issue 
has been to refer the cases of international crimes to immigration officials and decision-
makers for deportation of accused individuals on Canadian territory.838 
                                                 
832  Ibid, at p. 813. 
833  Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 7 (3.71) 
834 Finta, supra note 630 at 806-811.  
835 Dumont, supra note 472 at 191. 
836  Ibid. 
837  Ibid. at 196.  See also Tadíc, ICTY Appeals Chamber, supra note 264 at para. 283.  
838  Professor Dumont adds that by providing for proceedings for offences described in CAHWCA to be 
commenced with the personal consent in writing of and conducted by the Attorney General or Deputy 
Attorney General of Canada, Canada has ensured its control over the institution of such proceedings. 
(See Dumont, ibid. at 197-198.  See also Eboe-Osuji, supra note 669.  
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The Mugesera case, studied above, serves as an example of this practice.  As 
mentioned, the Court did not shy away from resorting to international customary law and 
international tribunal’s decisions to interpret domestic law related to international crimes.  
Namely relying on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the Court reversed its opinion in Finta 
by stating that “the requirement of discriminatory intent is unique to persecution”.839 
 
Since corporations are not subject to the laws of immigration for deportation, the 
reluctance of Canada to favour immigration orders over the prosecution of persons for the 
commission of international crimes may create a risk of impunity if this practice were to 
continue.   
 
Nevertheless, since the Finta case, it seems that CAHWCA, as a separate Act of 
Parliament from the Criminal Code, has settled any questions or previous ambiguities that 
existed concerning universal jurisdiction and the adjudication of international crimes.840  
Furthermore, the Munyaneza case has created an interesting precedent with regards to 
criminal prosecutions for such crimes that could eventually be transferred to the level of 
organizations, including corporations. 
 
Finally, just like the three international crimes defined in CAHWCA and the Rome 
Statute, there also exist other crimes “that the international community has determined are 
so important to prosecute that a country will have jurisdiction to prosecute, regardless of 
where the acts took place, on the basis of criteria established by treaty.”841  
 
 
                                                 
839  Mugesera, supra note 592 at paras. 142-143, referring to : “Le procureur c/ Tadić, 112 ILR 1 (Chambre 
de première instance, 1997) and Le procureur c/Kupreskic, aff. no. IT-95-16T-II, 14 janv. 2000”.  See 
also Dumont, supra note 472 at 196. 
840  CAHWCA, supra note 24, s. 8. 
841  DFAIT, supra note 477 at 8.  See also Advisory Group Report, supra note 4 at 8, 44; 2007 SRSG on 
Business and Human Rights Report, supra note 285 at 17; DFAIT Canada, supra note 476; 2006 FAFO 
Report, supra note 78 at 10.   
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Section 4.  Torture 
 
In a third scenario that provides an exception to the territorial jurisdiction principle 
of section 6 of the Criminal Code, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that, 
pursuant to section 7 of the Criminal Code, torture and other determined crimes are deemed 
to have been committed in Canada, if, “inter alia, the person who committed it is a 
Canadian citizen or normally resides in Canada, it was committed on an aircraft registered 
in Canada or it was committed against a Canadian citizen”.842 
 
Importantly, through the application of national and international law for liability 
for international crimes, as well as historical and public accounts, it is no longer possible 
for a corporation to shield itself against legal exposure on the activities it carries out in high 
legal and security-risk territories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
842  R. v. Hape, supra note 795 at para. 66. 
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Conclusion 
 
Canadian corporations’ increasing presence and operations on foreign territories is 
part of the inescapable phenomenon of international globalization.  As a corollary of 
overseas investments and growth of enterprises across the world, the international 
community has reacted to the absence of rules governing actions of a new legal personality, 
the MNC.  Canada has been a part of this global movement to elaborate the concept of 
CSR.  Its participation in the conceptualization and development of CSR shows that the 
Government supports sound corporate governance and corporations’ respect of the rule of 
law.   
 
In addition to measures taken on a national level, Canada has joined various 
multilateral initiatives to promote responsibility of Canadian corporations for human rights 
and international crimes.  This includes, for example, discussions to provide a regulatory 
basis for extraterritorial accountability of legal persons under the Draft Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations, prepared by the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations 
(UNCTC), set up in 1974.843   Canada has also ratified the Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, which holds legal persons liable for criminal offences that constitute or are 
related to the act of corruption;844 it participates in the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme, a joint governments, industry and civil society initiative to stem the flow of 
                                                 
843  Peter Muchlinski, “Attempts to Extend the Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Role of 
UNCTAD” in Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi, supra note 42, 97 at 99 (the Commission was originally named 
the UN Commission on Multinational Corporations and a UN Centre on Multinational corporations). 
See United Nations Draft International Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. 
E/C. 10/1984/S/5 (1984), 23 I.L.M. 626 (1984) and Proposed text of the draft code of conduct on 
transnational corporations, last version: UN Doc. E/1990/94 of 12 June 1990;  See also Carolin F. 
Hillemanns, “UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”, (2003) 10 German Law Journal, Vol. 4, 1065 at 1066, n. 4.  
844  27 January 1999, CETS No. 173 (Strasbourg, Council of Europe, entered into force 1 July 2002), art.  
18, online: Council of Europe 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=173&CL=ENG> (accessed 29 
April 2010).  See also Clapham, supra 100 at 175-176.  
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diamonds extracted under circumstances of armed conflict;845 and officially supports and 
contributes to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), created to establish a 
degree of revenue transparency in sums companies pay to host governments.846 
 
Moreover, as a member of the OECD, Canada complies with a number of 
recommendations under the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises,847 a set of 
voluntary principles and standards for responsible conduct of MNC’s, last revised in 2000.   
 
 Finally, the membership of the United Nations Global Compact (GC), which 
became operational in 2000, includes some 7,700 corporate participants and stakeholders 
from over 130 countries, including Canada.848 The GC promotes UN principles in the areas 
of human rights, labour standards, environmental protection and, since 2004, anti-
corruption.849 This is nevertheless a voluntary initiative with no binding effects.    
 
The GC is complementary to the Draft Norms on Responsibilities of TNC’s and 
Other..850  The latter provide, in the fourth paragraph of their preamble, that “transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, their officers, and their workers are further 
obligated to respect generally recognized responsibilities and norms in United Nations 
treaties and other international instruments”.851  They thereafter enumerates a long list of 
                                                 
845  Information on the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is available at online: Kimberley Process 
<http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/> (accessed 29 April 2010).  See 2007 SRSG on Business and 
Human Rights Report, supra note 285 at 22-23.  
846 Information on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is available at online: EITI 
<http://www.eitransparency.org> (accessed 29 April 2010).  See 2007 SRSG on Business and Human 
Rights Report, ibid.  In 2007, Canada announced its support for this initiative, including a contribution of 
$1,150,000 to the EITI Trust Fund over the next four years. Advisory Group Report, supra note 4 at vi, 
xiv. 
847 OECD Guidelines, supra note 5.  
848  Information on the United Nations Global Compact is available at online: Global Compact 
<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html> (accessed 16 April 2010).  
849  John Gerard Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda”, Working Paper 
No. 31, Corporate Responsibility Initiative (Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of government, 
Harvard University, 2007) at 2.   
850  Draft Norms on Responsibilities of TNC’s and Other, ibid. See also Ruggie, ibid.    
851  Ruggie, ibid. 
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such instruments, among which there is a reference to the Rome Statute.  This would be a 
formal recognition that MNCs are prohibited from committing international crimes. 
 
The SRSG on Business and Human Rights’s nevertheless observes that there exist 
potential difficulties in adopting the draft norms.  In particular, he expresses that “[t]he 
business and human rights agenda remains hampered because it has not yet been framed in 
a way that fully reflects the complexities and dynamics of globalization and provides 
governments and other social actors with effective guidance.”852  In particular, the draft 
Norms have not yet gained international recognition. Indeed, on the one hand, the text of 
2003 was praised by the main international human rights NGOs and the Sub-Commission 
as the “first non-voluntary initiative [in the area of business and human rights] accepted at 
the international level”.853  This optimism was not shared by the business community, 
including the International Chamber of Commerce and the International Organization of 
Employers, which were firmly opposed to it.854   
 
International efforts to promote CSR on the level of soft law and conventions with 
restricted membership must therefore be accompanied by enforcement of corporate 
accountability within national legal systems to have a true impact on corporate operations 
and concrete progression in this field.  In this regard, the recognition of domestic courts’ 
jurisdiction over international crimes is important to address the current impunity of 
corporations’ activities with regards to their involvement in international crimes across the 
world.  As it has been demonstrated in this thesis, international tribunals currently do not 
have jurisdiction to judge the accountability of corporations for the commission of 
international crimes.   
                                                 
852  Ibid at 5.  
853  David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”, (2003) 97 AJIL 901 at 903, cited in ibid at 
31 (Weissbrodt and Kruger are described by Ruggie as “the principal authors” of the Draft Norms on 
Responsibilities of TNC’s and Other). 
854  Ruggie, ibid. at 3. 
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This thesis has shown however that precedents of the military tribunals after the 
Second World War on concerted action, including common plans, joint criminal enterprises 
and complicity in committing international crimes have been re-integrated and further 
developed in the jurisprudence and statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC.   
 
Furthermore, the principle of complementarity of the Rome Statute confers a 
binding nature and implementation of international criminal law within the national 
jurisdictions of States Parties to the ICC.   States that recognize liability of corporations for 
indictable offences are henceforth compelled to take all necessary measures to ensure 
corporate accountability for international crimes. 
 
Responsibility of corporations for international crimes in Canada is recognized 
through a combined reading of sections 2 and 22.2 of the Criminal Code and CAHWCA, as 
well as customary international law.  In addition to this, Canada benefits from an excellent 
reputation among nations for having contributed to the development of international 
criminal law, having participated as a leading party in the negotiations for the establishment 
of an International Criminal Court and with many of its legal experts serving abroad within 
the international tribunals.855 
 
On the other hand, despite its important role and leadership on the international 
scene, Canada has shown some reluctance in the application of international criminal law 
within its own territory.  In the past two decades, it has favoured a political strategy of 
refusing immigration or refugee requests or resorting to deportation, denaturalization or 
extradition orders for presumed authors of international crimes, as was shown in this thesis 
through the examples of the Finta and Mugesera cases.856  The recent Munyaneza case 
however has shown some progress under the new provisions of CAHWCA to apply a 
                                                 
855   Dumont, supra note 472 at 189.  In fact, the Honourable Philip Kirsch, a Canadian jurist was judge of 
the ICC from 2003 to 2009 and was the ICC’s first president.   
856  Dumont, ibid. at 198. 
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limited universal jurisdiction to judge accused perpetrators of international crimes before 
Canadian courts. 
 
 With the growing publicity surrounding notorious allegations of Canadian 
corporations’ participation in international crimes, SCFAIT responded to recommendations 
of its Sub-Committee on the issue of accountability of Canadian corporations in 2005.857  In 
its response, it recognized corporate responsibility for international crimes, and indicated 
the possibility of extraterritorial grounds of jurisdiction in Canada, which include a 
substantial link between the crime and the adjudicating forum, as well as for the three “core 
crimes” in CAHWCA or other crimes of universal jurisdiction.  This view was supported 
by the Advisory Group of the national roundtables report,858 the March 2009 response of 
the Canadian Government to the Advisory Group report entitled Building the Canadian 
Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian 
International Extractive Sector,859 the 2007 Human Rights Council report drafted by the 
SRSG on Business and Human Rights860 as well as a 2005 study conducted by the 
Norwegian organization FAFO, sponsored by the Government of Canada.861 
 
This legal analysis remains theoretical at the time of writing, since, until this date, 
no corporation has ever been prosecuted for an international crime before a Canadian court.  
Notwithstanding, potential violations of international criminal law by Canadian 
corporations continue to face legal and public scrutiny in recent years.  Causes for 
prosecution may therefore eventually break the barriers and attain the realms of criminal 
justice. In such cases, amendments to the Criminal Code in 2003 include an elaborate list of 
sentences specifically applicable to corporations, including fines under sub-section 735 (1) 
                                                 
857  Advisory Group Report, supra note 4 at 8. 
858  Ibid. at 44.  
859  DFAIT, supra note 476.  
860  2007 SRSG on Business and Human Rights Report, supra note 285 at 17. 
861  FAFO, supra note 78 at 10.     
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and probationary orders under sub-section 732.1 (3.1) of the Criminal Code as studied in 
Part II, Chapter 4. 
 
In conclusion, through international solidarity efforts, soft law and binding 
instruments are currently being developed to increase the range of situations through which 
corporations may improve their conduct and/or be held accountable for violations of 
international criminal law.  Furthermore, it is now recognized by various sources that 
although corporations cannot be prosecuted for the commission of international crimes 
before the ICC or the other international tribunals, in many countries, including Canada, 
their actions may be denounced and judged before a national domestic court on the basis of 
both national criminal law and universal jurisdiction.   
 
Moreover, international law recognizes that the ICJ’s jurisdiction over States 
extends to violations of international criminal law for the acts of its organs, including 
corporations.  Public allegations and foreign proceedings taken against Canadian 
corporations for their participation in international crimes may therefore encourage Canada 
to consider prosecution of its corporations under its national legislation and jurisdiction.  
Indeed, the Security Council Panel of Experts affirms that “Governments of the countries 
where the individuals, companies and financial institutions that are systematically and 
actively involved in these activities are based should assume their share of the 
responsibility. (...) Governments with jurisdiction over these enterprises are complicit 
themselves when they do not take remedial measures”.862 
 
The qualification of the State as a concerned actor of corporate violations of 
international crimes, even beyond the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, may, in fact 
become a key motivational factor that will lead the Canadian government to consider future 
prosecutions under CAHWCA and corporate criminal responsibility legislation in Canada. 
                                                 
862  Final Report of the UN Panel of Experts 2002, supra note 481 at 31. 
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